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Abstract
A Hybrid Framework for the Systematic Detection of Software Security
Vulnerabilities in Source Code
Aiman Hanna, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2012
In this thesis, we address the problem of detecting vulnerabilities in software where the
source code is available, such as free-and-open-source software. In this, we rely on the
use of security testing. Either static or dynamic analysis can be used for security testing
approaches, yet both analyses have their advantages and drawbacks. In fact, while these
analyses are different, they are complementary to each other in many ways. Consequently,
approaches that would combine these analyses have the potential of becoming very ad-
vantageous to security testing and vulnerability detection. This has motivated the work
presented in this thesis.
For the purpose of security testing, security analysts need to specify the security prop-
erties that they wish to test software against for security violations. Accordingly, we ﬁrstly
propose a security model called Team Edit Automata (TEA), which extends security au-
tomata. Using TEA, security analysts are capable of precisely specifying the security prop-
erties under concerns. Since various code instrumentations are needed at different program
iii
points for the purpose of proﬁling the software behavior at run-time, we secondly propose a
code instrumentation proﬁler. Furthermore, we provide an extension to the GCC compiler
to enable such instrumentations. The proﬁler is based on the pointcut model of Aspect-
Oriented Programming (AOP) languages and accordingly it is capable of providing a large
set of instrumentation capabilities to the analysts. We particularly explore the capabilities
and the current limitations of AOP languages as tools for security testing code instrumenta-
tion, and propose extensions to these languages to allow them to be used for such purposes.
Thirdly, we explore the potential of static analysis for vulnerability detection and illustrate
its applicability and limitations. Fourthly, we propose a framework that reduces security
vulnerability detection to a reachability problem. The framework combines three main
techniques: static analysis, program slicing, and reachability analysis. This framework
mainly targets software applications that are generally categorized as being safety/security
critical, and are of relatively small sizes, such as embedded software. Finally, we propose
a more comprehensive security testing and test-data generation framework that provides
further advantages over the proposed reachability model. This framework combines the
power of static and dynamic analyses, and is used to generate concrete data, with which
the existence of a vulnerability is proven beyond doubt, hence mitigating major drawbacks
of static analysis, namely false positives. We also illustrate the feasibility of the elaborated
frameworks by developing case studies for test-data generation and vulnerability detection
on various-size software.
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In this chapter, we explain the motivations behind the research work presented in this thesis,
as well as our objectives, approaches, and contributions. Section 1.1 provides a brief back-
ground of the main different methodologies for securing software. Section 1.2 provides a
brief introduction to Free-and-Open-Source-Software (FOSS). Section 1.3 highlights the
motivations and the scope of the problem addressed in this thesis. Section 1.4 details the
objective of our research work. Section 1.5 highlights the contributions of our work, to-
gether with references to the various publications resulted from this research work. Finally,
Section 1.6 highlights the structure and organization of this thesis.
1.1 Software Security Methodologies
The past few years have witnessed an exponential growth of software utilization. The
movement from strictly single-function hardware, not long ago, to a hardware that can
behave in dramatically different ways through the use of software is rather apparent and
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indeed enjoyed by many of us. Today, software represents in one way or another a major
part of most, if not all, human beings lives. It is quite difﬁcult to imagine any major industry
today that does not take advantage of software. Whether it is medical imaging, online-
shopping, banking, education, cellular networking, satellite communications, etc., software
has managed to manifest itself into such industries. In fact, software turn to represent a
rather signiﬁcant component of many of such industries.
Yet, the increased utilization of software in the past decades has not been met with an
equivalent, or even relative, growth of concerns in relation to software security. As a matter
of reality, software attacks still make ﬁrst-page news headlines around the world. As an
example, on February 5, 2010, BBC News reported that Microsoft is to patch a 17-year-old
vulnerability. The vulnerability dates back from the DOS operating system and has then
been carried over into almost every version of Windows that has appeared since [15]. In
fact, as concurrently reported by BBC, Microsoft was to tackle a further 25 loopholes in
Windows at the same time, ﬁve of which are rated as “critical”, and that this update is not
even the largest that Microsoft has ever released. On October 2009, Microsoft has tackled
a total of 34 vulnerabilities, where 8 of those were rated as critical, the highest level [15].
Such security vulnerabilities and their consequent attacks represent a major challenge to
the software industry, where end-users expect security to be delivered out of the box. Yet,
most programs are not written by security analysts, and in many cases are not even designed
with security in mind.
The vitality of the problem at hand has resulted in various security research efforts being
conducted in academic, corporate and governmental organizations. The most prominent
proposals could be classiﬁed as: security engineering, security hardening, and security
2
testing.
Security engineering [11] attempts to consider security at the early stages of the soft-
ware development cycle. Although this approach, if followed, may indeed lead to more
secure software, its applicability in reality is questionable. Software developers often face
strict deadlines due to various market pressures, and hence they usually strive to produce
working software without much regard of other aspects, including security. Another prob-
lem with the security engineering approach is that a great deal of software has already been
developed and deployed. In these cases re-engineering is needed and could still be possible.
However, there is an attached cost to re-engineering that cannot be overlooked. In fact the
cost estimates of re-engineering a system are often compared to the cost of replacing or re-
developing that system [146]. Such cost may turn the re-engineering approach unattractive
in many cases.
Security hardening [115] is an attractive approach where hardened security routines
can be injected into existing code to produce more secure software. However, security
hardening requires the work to be done by a developer or by a personnel with sufﬁcient
programming and security background. Additionally, in order to harden software, the en-
gineer must ﬁrst know where the faults are, and so inject the hardening routines at the
appropriate locations. In general, we view security hardening research as a very interesting
subject that particularly complements software security testing.
While security engineering and security hardening are relatively precise to deﬁne, secu-
rity testing is a much broader ﬁeld. Security testing taxonomy encompasses various ﬁelds
such as security code inspection, vulnerability scanning, security auditing, penetration test-
ing, and others.
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Various research efforts have targeted security testing in the past few years. The scope
of concern and detection capabilities of the proposed approaches differ. For instance, some
of the approaches involve a reasonable amount of manual intervention either by developers
or by code-reviewers to reveal vulnerable code segments in the software. However, this is
usually quite difﬁcult to apply, especially for large-size software, which limits the applica-
bility of such approaches. Other proposals have compiled common errors and vulnerabil-
ities in code production languages such as C/C++. The intent is to make aware software
developers of what, and what not, to do when writing software. While such proposals are
good and could result in better code being written, developers are not bound to follow such
guidelines. Consequently, developers often discard such guidelines either fully or partially.
Validating the software against such guidelines is possible but also time-consuming, which
limits its applicability in reality.
Research efforts, such as [28, 63], have proposed more comprehensive approaches.
However, these approaches have speciﬁc testing focus. This, along with the underlying
methodologies of these approaches, have direct impact on their detection capabilities and
limitations, as we explain in Chapter 2.
1.2 Free-and-Open-Source-Software (FOSS)
Free-and-Open-Source-Software (FOSS) is software that is liberally licensed to grant the
right to users/developers to access the software and use/modify it in any way they wish
to. While commercial software has initially dominated the software market, the past few
4
years have witnessed a vast shift towards the dependence on free-and-open-source soft-
ware. The high cost of commercial software, including multiple after-purchase costs, such
as upgrades and support contracts, and its closed-source code nature are among the causes
of such shift. In contrast, open-source software provides software developers with a great
ﬂexibility by permitting reading, changing, enhancing and maintaining the source code.
Today, the utilization of open-source software is on the rise, by both individuals and orga-
nizations. For example, in 2002, a research ﬁnanced by the European Commission under
the Information Society Technologies (IST) Thematic Programme, showed that 395 out
of 1452 (about 27%) large-size organizations in Germany, Sweden, and the UK were in-
deed using, or planning to use within one year, some sort of open-source software [17].
A Netcraft’s survey [121] published in April 2007 polled all the websites they could ﬁnd
(totaling 113, 658, 468 sites), and found that Apache had 58.86% of the web servers mar-
ket, while Microsoft had 31.13% [160]. In 2006, an IBM-sponsored study [19] suggested
that GNU/Linux has “won the server war” as 83% were using GNU/Linux to deploy new
systems.
1.3 Motivations and Problem Statement
The problem being addressed in this thesis can precisely be described as the detection of
security vulnerabilities, by security testing, in free-and-open-source software, or generally
in software where source code is accessible. In this context, we examine multiple major
issues related to this problem, including the detection methodology, the precise capture
of security requirements, and the detection techniques. Consequently, matters such as the
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speciﬁcation of security properties, code instrumentation and test-data generation are ex-
plored. Moreover, a special care is dedicated to the level of automation, detection power,
reduction of false-positive reporting, and others.
Various reasons compose the rationale behind our choice to address this particular prob-
lem. Firstly, software security problems are very much a matter of our day-to-day reality.
Some of these problems are severe enough to make ﬁrst-page news headlines. A Secunia
report [58], in the ﬁrst quarter in 2010, has shown that the number of reported software
vulnerabilities has not declined in spite of all efforts in the past few years to lessen the
software security problem. As a matter of fact, the number of reported vulnerabilities in
2009 has roughly increased by nearly 20% in comparison to 2005 [58].
Secondly, problems arising from security vulnerabilities have an overwhelming ﬁnan-
cial impact that can be greatly alleviated through security software testing. It was esti-
mated that software failures currently cost the US economy alone about $60 billion every
year [31], and that improvements in software testing infrastructure might save one-third of
this cost.
Thirdly, an attractive solution to the vulnerable software problem would be to test the
software before deploying it, so that it carries no, or even less, security vulnerabilities.
While such solution seems ideal, we understand the reasons behind the lack of its applica-
bility today, as manual intervention is required. Actually, security testing is a non-trivial
process. Conventional testing, as proposed in many software engineering books and guide-
lines, is often both time-consuming and ﬁnancially costly. For instance, in order to increase
the chances that a software unit is error-free, full-path coverage may be required using unit
testing. However this is usually expensive in terms of time and hence cost. Consequently
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unit testing is either poorly conducted or simply discarded altogether. Hence, automation
of the testing process is rather crucial.
Fourthly, we realize that having access to the source code of a software can be a great
asset to lessen security problems. Realistically, source code is not always accessible. In-
stances of such include commercial software, and software where the source code is lost
or is unavailable for different reasons such as licensing issues. However, in other cases,
such as free-and-open-source software, the source code is accessible. In such cases, it is
possible to conduct security testing over the source code to enhance software security.
Additionally, with the increase in utilization of FOSS today, as well as its more suscep-
tibility to attacks, since the source code is available to attackers as well, efforts in relation
to detecting vulnerabilities in FOSS would be very advantageous to the ﬁeld of software
security.
Finally, another important point is that further work is still needed today in relation to
security. While various research efforts have indeed targeted different security problems,
the focuses of such works differ from our focus, as we detail in Chapter 2. Consequently,
contributions that address the problem targeted in this thesis are needed.
The above reasons/facts have strongly driven us to conclude that contributions to solve
the aforementioned problem are quite signiﬁcant to the software security ﬁeld today, and it
is worthwhile spending efforts to contribute to solving it.
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1.4 Objectives
The primary intent of this thesis is to elaborate a methodology and a framework for the
automation of source-code (particularly FOSS) security testing. More speciﬁcally, our
objectives are to:
• Assess the available approaches for software security testing, identify their strength-
s/shortcomings and extend their relevant methodologies to build a framework for
systematic security testing.
• Deﬁne an expressive language for the speciﬁcation of both high-level and low-level
security properties.
• Deﬁne a practical and efﬁcient framework for code instrumentation. Additionally,
leverage the aspect-oriented programming paradigm to deﬁne security-dedicated prim-
itives that enable expressive instrumentation.
• Elaborate efﬁcient techniques for test-data generation.
• Design and implement a software environment for automating security testing and
hence vulnerability detection, together with demonstrating case studies.
1.5 Contributions
This section highlights the contributions of the research work presented in this thesis, to-
gether with references to the different publications that resulted from this work.
The contributions can be summarized as follows:
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• Deﬁning an expressive speciﬁcation language for both high-level and low-level se-
curity properties [70, 162];
• Leveraging the aspect-oriented programming paradigm to deﬁne security-dedicated
primitives for expressive security instrumentation [16];
• Proposing and designing a novel code instrumentation approach based on compiler-
assisted and AOP pointcut model. Additionally, extending the GCC compiler for
code instrumentation [70, 71, 162];
• Proposing and designing a reachability analysis static-based approaches and frame-
work for vulnerability detection and test-data generation [9, 129];
• Proposing and designing a generic hybrid dynamic-static approaches and framework
for automating security testing and test-data generation [71, 98, 129].
The following sections describe the research issues and results that are addressed and
achieved in this thesis.
1.5.1 Security Model - Team Edit Automata
In order to test software against particular security properties, analysts ﬁrst need to accu-
rately specify such properties. One of the main contributions of this work is designing a
language with which security analysts are capable of specifying the security properties that
they wish to test the software against. The language is designed with speciﬁc factors in
mind, such as the capability to specify a very large set of security properties, and ease of
use. The related contributions are:
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• Proposing a language that enables security analysts to accurately, yet easily, specify
the security properties in concern. Beside having some basic knowledge of automata,
security analysts do not need to have any further expertise to utilize the language.
• Elaborating a security automata model, namely Team Edit Automata (TEA), that
provides an enhancement over existing similar models. This model combines the ca-
pabilities of previous models and provides an enhancement over their expressiveness,
as we detail in Chapter 3.
• Design and implement an integrated development environment that encompasses a
graphical user interface for specifying security properties. Such interface facilitates
the speciﬁcation of the properties. Instead of requiring the analysts to provide a con-
crete code to specify the property, they only need to graphically draw the desired
automata. Our model then transforms such graphical automata into the needed con-
crete code.
• Provide a suite of speciﬁcations for common security properties. With such suite, the
analysts do not need to specify the automata targeting these known properties; rather
just use the provided ones as long as the veriﬁed property is application independent.
If the property to verify is application-dependent then the analyst has to specify it.
This suite can further be extended by the analysts.
1.5.2 Code Instrumentation Unit
In order to achieve various functionalities at both static and dynamic stages, there is a need
to instrument various code segments at different program units. For instance, in order to
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collect behavioral information of the program at runtime, proﬁling code segments are to
be injected at speciﬁc locations. For the purpose of achieving automation, there is a need
to suppress and substitute particular method calls. The primary contribution of this work
is the design and implementation of a code instrumentation API that enables such needed
instrumentations to take place. This code instrumenter is used to inject monitoring code at
speciﬁc locations in the program depending on what to be achieved. This unit is particularly
crucial to the dynamic analysis functions of our model, where proﬁling information is
needed for different purposes such as vulnerability detection and test-data generation. The
related contributions are as follows:
• Design a code instrumentation unit that enables the injection of proﬁling/monitoring
code at various desired points in a source code.
• Elaborate on needed extensions to AOP, which would enable the language to be much
more usable and appropriate for security testing.
• Incorporate the code instrumentation capabilities of compilers with the AOP pointcut
model to provide an effective code instrumentation technique.
• Provide a compiler that allows the needed code instrumentations; in speciﬁc, extend
the GCC compiler for such purpose.
1.5.3 Automatic Test-Data Generation
For the purpose of proving that a speciﬁc vulnerability indeed exists in a software, it is nec-
essary to generate test-data, with which program execution would lead to this vulnerability
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being exploited. The primary contribution of this work is a test-data generator, with which
a suspected existence of a vulnerability can be proven beyond doubt; that is eliminating
false-positive reports. This generator aims at generating test-data that would exploit a tar-
geted vulnerability. The generator differs from other known data generators in its novel
nature, as being goal-path oriented. The generated data would result in speciﬁc program
points being reached through the execution of speciﬁc paths. The related contributions are
as follows:
• Elaborate an approach that enables automatic generation of test-data.
• Demonstrate the applicability of mere dependence on static analysis for test-data
generation.
• Propose a hybrid dynamic-static analysis approach for test-data generation.
• Elaborate a security vulnerability detection model for automating security testing.
• Analyze the proposed approaches and methodologies against the detection of security
vulnerabilities with real-life security testing case studies.
1.6 Thesis Organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the current
literature on the subjects that are related to the problems addressed in this thesis, together
with the most relevant research proposals. In Chapter 3, we present a language with which
security analysts are capable of specifying the security properties. In Chapter 4, we present
our approach to code instrumentation. In Chapter 5, we present our mere static-analysis
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based approach to test-data generation. In Chapter 6, we illustrate our generic hybrid
static-dynamic approach to test-data generation. In Chapter 7, we provide the details of
the conducted experiments over our models, together with supportive results. Concluding




In this chapter, we present an overview of the current literature on the subjects that are re-
lated to the research problems addressed in this thesis. In this context, we initially present
a general view of software security, and differ it from other ﬁelds of IT security. We high-
light the main different approaches to securing software, and underline their advantages
and limitations. A background on two major subjects, code instrumentation and test-data
generations, is then presented. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section
2.1, we present a general overview of information and computer security. Section 2.2 pro-
vides a particular classiﬁcation of software vulnerabilities, as being low-level or high-level
vulnerabilities. Section 2.3 provides a background of software testing. Section 2.4 provides
a background of software security testing techniques and detections. Section 2.5 provides
a background of code instrumentation. Section 2.6.1 provides a background of test-data
generation. Finally, in Section 2.7, we provide concluding remarks about what is covered
in this chapter.
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2.1 Information, Application and Software Security
With the exponential increase of software utilization in the past few years, security has be-
come a critical concern. However, in this context, the term security actually implies a large
spectrum of ﬁelds. While these ﬁelds are actually interrelated, they are distinct.
According to Title 44 of the United States Code [155], the term information security refers
to the subject of protecting information and information system from unauthorized access,
use, disclosure, disruption, modiﬁcation, or destruction in order to provide integrity, con-
ﬁdentiality and availability. It is hence clear that the term is not restricted to computer
security since it applies to other ﬁelds, such as printed data. Further, computer security
may very well focus on other aspects, such as ensuring the availability of a computer sys-
tem without any regard to the correctness or the availability of the information stored/used
by the computer. Consequently, the approaches and methodologies used to provide security
for each of these ﬁelds differ.
On another hand, application security encompasses the use of software, hardware, and
procedures to protect applications from various threats. Generally, it refers to the matter
of how a software application should generally behave, so that it complies with a deﬁned
security policy. In theory, in order to implement a secure application, all needed measures
must be considered during the development life-cycle of the application, so that the im-
plemented application is secure. While in many cases very strict measures are actually
put in place during the development of the application, it is almost often that the deployed
application may carry various vulnerabilities. There are many reasons behind this reality
including market pressures to produce a functional software within a bounded amount of
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time and the fact that many parts of the applications are usually written by software engi-
neers who are not security specialists. Nonetheless, it is clear that software security is just
a particular ﬁled of application security, which is not limited only to software. Problems
related to software security are mainly driven by coding defects that result in the software
becoming vulnerable to attacks. However, in the context of this thesis, we tend to follow a
more precise deﬁnition of an insecure/vulnerable software, as follows: A software is vul-
nerable if its behavior violates a given security property. This deﬁnition provides the scope
and focus of software security considered in this research. In the following sections, we
provide a classiﬁcation of software vulnerabilities and highlight the major methodologies
for securing software.
2.2 Low-Level and High-Level Security Vulnerabilities
In computer security, the word vulnerability refers to a weakness in a system, with which,
if exploited, an attacker may become capable of violating one or more security properties
of the system, such as conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability. In general, a vulnerability
may be viewed as an entity that exists only in theory, until the moment when it is exploited.
It can also be viewed as an entity that has a signiﬁcant interest to attackers, especially when
the program containing it operates with special privileges, such as providing access to
user/ﬁrm data or other resources, such as network servers. The source of vulnerability may
vary, although often it is initiated by a programmer’s carelessness. For example, a speciﬁc
vulnerability may be initiated during design phases. Such design ﬂaw may naturally result
in the vulnerability being propagated through the ﬁnal implementation of the software.
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There are many ways to categorize vulnerabilities. For example, we can view vul-
nerabilities based on their causes. For instance, some vulnerabilities are caused by user
inputs. A PHP/HTML/JavaScript web page, for example, that allows a user to enter data,
to perform search queries, may allow an attacker to corrupt the site’s data and permanently
damages the behavior of this page. This can be done by the attacker entering simple HTML
controls, such as “< script >”, as input. SQL Injection is another example of such cases,
where the user’s input leads to improper or unauthorized execution of SQL statements.
Some other vulnerabilities are caused by programmer’s failure to check the size of a data
buffer, hence leading to an overﬂow. Consequently, this may cause corruption of some
memory areas including the stack and the heap and allows the system to execute code
provided by the attackers.
It should be noted that there is a very thin line between the two causes just described.
For example, it is reasonably valid to also blame the programmer for failing to validate
and correct the user’s input in the ﬁrst example; for instance by mapping the input through
some functions such as htmlentities, addslashes, etc.
We here follow a particular classiﬁcation of security vulnerabilities, which is according
to the security properties they violate. Security properties can also be categorized as high-
level security, or low-level security. We further refer to the former as security properties
and to the latter as safety properties.
High-Level Security
There are mainly three high-level security properties, namely integrity, conﬁdentiality, and
availability. We here overview these properties, and then highlight some of the techniques
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and mechanisms needed to enforce these properties.
Integrity: Integrity is the process of ensuring that information will not be accidently
or maliciously altered or destroyed. Often, information go through various processing
operations, such as transferring, storing, forwarding, and retrieval. Data integrity is the
process of ensuring that no unauthorized or accidental alteration has been applied to it
during processing.
Conﬁdentiality: Information conﬁdentiality is the process of ensuring that there is no
leak of information to unauthorized parties. Since data conﬁdentiality represents one of
the most signiﬁcant concerns today in relation to information security, a stricter deﬁnition
of it, following the military Need-to-Know principle [3] may be more appropriate. Simply
put, information that is considered to be conﬁdential in nature must only be accessed, used,
copied, or disclosed by entities who have been authorized to access, use, copy, or disclose
the information. Moreover, this can only be done when there is a genuine need to access,
use, copy or disclose the information.
Availability: Data availability is the process of ensuring that data, resources to access
this data, as well as security controls over this data and the recourses, are all available and
functioning as expected when access to this data is required. The unavailability of any of
these is best known as Denial of Service (DoS).
In order to ensure these high-level security properties, some techniques and mecha-
nisms are needed. Below, we provide examples of such mechanisms.
Authentication: In software, authentication is the process of determining whether a
user/process is, in fact, who or what it is declared to be. Today, the most common method
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for authentication, in both private and public networks, is through the use of users’ identi-
ﬁcations and passwords. Providing the correct password is assumed to guarantee that the
user is authentic. This method however is too weak, especially for transactions that are
highly sensitive, such as military or ﬁnancial transactions. Passwords can often be stolen,
guessed, or accidentally revealed. For example, it is not difﬁcult to mimic the look of a
ﬁnancial institution webpage, and redirect users to it instead of to the appropriate site for
the purpose of collecting users’ passwords. The redirection can also be done easily. For
instance, many users keep the web addresses of their ﬁnancial institutions as a favorite link
in their browsers. An attacking process can easily manipulate the Uniform Resource Lo-
cators (URLs) behind these favorite links. Further use of these favorite links would then
redirect the user to the attacker’s site instead. Another serious issue with passwords, which
is often totally overlooked, is that although passwords are indeed secrets that are chosen by
the appropriate person/entity, they are ﬁnally stored in databases, which can be accessed by
others. This, in fact, has motivated the creation of more stringent authentication schemes,
such as digital signatures.
Privilege Escalation: Privilege escalation is the act of wrongly allowing an entity (user,
process, etc.) to gain access to resources, which normally would have been protected from
this entity. In other words, that is allowing an entity to execute actions with a higher secu-
rity context than what it is supposed to. Privilege escalation often occurs as a result of a
bug exploitation, or when an application with high privileges has ﬂawed assumptions about
how it will be used. For example, a high-privilege application may assume that it will only
be provided with input that matches its interface speciﬁcation, and hence does not validate
the input. An attacker may then be able to exploit this assumption so that unauthorized
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code is run with the application’s privileges. For instance, in certain versions of Linux ker-
nel, such as Linux 2.6.13, it is possible to write a program that would request a core dump
be performed in case it crashes at runtime. An attacker program would simply set its cur-
rent directory to /etc/cron.d, then has itself killed by another process. Consequently,
upon the termination of the process, the core dump ﬁle is placed under /etc/cron.d,
and cron would treat this ﬁle as a text ﬁle instructing it to run programs on schedule.
Because the contents of the ﬁle is under attacker’s control, the attacker would then be able
to execute any program with root privileges [74]. Cross-zone scripting is another form of
privilege escalation attacks. The security zone concept classiﬁes websites into different
zones according to the limits of what a website should be able to do. Consequently, a web
browser would view any site as a part of one zone or another. For example, Internet Ex-
plorer 4, and later versions, divide all sites into 4 zones [112]: Local Intranet, Trusted Sites,
Restricted Sites and Internet (everything that does not belong to one of the other zones).
The ﬁrst 3 zones are usually conﬁgured as privileged zones. Cross-zone scripting attacks
sabotages the browsers security model, as a result of a browser’s bug or a conﬁguration
error, so that a web site can run malicious code on the client’s machine.
Authorization: Authorization refers to the restriction measures to resource use. In
respect to the authorization model, software entities are viewed as subjects and objects,
where subjects are the entities that can perform actions in the system and objects are the
entities on which actions are performed and possibly need to be controlled. In that context,
authorization is the process that decides whether or not a subject is allowed to access an
object.
Non-Repudiation: The term non-repudiation is possibly more traditionally common
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in the legal system than in information technology. The deﬁnition of the term in both
ﬁelds is the assurance that contract terms will be carried by the parties involved and that
the identity of these parties is validated/assured to be the correct identities. In information
technology, non-repudiation can alternatively be deﬁned as the impossibility for one of the
entities involved in a communication denying having participated in all or part of the com-
munication. For example, if a sender and a receiver agreed to send and receive information
respectively, then the transmission and receiving of information must be carried. Hence, a
non-repudiation of transmission proves that the data has been sent and a non-repudiation
of receiving proves that the data has been received. It is clear however that means of repu-
diation in the legal system signiﬁcantly differ from those in information technology.
It should be clearly noted that the above-mentioned mechanisms for enuring high-level
properties are not inclusive. Other important mechanisms include atomicity, fairness, certi-
ﬁcation, secrecy, and revocation. Additionally, various signiﬁcant security mechanisms and
technologies exist for the purpose of achieving some of these security properties. For in-
stance, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Rijndael Algorithm [44], the Rivest-
Shamir-Adleman (RSA) Algorithm for encryption [133], Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
for veriﬁcation [156], the Clipper Chip and Skipjack Algorithm for encryption and pri-
vacy [52], and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) for encryption of e-mails over the Internet [128],
are among such mechanisms. It should be noted that the available mechanisms may not
be sufﬁcient to achieve the full spectrum of security requirements. Moreover, some of
these mechanisms are themselves subject to attacks and possible depreciations. For in-
stance, RSA-576, RSA-640, and RSA-768 were factored on December 3, 2003, November
2, 2005, and December 12, 2009 respectively [137].
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Low-Level Security - Safety
During the past few decades various programming languages have been introduced, from
which some have gained an overwhelming popularity. There is no doubt that the successes
of these popular ones were directly related to their level of capabilities and power in produc-
ing more complex software. It might be quite reasonable to state that C, and its successor
C++, have enjoyed the very top of the popular list for quite a while. As a matter of reality
too, a massive amount of software has been, and still being, developed using them. Unfor-
tunately though, C and C++ have also led another list as being among the most vulnerable
languages in terms of security. It has been argued that the maximal performance and power
of these languages has been achieved at the cost of the security level that they provide.
The relation between low-level security and the used language is direct. Low-level
security is extremely dependent on the programming language, or in other words, on loop-
holes that a programming language would allow. However, programming languages are not
the only reason behind low-level security vulnerabilities. For example, low-level security
vulnerabilities may be caused as a result of design or implementation errors in a speciﬁc
platforms, architecture, or system software, such as operating systems. There are various
low-level security vulnerabilities. In the sequel, we list and discuss some of the major ones.
Buffer Overﬂow: Buffer overﬂow occurs as a result of allowing more information to be
stored in a bounded buffer, and above the capacity of what this buffer is capable of holding;
consequently allowing illegal access to other areas in memory. In some fortunate cases,
attempts to access illegal memory locations may just result in memory access exception and
program termination. In worst cases, a malicious user may use buffer overﬂow to breach
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system security. Unfortunately, it is often quite easy, especially with some programming
languages, for attackers to stress on this vulnerability to breach system security in one way
or another. Such attacks may result in crashing the program or making it behave in an
unintended way. For instance, the 1997 Cisco 7xx routers password overﬂow [33] is an
example of how easy, and how serious, a buffer overﬂow problem can be. In this incident,
an attacker needs only to telnet to the router, or to gain access to its console port, so
that he/she is allowed to enter a username/password. It was only sufﬁcient to crash the
router by entering a very long password, which overﬂowed the buffer allocated to read the
password. Consequently, the routers crashed, breaking the network paths and resulting in a
denial of service attack. Worst, as reported by Cisco, other possibilities did exist where the
attacker could exploit this problem to launch different attacks against the router, rather than
just crashing it [33]. By including the right data at the right place in the too-long password
string, an attacker could cause the router to hang indeﬁnitely, or to take complete control of
it, including reconﬁguring it, or modifying its functionality, theoretically in any way at all.
Although buffer overﬂow may be most known as memory-related overﬂow, we should
emphasis that the types of memory being exploited vary. We here brieﬂy describe some
of these various types of exploitation. We also discuss some of the methodologies and
techniques used to remedy them.
Heap Overﬂow: This is also known as heap-based exploitation. The heap is a memory
area that is dynamically allocated to a program at runtime, and usually contains program
data. An attacker can stress on heap overﬂow to change the content of the heap, possibly
causing the application to overwrite some of the dynamically allocated internal structures,
such as pointers and linked lists. The 2004 Microsoft JPEG vulnerability is an example of
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such overﬂow [111], where a heap overﬂow could be exploited as a result of the processing
of a JPEG image by some Microsoft software components. An attacker who could success-
fully exploit this vulnerability would gain complete control of the affected system. With
this vulnerability, the attacker just needed to persuade a user to open a specially crafted
image ﬁle, or to view a directory that contains that ﬁle; this could also be possible through
persuading the user to connect to a web page that hosts the image.
Stack Overﬂow: This is also known as stack-based exploitation. A stack, or more
accurately a call stack, is a bounded memory buffer that keeps information about active
subroutines. Stack buffer overﬂow occurs when a program writes more data to a buffer
located in the stack in excess to the capacity of that buffer. Consequently, this almost always
results in the corruption of adjacent data of the stack. An unintentional occurrence of stack
overﬂow will often result in program crash or misbehavior. On the other hand, a malicious
user can use this problem in various ways to severely harm the system. For example, by
overﬂowing the buffer in the stack, the user may be able to change a nearby value of the
stack, such as a subroutine return address, a function pointer or an exception handler code.
A change of a subroutine return address, for instance, could allow the attacker to point the
program once returned to a different address, and hence execute a different code, which is
usually provided by the attacker.
Integer Overﬂow: Many programming languages introduce various integer types, and
permit conversions between these types; either explicitly or implicitly. For examples, com-
pilers do distinguish between unsigned and signed integers, and allow various operations
on them, such as implicit casting, integer truncation, integer rounding, overﬂows and un-
derﬂows. Some of these operations, if overlooked, can turn very severe. Generally, integer
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overﬂow security issues arise either by such conversions, or as a result of their inherently
limited range [143]. These problems can be remedied however if integer operations are
replaced by safer code that performs range checking before carrying out sensitive opera-
tions [143].
File Management: File manipulations, such as creation, reading, writing or deletion,
are allowed by many programming languages. Although ﬁle manipulations are needed, a
misuse of these capabilities may result in very sever security issues, such as data corruption,
data disclosure, code injection, illegal privilege escalation, and others. For example, a
common practice is the use of temporary ﬁles to support the execution of an application.
These ﬁles are possibly created with predictable names and without prior veriﬁcations that
ﬁles with the same names do not already exist in the temporary ﬁle directory. A local
attacker may take advantage of this by creating symbolic links to the temporary ﬁles used
by the vulnerable application. When a target user runs the application, the temporary ﬁles
will be overwritten with the rights of this user. This makes it possible for the attacker to
then create or overwrite existing ﬁles in the ﬁlesystem with the elevated privileges of the
target user [144].
Memory Management: We could reasonably state that the most powerful, yet very
dangerous, operator in any programming language is the pointer operator “*” introduced by
C/C++. These languages allow a great deal of expressiveness power to programmers since
they can directly point, or attempt to point, to virtually any memory location. Although
some level of protection is provided, for example by operating systems, to prevent such
illegal access of memory, many other memory management problems are still possible,
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and usually provide attackers with a great help. Some of the very common pointer manip-
ulations might lead to memory leak, dangling pointers, double-free, use of un-initialized
memory, and use of previously freed memory. Better programming practices and proper
use of pointers might provide the best remedies to these problems. However, since this is
not a practical assumption, other solutions such as software hardening, or use of safer APIs
is needed to solve these problems.
2.3 Software Testing
With the tremendous growth of software size and complexity in the past two decades, soft-
ware testing has become a very challenging subject. Particularly, matters such automation
and detection powers have turned to be signiﬁcantly important. Various researches have
consequently taken place in order to provide an acceptable software testing approaches and
routines. Below we describe some of the initiatives that have taken place in relation to
the subject. The main reason behind our review of these research initiatives is due to the
fact that we take advantage of some of the techniques described or used in these works.
However, it must be noted that these approaches target software testing in its general form,
which are not speciﬁc to security testing and vulnerability detection. For instance, the work
described in [14] is very useful for testing under extreme cases, where the value of a state
variable is at either maximum or minimum of its sub-domain. This however does not target
security testing in particular, where vulnerabilities may occur while the state variables are
far below, or above, maxima or minima. The work described in [6] is very useful for testing
large software, since the approach is to break it into smaller units. However, the approach
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targets the detection of program faults such as crashes and assertion violations, which may
not be related at all to testing against particular security violations.
Section 2.3.1 provides a background and the related work in relation to subject of formal
methods and formal speciﬁcations. Section 2.3.2 discusses the research works in relation
to software testing techniques and automation. Section 2.3.3 provides the related work in
relation to security policy speciﬁcation. Section 2.3.4 discusses the relation between formal
veriﬁcation and testing and the related work to this subject.
2.3.1 Formal Methods and Speciﬁcations
The matter of formal speciﬁcation may not at a ﬁrst glance seem related to testing. How-
ever, this is inaccurate since the use of formal methods to specify the software functionality
and behavior at early stages tend to indeed produce higher quality software. This leads to a
reduction in cost and time in discovering and ﬁxing system misbehavior. Formal speciﬁca-
tion languages are designed to assist with the construction of systems, including software.
Below, we provide a background on the main formal speciﬁcation languages.
Speciﬁcation Languages
The main goal behind the utilization of formal languages, in relation to software, is to allow
for the writing of precise speciﬁcation of the software. Both textual and graphical notations
can be used to achieve what is needed. This speciﬁcation can additionally target both the
functional behavior of the system, as well as its non-functional aspects, such as security.
In that regard, some of the proposed speciﬁcation languages target the general aspects of
a system, while other are proposed with speciﬁc target scope in mind. We here provide a
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background on the main categories of formal speciﬁcation languages.
Finite State-Based Languages
The main idea behind ﬁnite state-based languages is the representation of system states as
states of a ﬁnite transition system; i.e. state machines. The representation of such state
machines can be done either through textual or graphical representations. Examples of
utilization of such approaches include Finite-State Machines (FSMs) by Lee et al. [39],
X-machines by Holcombe et al. [105], and Statecharts by Harel et al. [38]. Generally,
testing based on FSM-based languages is capable of naturally achieving matters such as
conformance testing. However, FSM-based testing is not limited to this. For instance, they
can be combined with other approaches to produce more powerful testing approaches. For
instance, it is possible to ﬁrst construct a model of the system, for instance using model-
checking, then drive the testing process based on these constructed models. Examples of
such approaches have been illustrated by Grieskamp et al. [158], and Farchi et al l. [46]. A
general deﬁnition of a FSM, F, can be given as follows:
〈Q,Q0, I, O, δ,DF 〉, where:
• Q is a ﬁnite set of states,
• Q0 is a ﬁnite set of initial states such that Q0 ⊆ Q,
• I is a ﬁnite set of input symbols,
• O is a ﬁnite set of output symbols,
• DF ⊆ Q0 × I is the speciﬁcation domain, and
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• δ : DF → P(Q × O) is a transition function, where P(Q × O) is the powerset of
Q×O.
Now, given a FSM F, it is possible to obtain a corresponding language L, such that
L(F) deﬁnes all the possible sequences of F starting from any possible input at the initial
state. Such sequences can then be used very effectively for testing purposes by tracing
the behavior of a system represented by such a machine. Additionally, many speciﬁcation
languages that deploy a ﬁnite state structure also incorporate additional internal data. In
such cases, transitions can represent operations that manipulate such data, possibly through
guards that allow/disallow such manipulations. These machines are referred to as Extended
Finite State Machines (EFSMs).
Model-Based Languages
Precise speciﬁcation of a system can be achieved through the construction of a model that
corresponds to the intended behavior of the system. Such a model can be described in
various ways. For instance, it is possible to describe the states of the system together with
operations that performs changes to these states. Speciﬁcations languages such as the Z
language [79, 80], the Vienna Development Method (VDM) [23] and the B Method [82]
can be used to allow for such precise speciﬁcations.
Such languages can describe arbitrarily systems with possibly inﬁnite set of states.
While this may be attractive in some cases, it is considered as a shortcoming when au-
tomation is required due to the difﬁculty to automatically reason on the potentially inﬁnite
behavior of such systems. It is worth noting that FSM-based languages do not suffer such
shortcomings.
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2.3.2 Testing Techniques and Automation
Software testing aims at uncovering faults in software. Such faults may result from early
incorrect speciﬁcations or from incorrect design or implementation. Traditionally, the soft-
ware testing process is described as a sequence of testing phases. These phases are initiated
as unit testing, where individual units are tested in isolation. This is followed by integra-
tion testing, where multiple components are combined and testing is then performed over
these components. This later process repeats until all system components are put together
and the system is them tested as a unit, which is referred to as system testing. Acceptance
testing is then conducted to ﬁnd out whether the system speciﬁcation and requirements are
met by the implemented system. While the testing process can manually be conducted in
some cases, the increased of software complexity and sizes today may turn this task as a
next to impossible one. Consequently, automation of software testing is rather crucial. The
importance of such subject has resulted in various research efforts.
While it is clear that automation is needed to efﬁciently conduct software testing today,
automation is a challenging subject that has its own obstacles. Different techniques have
been proposed to overcome different problems. Below, we provide a background on some
of the main techniques in relation to the subject.
Software Partitioning for Testing Automation
One of the main obstacles when it comes to software testing is the size of the software.
The idea of software partitioning was proposed to mitigate such problems. In [134], Hi-
erons introduced an algorithm for partitioning software based on their input domain. The
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algorithm required the software speciﬁcation to be expressed in the Z language. The gen-
erated partitions can be used for the generation of test cases as well as to produce a ﬁnite
automata model, which can be used to control the testing process. The main idea was to
rewrite the speciﬁcation to an intermediate form used to derive both partitioning of the in-
put domain and the states of a ﬁnite state automaton model. Test cases are then derived
from the partitions, while an automated system that controls the testing process is based
upon the ﬁnite automaton. In [138], Burton used user-deﬁned testing criteria, expressed
as Z speciﬁcations, to automatically generate test cases. To facilitate automation, formal
speciﬁcation of the heuristics for generating the tests was required. The speciﬁcation also
allows for desirable properties to be checked and for a comparative analysis to be carried
out between testing criteria.
In [14], Legeard et al. proposed two methods for automatic generation of tests, namely
the Test Template Framework (TTF) and the B Testing Tools (BTT). The ﬁrst requires a
speciﬁcation given in Z language and the manual generation of test cases, while the later
works over B speciﬁcation, and uses constraint logic programming techniques to generate
test sequences. The proposed methods targeted boundary testing, and avoided the construc-
tion of a complete ﬁnite state hence mitigating the state explosion problem.
In [25], Meudec proposed a language, VDM-SL, used for expressing the speciﬁcations
then for deriving efﬁcient test sets. VDM-SL extended the idea of partitioning and TTF
to work better with qualiﬁers. An interesting conclusion by Meudec pointed out that con-
straint logic programming seems promising, yet a complete automation may not be that
achievable.
In [6], Chakrabarti et al. proposed partitioning to effectively automate unit testing. The
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idea was to identify the control and data inter-dependencies between the software compo-
nents using static analysis of the program. Based on these analyses, the software is then
divided into units, where highly-related components are grouped together. These compo-
nents can then be tested in isolation using automated test-generation tools. In [141], Spacey
et al. examined the speed factor in relation to software partitioning. They demonstrated that
a faster execution can be obtained if the partitioned code segments are instantiated on more
than one location. Further, they demonstrated that the run-time of the program is not only
dependent on the frequency of calls to these segments but also on the order on which these
calls are made.
Other Testing Automation Techniques
Other techniques for testing automation have been proposed. For instance, in [109], Vaziri-
Farahani proposed a method for ﬁnding program faults based on a given property. The idea
was to generate an example that negates the property, that is violating it, hence proving
the existence of a fault. To facilitate automatic analysis, the speciﬁcations are written in
a Z-like language, called Alloy, that is strictly ﬁrst-order. The program statements are
encoded as constraints before and after states. A conjunction of the encoded constraints
with the negation of the property is then constructed. A constraint solver is then used in an
attempt to check the satisfaction of these ﬁnal constraints. Satisfaction of the constraints is
indicative of the violations to the speciﬁcations.
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Finite-State-Based Testing
Many systems can be described using state machines. That is, operations performed on
these systems affect their internal states. These state machines can consequently be very
useful when it comes to testing those systems, and how they behave under different condi-
tions. This has attracted various researches in the ﬁeld. In [153], Chow proposed a method
of testing the correctness of a control structure given that the structure can be modeled by
a ﬁnite-sate machine. The tests were derived from the design and then used to validate
whether the speciﬁcations are satisﬁed. In [103] Gaudel presented program testing based
on formal speciﬁcation. The idea was to utilize ﬁnite-state machine for testing while rely-
ing on some minimal hypotheses on the program under test. In [134], Hierons investigated
the cost of using ﬁnite-state machines for testing, considering that a known faulty sequence
is given. More speciﬁcally, their work considered the possibility of having reset transitions
in the input sequences. Such transitions would bring the implementation under test to an
initial state. They showed that it is sometimes desirable to check sequence with a minimum
number of reset transitions rather than a shortest checking sequence.
2.3.3 Security Policy Speciﬁcations
In order to test a system against a particular property, the property must be speciﬁed. Such
speciﬁcation should be made in a formal way. For example, natural languages are not suit-
able for such purpose since different interpretations can be given to a single speciﬁcation.
Various proposals were given for the purpose of formally specifying security properties.
In [72] Aktug and Naliuka presented an automata-based language, called ConSpec, for
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policy speciﬁcation. The language has the advantage of being suitable for the validation
of both system’s requirements and security-relevant behavior. Another advantage is that
it has a reasonably simple semantics. This simplicity however trades off the expressive-
ness of the language. The language hence allows for the speciﬁcation of a limited class of
policies. In [154], Erlingsson proposed a security policy speciﬁcation language, referred
to as PSlang, as part of a security enforcement toolkit called PoET. The policies of PSlang
implement security updates occurring at security-relevant actions, and deﬁne any needed
remedial actions that should be taken upon validation. The language has the advantage
of allowing security policies to be speciﬁed in a simple way. Additionally, the language
allows additional user-provided actions to be easily incorporated into the target program,
hence facilitating monitor inlining. However, this provided simplicity has the drawback
of making the speciﬁcation less formal. The language encodes security automata from
a provided text where state variables and updates represent automata states and transitions
accordingly. The language does not indicate however how his extraction is performed. This
is non-trivial since the provided updates may be given using a programming language that
allows for powerful and relatively complicated constructs. In [94, 95], Bauer et al. intro-
duced a language and a system to allow the enforcement of security policies on untrusted
Java applications. The language allowed for the composition of complex run-time secu-
rity policies. Two types of methods, categorized as query/suggest and execute suggestion,
comprise these policies. A method of the ﬁrst type is queried when the application attempts
to execute a security-sensitive action. The method returns one of six suggestions indicat-
ing how the action should be handled. These suggestions include halting the program or
inserting or suppressing some actions. Methods of the second category are then called to
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execute the updated based on the given suggestions. The work is presented in this proposal
is very useful for specifying security policies; however it focuses on Java applications in
particular. Additionally, the semantics of the language are not simple, which represents an
additional overhead for the security analysts. Furthermore, the correctness of the Polymer
policy inlining cannot be proven, as its semantics is not formally presented [72].
2.3.4 Formal Veriﬁcation and Testing
While formal veriﬁcation and testing are distinct ﬁelds, they can be quite complementary
to each other. Formal veriﬁcation, through its underlying mathematical techniques, can
provide a substantial support to software testing. There is a reasonably large spectrum
of mathematical techniques including Satisﬁability problems (SAT) solving and constraint
solving, theorem proving, constraint logic programming, and temporal-logic model check-
ing. In [73], Lynce examined the existing solvers and pointed out that newer solver are
capable of solving very large and very hard real-world problem instances. In [37], Detlefs
et al. detailed an automatic theorem prover for program checking, namely Simplify, which
combines decision procedures for various theories, and employs a matcher to reason about
quantiﬁers. Simplify matches up to equivalence in an E-graph, instead of conventional
matching in a directed acyclic graph. This allows it to detect many relevant pattern in-
stances that would be missed by the conventional approaches. In [85], Marriott et al.
provided a comprehensive introduction to the subject of constraint programming and, in
particular, constraint logic programming. In [48, 49], Clarke et al. provided an important
initiation to the ﬁeld of model checking. Using algorithmic means, model checking can
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determine whether an abstract model satisﬁes a formal speciﬁcation expressed as a tempo-
ral logic formula. If this concludes that the speciﬁcation is not satisﬁed, a counterexample
is provided, which shows the cause of the problem. Furthermore, the fact that the model-
checking process can be fully automated, they can be viewed as the most relevant of the
above approaches in relation to testing.
Model-Checking and Testing
For the purpose of testing, it is important to model systems’ requirements using tempo-
ral properties. Properties that allow only a description of current events are insufﬁcient,
since they are incapable of providing information on previous system conditions, which
may be necessary to detects violations. Model-checking uses decision procedures to ﬁnd
out whether a model satisﬁes temporal properties. These decision procedures are used to
systematically explore the system’s space [50]. In [108], Vardi et al. described an automata-
theoretic automatic veriﬁcation of concurrent ﬁnite-state programs by model-checking.
The point is that if the system model is ﬁnite, then exploration can be conducted automati-
cally using model-checking algorithms as has been iterated in [48,49]. The models used by
model-checkers can be obtained directly from the source code if available, or alternatively,
they can be constructed or built by the user. For the purpose of automation, automatic
construction from source code, if possible, is desirable. Examples of model checkers are
the Java Symbolic Analysis Laboratory (SAL) [42], that supports dynamic constructs such
as object instantiations and thread call stacks then conducts exhaustive veriﬁcation for the
detection of deadlock and assertion failures. Other tools include BLAST [36], an automatic
veriﬁcation tool for checking temporal safety properties, particularly memory safety, in C
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programs, and SPIN [60], a generic veriﬁcation system that supports the design and veri-
ﬁcation of asynchronous process systems. It is worth noting that the process of checking
temporal properties can also be applied at run-time, which is then referred to as run-time
monitoring. In [22], Artho et al. proposed a framework that provides further automation of
test-case generation, based on systematic exploration of the input domain of the program,
with run-time veriﬁcation. Using properties expressed in temporal logic, the execution
traces are monitored and veriﬁed against such properties.
There are however some important issues that need to be examined in relation to model-
checking. One of such is the problem of state-space explosion. Basically, the larger the
system grows, in terms of its components, the more chances that the number of states will
also grow. The growth may become exponential resulting in the space explosion problem.
Another main issue with model-checking is how test-data sequences can be generated. In
[59], Fraser et al. argued that model checkers suffer several drawbacks when they are used
for testing. This is due to the fact that they were not originally meant to be used for testing
and test-data generation, rather for formal veriﬁcation. They pointed out that signiﬁcant
improvements can be achieved in regards to test suite quality and performance if model
checkers are designed with software testing in mind. In [77], Callahan et al. proposed
that conformance testing can be achieved by targeting the negation of the property to be
tested. Assuming that the system has already been successfully model-checked against a
given a property P , instead of attempting to generate input sequences that satisfy P , re-
model-check the system again against the negation of P , ¬P . Since the system has already
been proven previously to satisfy P , the veriﬁcation produces input sequences that actually
violate ¬P . The reported data are hence the desired test data.
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Regardless of the original difference in scope between system veriﬁcation and testing,
a reasonable effort has been made during the past few years to allow the use of model
checkers for testing. In [135], Hierons et al. pointed out that formal speciﬁcations and test-
ing should not be viewed as rivals, and showed various ways of how formal speciﬁcations,
particularly model checking, can be used to support testing. Examples of initiatives that
combines model-checking and testing are BLAST [36], MOPED [88], a model-checker for
linear-time logic (LTL) on pushdown systems, Bandera [75], a tool for reasoning about the
correctness of requirements of Java programs, and SLAM [149]. In [150], Ball et al. indi-
cated that SLAM scaled, evolved and matured as the core engine inside Microsoft’s Static
Driver Veriﬁer (SDV) tool. The latest version of SDV that ships with Windows 7 includes
a new version of the SLAM engine. In [47], Gunter et al. illustrated how model-checking,
testing and veriﬁcation can work together for the purpose of unit testing. In speciﬁc, they
presented a symbolic model-checking approach that can either verify a single unit of code;
i.e. a procedure, or a collection of interacting procedures. The proposed approach can be
used to automate test case generation for unit testing.
It should be noted that other approaches in relation to model checking and testing have
been proposed. For instance, Peled presented in [40] various combinations of model check-
ing and testing techniques so that systems can be checked even if the model is not given,
or it is incomplete or inaccurate. In [41], Peled et al. investigated the subject of testing
property staisﬁability over implementations of unknown structures. They suggested vari-
ous algorithms to formalize the idea of black-box checking. In [8], Groce et al. investigated
the case when both the system and its model are accessible but there are inconsistent with
each other. They showed that in such cases, automatic veriﬁcation can still be possible
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through the utilization of black-box testing and machine learning.
Security Testing
Software security testing is a particular class of software testing, where the testing focus is
not on just ﬁnding faults, but rather on ﬁnding those particular faults that violates security
properties. Such violations mainly compromise systems’ security. This contrast the gen-
eral case of software testing where existing faults may not violate in any way the security
aspects of the systems.
In [68], Song et al. pointed out that according to CERT, 10 particular types of vul-
nerabilities represent the majority of software defects. They referred to these defects as
typical defects, and proposed a security testing method, where a threat tree is constructed
then traversed based on depth-ﬁrst search to generate the needed test-data. While this is
a reasonable effort, their work mainly targets low-level vulnerabilities such as memory
leaks, buffer-overﬂows and illegal string formatting. In [163], Hui et al. argued that defect-
based testing is more effective than speciﬁcation-based testing. They categorized security
errors and investigated existing common error reporting in order to create a security de-
fect taxonomy, which they correlated with most know sever errors. While such taxonomy
may be very useful for testers as they argued, the defects included in this taxonomy are
mainly safety properties, which are input validation, access validation, concurrency, error-
handling support of environment variables, and design defects. In [83], Romero-Mariona
et al. pointed out the importance of trustworthiness of software systems and indicated
that testing of security-intensive systems is proven to be complicated in many cases. They
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raised the point that if both safety and security are considered at early stages of the soft-
ware development cycle then it is more likely that the implemented software will have a
reasonable level of trustworthiness. They additionally argued that while there are tech-
niques for security speciﬁcation, there is a lack of using such requirements in a useful way
during testing. They hence proposed a security requirement engineering technique, namely
SURE. Using speciﬁc syntax, SURE is able to map security requirements into testing ar-
tifacts. While the general idea is useful, it has a limited scope since the focus is on early
speciﬁcation and requirements. On the other hand, this lacks focus on already implemented
software that is known, or suspected, to be untrustworthy. In [43], Zhang et al. presented a
trace-based security testing approach for detecting vulnerabilities in C code. The approach
is based on symbolic execution where program traces are executed, symbolically, to pro-
duce both program and security constraints. Program constraints are imposed by program
logic on the variables, while security constraints are deﬁned as conditions over these vari-
ables. Such constraints must hold true for the system to be considered secure. While the
approach may indeed be effective in some cases, it has shortcomings including the static
nature of the analysis and its lack of multi-language support since it is only usable over
C programs. In [131], Hassan et al. showed both the usefulness of formal methods in
relation to security testing, as well as the lack of elaborate formal requirements. They in-
dicated that such lack is a major reason behind the difﬁculty in reaching full automation.
They proposed a goal-oriented technique, namely FADES, that bridges the gap between the
goal-oriented semi-formal Knowledge Acquisition for autOmated Speciﬁcations (KAOS)
framework and the B formal method. Among the main issues considered by their proposal
was automating the transition from requirements to speciﬁcations, as well as automating
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the derivation of acceptance test cases suite from the requirements. These cases are needed
to verify whether the implementation corresponds to the requirements. While the proposed
approach can be useful in achieving higher automations, it suffers multiple limitations in-
cluding an increased initial cost of development, compared to informal approaches, and
the lack of requirement completeness and consistency, which may affect the overall de-
sign quality. In [66], Haralambiev et al. focused on source code analysis for the purpose
of vulnerability detection, particularly over large software. In his research, multiple tools
have been used, analyzed, and compared. While this may represent a useful contribution,
there is a need for the testers to grasp the business logic of the software being tested. This
overhead may not be acceptable in many cases. Further, the proposed approach is heavily
based on static analysis, which limits the general capabilities of such an approach. In [27],
Yan and Dan proposed an approach to security testing based on what they referred to as a
privilege scenario. Their approach is mainly based on model checking, which is actually
used to construct these privilege scenarios. It takes these scenarios as input then provides
test cases out of them. The privilege scenarios are provided as automata written in SMV
language, which is expected by the NuSMV [7] symbolic model checker. Although their
approach beneﬁts from model-checking and the ability to formally specify privilege scenar-
ios, it lacks the support of complex scenarios. Extensions are still needed for the approach
to be able to specify more complex scenarios as well as to reduce the overall testing cost.
In [118], Shahmehri et al. proposed an approach for vulnerability detection based on pas-
sive testing. The main idea is to observe the behavior of the system at run-time to conclude
the existence of vulnerabilities. The approach examines the execution traces in an attempt
to detect the presence of vulnerabilities in these traces. Formal models are used to identify
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the causes of the detected vulnerabilities and their dependencies. The approach has the ob-
vious advantages inherited from passive testing, that the generation of speciﬁc test inputs
are not needed. However, there are drawbacks to such an approach including that it is not
conclusive. That is, the absence of vulnerability indications in the traces does not mean that
the vulnerabilities are nonexistent. Furthermore, there is a difﬁculty in specifying and test-
ing against a particular vulnerability. There is also an overhead involved since many runs
may be needed before the software ﬁnally executes a speciﬁc vulnerability under concern,
hence having an execution trace that proves the existence of such vulnerability. In [67],
Shahriar and Zulkernine pointed out the lack of a comparative study of vulnerability de-
tection techniques and suggested a criteria for analyzing software security approaches. A
total of 7 issues were proposed as the main criteria behind selecting a particular approach,
which included the level of the automation, vulnerability coverage, and test-data generation
capabilities. They provided as part of their effort a comparative study where they summa-
rized existing security testing work. While this is a good initiative that could be helpful
to security analysts, their work however was based on particular low-level vulnerabilities
such as buffer-overﬂow, string formatting, and SQL injection.
2.4 Software Vulnerabilities Detection Techniques
Understanding the seriousness of security problems, various approaches have been pro-
posed for detecting vulnerabilities in software. While these approaches and their underly-
ing technique may vary greatly, they can be classiﬁed as either static-based or dynamic-
based. This classiﬁcation is driven by one major factor, which is whether or not program
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execution is required for the detection process. In this section, we highlight some of the
main proposed approaches for detecting vulnerabilities in software.
2.4.1 Static-Based Vulnerability Detection
Static-based detection approaches attempt to uncover security vulnerabilities by merely
investigating the software semantic representation obtained from its structure or documen-
tation, without the execution of the program. The following introduces some of the main
static-based approaches proposed for vulnerability detection.
Expression and Statement Pattern Matching
This type of techniques depends on pattern matching of program constructs to uncover
vulnerabilities [157]. The pattern is initially stated by the analyst. The pattern matching
techniques then scan the software for expressions matching the given pattern. The de-
tection of such expressions reports the existence of security vulnerabilities. Examples of
patterns are: fun1(), fun1("str1"), fun1(!"str1"), x = fun1(), and x =
y. The fun1() pattern indicates search for any call to a method called fun1, which takes
no parameters. The fun1("str1"), fun1(!"str1") calls respectively indicate the
search for a method called fun1 which accepts, or does not accept, an argument value
equals to str1. The x = fun1(), and x = y respectively indicate search for assign-
ment expression where the right-hand-side is equal to a value matching the pattern fun1()
fun1(), or to another variable y. This type of pattern matching technique can be useful
for detecting vulnerabilities resulting from the use of unsafe calls. For instance, the stan-
dard C library provides a large set of calls, such as strcat(), strcpy(), gets(),
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scanf(), sprintf(), etc., which are known to be unsafe due to their potential of pro-
ducing different vulnerabilities, such as buffer overﬂow. The utilization of such calls can
be detected through this pattern matching technique.
It should be noted however that some of the reported vulnerabilities may actually be
false-positives. Another problem with this technique is that it focuses on pattern matching
rather than on the violation of a security property. Since security properties often involve
multiple actions at different points in the program, only few properties can actually be
speciﬁed through pattern matching techniques. This directly limits the detection power of
such techniques.
Veriﬁcation Through Program Annotation
With this technique, security properties are annotated into the program being tested as sets
of pre- and post-conditions constraints. The technique statically propagates through the
source code verifying the accumulated set of constraints against the ones deﬁned in the
post-conditions. A mismatch would then conclude a violation of the property. One of the
main advantages of program annotation techniques over pattern matching is their capability
to specify security properties. Additionally, since the annotations are actually described
as pre- and post-conditions to program segments, the analysts are able to easily deﬁne
properties that are program-dependent. On the other hand, these techniques suffer major
disadvantages. The annotations are mainly performed manually by the analyst. For real-
life software of reasonably large sizes, the needed human involvement becomes intense,
resulting in these techniques being very impractical to use. Moreover, due to the static
nature of these techniques, false positive reporting is another major disadvantage.
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Extending Type Systems
In computer science, a type system is the entity responsible for associating types with the
values that are the result of expression evaluation. High-level languages use type systems
in order to associate types with variables and expressions and to make the program safer.
Generally, a type system consists of a set of typing rules and a set of type inference rules.
The ﬁrst set of rules deﬁnes types and associates them to language objects and expressions.
Type inference rules deduce the type of an un-typed expression in a given program. To
prevent runtime errors, type systems are augmented with type constraints that enforce pre-
conditions on inference rules. If all type constraints of a program are solved, the program is
"well-typed" and is free of runtime errors. This feature is summarized by the famous 1978
Milner’s slogan "well-typed programs cannot go wrong" [113].
Different programming languages handle type errors differently. In general, type safety
deﬁnes the extent that a programming language discourages or prevents type errors. As a
matter of fact, type safety can sometimes be controlled by the program, rather than by the
language of that program. In other words, the type safety provided by the languages can be
overpowered by careless programming.
Type errors, such as improper explicit casting, can be the source of many security vul-
nerabilities. This group of veriﬁcation techniques targets such violations. Some sort of
type enforcement is hence needed. This enforcement can be conducted statically through
extending type systems to the compiler, hence detecting potential vulnerabilities at compile
time. While these techniques can be very effective in detecting this type of vulnerabilities,
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they have major drawbacks. The scope of vulnerabilities that can be detected by such sys-
tem is very limited [65]. Additionally, since the security properties are actually deﬁned in
the compiler, the techniques are incapable of allowing further user-deﬁned properties.
Model-Checking
One of the main problems with the aforementioned approaches for static vulnerability de-
tection is their lack of automation. Pattern matching is only capable of describing a very
limited set of properties. With program annotation, a huge user involvement may be re-
quired to annotate the pre- and post-conditions. The implementation of type system and
enforcement in the compiler is by no means a trivial task.
Model-checking [107] belongs to the ﬁeld of logic in computer science which attempts
to solve the following problem: Given a model of a system, automatically test this model
to discover whether or not it complies with a given speciﬁcation. Consequently, model-
checking can be very suitable for detecting security violations. Techniques based on model-
checking allow the speciﬁcation of security properties, often through ﬁnite-state machine
representation. The techniques scan the software being tested and matches changes in its
states to the given property. A vulnerability is ﬂagged if the trace results in the property
speciﬁcation being violated (i.e. reaching an error or unexpected state of the state machine).
We view model-checking as one of the most useful techniques for statically detecting
security vulnerabilities in software. In addition to the automation capability, there are other
advantages to model-checking techniques. Model checkers function over an abstracted
model of program states, so they are independent of the programming language of the
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program being tested. An existing model checker can be made capable of detecting vul-
nerabilities in programs written in newer languages by only implementing a parser for the
new language. However, being based on static analysis, model-checking techniques suffer
the major problem of false-positive reporting.
2.4.2 Dynamic-Based Vulnerability Detection
Due to the nature of static analysis, detection techniques based on such analysis are of-
ten inconclusive and suffer major problems including the potential of reporting a massive
number of false-positives. Dynamic analysis approaches address the limitations of static
analysis. In contrast to static-analysis approaches, dynamic analysis techniques require
program execution for detections to take place. Various dynamic analysis approaches exist.
Below, we highlight some of the major ones of such approaches.
Random-based Veriﬁcation
The main idea behind this approach is to execute the program repeatedly with randomly
generated data until either the vulnerability is detected or a pre-determined number of ex-
ecutions is exhausted. For instance, if detection is to take place against buffer overﬂow
vulnerabilities, then the approach would randomly generate long strings for program input.
The execution of the program would take place over these strings in an attempt to detect
the vulnerabilities.
Using this approach may very well reveal security vulnerabilities in programs. The ap-
proach clearly has a major advantage, which is its simplicity. It is very easy to implement
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and apply. However, the approach suffers many drawbacks. Firstly, the set of security prop-
erties that this approach can test is quite limited. Secondly, the approach is not sound. The
lack of positive reporting does not guarantee the non-existence of vulnerabilities. Addition-
ally, the reporting of errors does not guarantee that all vulnerabilities have been discovered.
Thirdly, the time spent to repeatedly execute the program before detections are made can be
extensive. Due to the random nature of the approach, many executions may take place over
traces/paths of the program that do not include the vulnerabilities. Consequently, detection
tools based merely on this approach are considered unreliable and inconclusive.
Directed Random-Based Veriﬁcation
This approach attempts to mitigate some of the problems of the random-based approach.
Instead of generating data that may take the program execution towards any path, the ap-
proach attempts to generate data that would drive program execution towards speciﬁc paths.
The choice of these paths is critical and usually based on the sensitivity/importance of these
paths, or on the potential existence of vulnerabilities in these particular paths. For instance,
if 20% of all programs paths are possibly those ones where 90% of the targeted vulnera-
bilities may exist, then it is wise to keep in generating data that would execute these paths,
at least ﬁrst. This contrasts the random-based approach, where possibly most of the exe-
cutions may actually end up taking place over the undesired paths. While this approach
may provide some improvements over the mere random-based approaches, it still suffers
the same main problems due to its random nature.
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Fault Injection Veriﬁcation
Fault injection techniques attempt to enhance the testing coverage of the program by actu-
ally injecting faulty code segments at particular program points. Those points are usually
selected very carefully to provide the needed detections. Such points may include error
handling paths that may rarely execute. The approach mainly considers that vulnerabilities
are caused by program faults, which drive the execution through error handling routines
or assertion failures. The injection process can be automated by locating those program
points where faults would drive execution towards fatal error segments including assertion
failures. Faulty code is then injected at these locations, and program execution is attempted.
Failures in such execution would be indicative of security vulnerabilities in the program.
While this approach may uncover some vulnerabilities, it has a major drawback caused
by its fundamental idea of injecting faults that the program does not actually have. In other
words, it is very questionable whether the detected vulnerabilities are indeed exploitable.
Detection through Dynamic Monitoring
The aforementioned approaches detect vulnerabilities by executing the program and mainly
leading it to a crash of some sort. While this may indeed ﬂag the existence of a vulnerability,
it deﬁnitely does not show the violation of a particular security property. As a matter of
fact, none of them allows precise speciﬁcation of the property.
Vulnerability detection through dynamic monitoring differs from all these approaches.
The main idea of such an approach is to allow the analysts to specify the security property
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that they need to test the software against. Runtime monitoring routines are then instru-
mented at particular program points that relate to the speciﬁc property being tested. When
program execution takes places, the monitors verify whether the execution is in compliance
with the property. If not, then this is immediately ﬂagged as security violation to the prop-
erty being tested. We generally view this technique as the most prominent for dynamically
detecting security vulnerabilities.
2.5 Code Instrumentation
In order to obtain proﬁling information of a program, it is necessary to inject monitoring
code at speciﬁc locations, with which behavioral information can be collected. While the
general idea of code instrumentation is rather simple; that is just inject additional monitor-
ing code in the base code, various code instrumentation techniques exist. These techniques
signiﬁcantly differ from each others depending on where the monitoring code is to be in-
jected and the purpose behind such injection. Below, we provide a background of the major
existing approaches for code instrumentation.
2.5.1 Preprocessor’s Macros Instrumentation
Many programs, such as compilers, operate on data that has been previously processed by
other programs, the preprocessors. The lowest-level of such programs are referred to as
lexical preprocessors, as they only require lexical analysis. Lexical preprocessors typically
perform macro substitution, textual inclusion of other ﬁles, and conditional compilation
or inclusion. The most widely used lexical preprocessor is C PreProcessor (CPP) used
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by C and C++ compilers. When programs are written in these languages, preprocessor
directives are added to the code; these are lines that are not program statements, rather
directives for the preprocessor. The preprocessor handles directives for source ﬁle inclu-
sion (#include), macro deﬁnitions (#deﬁne), and conditional inclusion (#if). Applying C
preprocessor macros for code instrumentation has been proposed by Kranzlmueller [93].
The basic idea is to replace the original statements to be observed by monitoring code that
would effectively perform the same activities of the original code and additionally provide
the needed monitoring functionality. In practice, this can be done by providing a macro
deﬁnition for each event of interest, which maps the original function onto a monitor func-
tion.
2.5.2 Library Inclusion Instrumentation
Code instrumentation can simply be achieved through implementing a library that incor-
porates all the needed monitoring information. Calls to this library from an original code
would hence imply code instrumentation. The advantages of such technique lie in its sim-
plicity, its minimal requirements to alter the original code, as well as its portability and
hardware independence. However the technique requires re-linking of the application.
An example of such a technique is the Message-passing Portable Instrumented Com-
munication Library (MPICL) [127], a subroutine library for collecting information on com-
munication and user-deﬁned events in message-passing parallel programs written in C or
FORTRAN.
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2.5.3 Library Replacement Instrumentation
This technique is similar to library inclusion, however instead of adding a new library, the
techniques modiﬁes the original library used by the program to include all the needed mon-
itoring information. A re-linking is then needed to use the modiﬁed library. The technique
is still simple; however it does not allow monitoring of program behaviors except for those
associated with the external libraries. Another disadvantage of this technique is that it also
requires that the original functionality must be coded in the replacement library. This large
overhead questions the applicability of this technique in reality.
2.5.4 Parser-Level Instrumentation
A parser is the component of a compiler that carries out the task of analyzing a sequence
of tokens to determine its grammatical structure with respect to a given formal grammar.
The parsing process also transforms the data into data structure, usually an abstract syntax
tree (AST), which captures the implied hierarchy of the input. A parser hence has access to
additional information that is unavailable to preprocessors. Consequently, utilizing parsers
for code instrumentation is more advantageous. The AspectC++ Puma library is one exam-
ple of such parsers, which is capable of performing a large spectrum of complicated code
transformation at various points of a program. However, since parsers naturally transform
source code to data structures, i.e. AST, the technique is disadvantageous when original-
source-to-instrumented-source code transformation is required. Although this is still pos-
sible, it requires additional transformation steps, which lead to increased compilation time;
an overhead that many applications may not accommodate.
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2.5.5 Binary Wrapping of Object Code
As discussed, preprocessor’s macro instrumentation does wrapping of textual information
of a program into other textual representation. This technique can be viewed as an enhanced
version of such textual substitution techniques. Instead of wrapping textual representation,
the technique operates by changing the executable code of a program by substituting the
bytes of the object code by others. Examples of tools utilizing such techniques are the Just
in Time Instrumenter JiTI [136], Performance Analysis Tool (PAT) [61] and Analysis Tools
with Outcome Mapping (ATOM) [148], which could insert calls to arbitrary C functions
before/after individual instructions, basic blocks, or functions of the program being instru-
mented. A slight variation of this technique exists, which performs the wrapping on the
executable code instead of the object code. The Executable Editing Library (EEL) [97] is
an example of applications that utilize this instrumentation technique.
Compiler-Assisted Instrumentation
This technique enhances the parser-level code instrumentation technique. The difference
between the two techniques lies mainly in the processing stages. With this technique, once
the abstract syntax tree, or parse tree, is generated, no generation of transformed source
code is performed; instead, the tree is directly passed to the compiler’s backend and object
code of the instrumented program is directly generated by the compiler.
Despite of the overhead needed for transforming the intermediate representation, the
direct processing of these representation makes this technique both powerful and efﬁcient.
Protagoras [29], a plug-in architecture for the GNU compiler collection that allows one
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to modify GCC’s internal representation of the program under compilation, is an example
where this technique has been applied.
2.6 Test-Data Generation
In order to prove that speciﬁc vulnerabilities exist in the software being tested, the software
must be executed with concrete data values, with which the program is driven towards the
execution of the vulnerabilities. Traditionally, the creation of this data set was performed
manually. However, with the obvious increase in complexity and size of software during the
past decade, manual creation of this data turned out to be a next-to-impossible task. Thus, it
was clear that automation is signiﬁcantly needed. This has attracted many researchers in the
ﬁeld. Consequently, various, and signiﬁcantly different, approaches to test-data generation
have been proposed during the past few years. The capabilities of these approaches indeed
differ. In fact, in [81], Miller et al. pointed out the difﬁculty being faced in accepting these
techniques in a general form. In this section, we provide a background of some of the most
prominent approaches to test-data generation. We ﬁrstly provide a literature review of the
subject and its related approaches and proposals. We then follow with a more detailed
description about some of these approaches in particular.
2.6.1 Automatic Test-Data Generation
The subject of automation represents a crucial aspect when it comes to test-data generation.
There are many reasons behind that including cost effectiveness, and the avoidance of the
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need of manual intervention. In [78], Edvardsson argued that Automatic Test-Data Genera-
tion (ATDG) is among the most important components of software testing. While attempts
can be made to classify the proposed techniques, it should be noted that there is no deﬁnite
isolation between the underlying methodologies of these approaches and that overlaps of
techniques are sometimes present. For instance approaches based on path analysis may
very well use constraint solving to achieve what is needed.
Path-Based Techniques
This type of approaches focuses on path analysis for test-data generation. In [130], Dharam
and Shiva pointed out that in spite of the fact that various software testing techniques exist,
they do not insure that all possible behaviors of the software are analyzed, executed, and
tested. They proposed dynamic-monitoring based approach for the purpose of detecting
and preventing path traversal attacks. The approach combined two pre-deployment testing
techniques: data-ﬂow testing and basic path testing. While the proposed approach may
have the potential of being useful for path-based testing, further work is still needed in terms
of both automating the proposed process, as well as extending it for the detection of a more
complex attacks. In [119], Sy and Deville proposed a technique for ATDG for imperative
programs containing integer, boolean and/or ﬂoat variables. The goal of the generated data
is to execute a speciﬁc statement, to traverse a branch or to traverse a speciﬁed path. For
path traversal, the approach transforms the path into constraints then solves them using
an interval constraint-solving algorithm. The desired test-data is then obtained from the
interval solution. For statement or branch coverage, the approach dynamically constructs
a path that reaches the speciﬁed statement or branch then uses the path traversal technique
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to generate the required data. In [76], Lin et al. proposed a technique that extended the
Hamming distance to measure the distance between two paths. The approach also utilizes
genetic algorithms by employing a ﬁtness function to achieve the goal of the selected path.
In [126], McMinn et al. introduced a search-based approach to ATDG, referred to as species
per path. It transforms the program to a version in which multiple paths to the search target
are factored out. A group of operating species is then run in parallel to generate the data.
The point is that the factorization of the paths results in different search landscapes. These
landscapes are potentially more conducive to test data discovery than the original overall
landscape.
Heuristic Search Techniques
These techniques are based on based on heuristic search methods or evolutionary computa-
tion, such as simulated annealing and Genetic algorithms. In [117], Mansour and Salame,
proposed two stochastic search algorithms for generating test cases for speciﬁc path execu-
tion. One of the algorithms was based on simulated annealing, while the second was based
on genetic algorithms. Both algorithms however were based on optimization formulation
of the path testing problem. The targeted paths included both integer and real-value test
cases. In [120], Tracey et al. proposed an approach that targets the automation of full-path
coverage of a given structure. Their approach resorted to heuristic-global optimization and
simulated annealing. Their data generation tool considered boundary value analysis, where
test-data that lies close to the boundaries of a given subdomain is to be considered of a
higher adequacy than test-data further away. Their tool also considered assertion/run-time
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testing, where the generated data is to break program assertions or cause runtime excep-
tions, and component re-use testing. Component re-use testing aims at ﬁnding test-data
that causes the precondition of a re-usable component to be broken, possibly as a result
in changes of environment conditions between use and re-use times. In [125], Bueno and
Jino presented a tool for test-data generation and identiﬁcation of structural testing. The
proposed tool used genetic algorithms and employed a ﬁtness function that combined dy-
namic control and data-ﬂow information to speed up data generation. In [161], Liu et al.
proposed test-data generation approach that takes advantage of a ﬂag cost function. This
cost function is introduced as the main component of ﬁtness function, whose value changes
with the variation of the ﬂag problem. The proposed approach took advantage of the multi-
agent genetic algorithm to ﬁnd, with a small cost, test-data for program statements along
with the ﬂag problems.
Graph-Based Techniques
Various proposals suggested the construction of graph that then guides the test-data gener-
ation process. In [132], Pargas et al. suggested an algorithm based on genetic algorithms.
They implemented a tool for parallel processing to improve the search performance. The di-
rection of the search was guided by the control-dependence graph of the program. In [96],
Gallagher et al. focused on object-oriented testing. They extended single class testing
to multiple-class integration testing. A single class behavior is modeled as a ﬁnite state
machine. The approach was to transform the representation into a data ﬂow graph that
explicitly identiﬁes the deﬁnitions and uses of each state variable of the class. They ex-
tended this idea to inter-class testing through the construction of ﬂow graphs, ﬁnding paths
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between pairs of deﬁnitions and uses, detecting some infeasible paths and then automati-
cally generating test-data for these glasses. In [26], Yang et al. focused on automatic and
semi-automatic testing for parallel programs. They demonstrated that with some extension,
sequential test-data adequacy criteria can still be applicable to parallel program testing. To
support their approach, they utilized parallel program ﬂow graph. In [139], Gouraud et al.
proposed an approach for automating statistical structural testing, based on the combina-
tion of uniform generation of combinatorial structures and randomized constraint solving
techniques. The idea was to formalize the control ﬂow graph of the program as combi-
natorial structure speciﬁcation. This allowed for execution paths to be drawn uniformly.
The drawn paths are then analyzed and test-data are obtained using a constraint solving
library. In Gupta et al. [116] and Soffa et al. [106], the authors presented an approach that
targets test-data generation for a given path. The approach attempted to iteratively reﬁne
the input using a set of linear constraints on the input. They designed an approach, namely
the Uniﬁed Numerical Approach (UNA), to solve the constraints. UNA constructed and
utilized control ﬂow graphs of the program to generate test-data. In [140], Edwards out-
lined a general strategy for automated black-box testing. This is achieved using directed
ﬂow graphs, where one end of the graph represented object construction and the other rep-
resented object destruction. Hence, the graphs simulated the lifetime of the object and the
allowed sequences of operations over these objects. In [5], Sofokleous and Andreou pro-
posed a dynamic framework for test-data generation. The framework was based on genetic
algorithms. The idea was to have one component for analyzing the code being tested. This
component then interacts with a test-data generator to automatically produce test-data. The
analyzer’s function included the extraction of the related variables and statements from the
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program and the creation of control-ﬂow graphs accordingly. The Generator component
attempted to produce a near-optimum set of test-data cases with respect to edge/condition
coverage criterion. For that, the generator took advantage of two optimization algorithms,
the Batch-Optimistic (BO) and the Close-Up (CU). A comparison to other techniques, in
terms of time and coverage, was given. While the proposed approach represents a rea-
sonable contribution to the subject, it suffers some limitations. The analysis is based on
control-ﬂow graphs of individual units of the program. That is, a separate control-ﬂow
graph is constructed for each function/method of the program being tested. A new control-
ﬂow graph and a new required set of test cases are initiated for each method. This overhead
is directly increased as the number of methods in the program increases. Another limita-
tion is in relation to testing object-oriented programs. Since the control-ﬂow graphs are
constructed for individual methods, these control-ﬂow graphs are unable to describe, and
hence test, OO class-based features.
Syntax-Based Techniques
This type of testing takes advantage of information that can be obtained by investigating
the program’s syntax. This includes for instance functional analysis, boundary value anal-
ysis and partitioning analysis. In [10], Hajnal and Forgács proposed an integrated testing
criterion that extended traditional criteria in order to effectively reveal domain errors. An
automated test-data generation algorithm is developed to satisfy the criterion. The proposed
algorithm combined path selection and test-data generation, where function minimization
is used to ﬁnd the required test cases. The algorithm ﬁrst initiated coverage of some prede-
ﬁned program paths and then a domain testing is conducted for additional requirements of
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some ON-OFF points on these paths. In [104], Gallagher and Narasimhan presented a soft-
ware system for generating test-data for programs developed in Ada83, namely ADTEST.
ADTEST located input domain boundaries intersections and generated ON-OFF test-data
points. Boundary value analysis was also used as one of the tests described in [120].
Numeric-Based Techniques
These techniques take advantage of on numerical or mathematical approaches in order
to provide the needed test-data. For example, the key feature of ADTEST, presented by
Gallagher and Narasimhan in [104], is that the test-data generation problem is treated en-
tirely as a numerical optimization problem. This avoids shortcomings presented in other
techniques, such as symbolic executions, including input variable-dependent loops, array
references, and module calls. In this case, program instrumentation was used to solve a
set of path constraints without requiring an explicit knowledge of the exact form of these
paths. The approach presented in [96], also takes advantage of such techniques. The ap-
proach allows database tables to be associated with a mathematical set, that is deﬁned as
the sequences comprising the primary key values of the tables.
2.6.2 Random Test-Case Generation
Random Test-Case Generation (RTCG) is one of the earliest techniques that are used for
such purpose. The level of randomness in various RTCG techniques vary. For example,
some of these techniques may view the entire software to be tested as a single unit. In other
words, they do not distinguish between different subroutines or different portions of the
code when the tests are generated. They hence create a set of test cases totally randomly
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and initiate testing based on these cases. Other RTCG techniques would still create the
tests randomly but based on assumptions concerning fault distributions, or concerns over
speciﬁc portions of the code that could be more signiﬁcant or more susceptible to errors.
Although random tests are relatively easy to generate, they are quite extensive, since
millions of tests may be needed before a particular error in the software can be detected.
Additionally, they are not sufﬁcient. Even if a mass number of test cases is generated, there
is no guarantee that these cases will detect a speciﬁc error, or guarantee full-path coverage.
Consequently, the applicability of these kinds of test generation techniques is often limited
due to this fact and other various factors, such as the size and complexity of the software.
2.6.3 Structural Testing
Sometimes, the code of the software to be tested might be available. In such cases, dif-
ferent types of testing can be performed. This is often referred to as white-box testing or
structural testing. Generally, since the code is available for testing, various tests can be per-
formed either statically or dynamically. Below we describe some of the main techniques of
structural testing.
Goal-Oriented Approach: It is somehow a contradictory approach to the classical full-
path coverage approach. With full-path coverage, each path in the program must be tra-
versed at least once. On the other hand, the goal-oriented approach does not have such
constraint; rather it qualiﬁes the various ﬂow control branches of the program with an im-
portant level, such as Critical, Semi-Critical, Non-Essential, or Required with respect to
a speciﬁc target. The target is usually a speciﬁc node in the Control Flow Graph (CFG),
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which reﬂects a speciﬁc objective. A simple deﬁnition of the approach has been given by
Korel [91] as follows: Given node Y in a program. The goal is to ﬁnd a program input x on
which node Y will be executed. By traversing the different paths of the CFG, a decision can
be made on the appropriate classiﬁcation of the path. In speciﬁc, any path that would lead
the execution away from the target node is considered critical and should not be attempted.
The approach starts by generating arbitrary program inputs. A search procedure then
examines whether the execution with a value of them at a speciﬁc node would lead to the
target. If so, the execution continues; otherwise, a new program input must be considered
at that node in an attempt to force the execution through the desired path. To illustrate the
approach, consider the C++ code fragment given in Figure 1.
The control-ﬂow graph representing the code in Figure 1 is shown in Figure 2. In con-
trast to full-path coverage approach, go-oriented focuses on essential branches; which are
those branches inﬂuencing the execution of the target node. The scope of control inﬂuence
for conditional and looping statements is deﬁned as follows [91]:
a) if Z then B1 else B2
X is in the scope of control inﬂuence of Z iff X appears in B1 or B2.
b) while Z do B
X is in the scope of control inﬂuence of Z iff X appears in B.
Classiﬁcation of branches can then be concluded as follows:
1. Non-Essential: A branch (ni, nj) is non-essential with respect to a node Y iff Y is
not in the scope of the inﬂuence of ni. For instance, assuming that the loop at node 3 in
Figure 1 will eventually terminate, i.e., no inﬁnite loop, then branch (3, 4) has no inﬂuence
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void GoOrientedApproach() {
int i1 = 0, i2 = 0, i3 = 0, i4 = 0, i5 = 0, i6 = 0;
cout << "Enter 4 Integers: ";
cin >> i1 >> i2 >> i3 >> i4 >> i5;
while (i1 < 10) { // node 3
if (i5==12) { // node 4
cout << "Point1" << endl;
i6++; } // node 7
else {
cout << "Point2" << endl;
i1 *= 10; }
i1++; }
i2++; // node 10
while (i2 < 10) { // node 11
i3 = i2 - 1;
if (i3 % 2 == 0) { // node 13
cout << "Point3" << endl;
i2++;
while(i3 > 5) { // node 17
if (i6 > 0) { // node 18
cout << "Target Point" << endl; }
else {
i3 -=5;
cout << "Point4" << endl; }
i3–; } }// node 22
else {
cout << "Point5" << endl; // node 15
i2 *= 2;
i5 += 10;
if(i2 > 2) { // node 25
cout << "Point6" << endl; }
if(i3 < 12) { // node 27
cout << "Point7" << endl; }
else {
cout << "Point8" << endl; }
i3 +=2; } // node 30
i4–;
i5++; // node 32
}
i4 = i3–;
i5 = i2 + 4;
if (i4 == i5) { // node 35
cout << "Point9" << endl; }
else {
cout << "Point10" << endl; }
cout << "Point11" << endl; // node 38
}
Figure 1: Goal-Oriented Approach Example
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Figure 2: Flow Diagram for Code Segment in Figure 1
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on the execution of the target node (node 19). Consequently, this branch is considered as
non-essential in relation to the target node. Similarly, branches (3, 10), (25, 26), (25, 27),
(27, 28), and (27, 29), are all non-essential. Since non-essential branches do not inﬂuence
the execution of a target node, execution of these branches should always be allowed.
2. Critical: A Critical branch is a branch that would permanently lead the execution
away from the target node. A branch (ni, nj) is critical with respect to node Y iff (1) Y
is in the scope of the control inﬂuence of ni, and (2) There is no possible path from ni to
Y through branch (ni, nj). In other words, the execution of branch (ni, nj) in such case is
critical in the sense that it will immediately and permanently eliminate all chances to reach
the target node. For instance, branch (11, 33) in Figure 2 is critical since the execution of
this branch would permanently lead the execution away from the target node (node 19).
3. Semi-Critical: A branch (ni, nj) is semi-critical with respect to node Y iff (1) Y
is in the scope of the control inﬂuence of ni, and (2) There is no acyclic path from ni to
Y through branch (ni, nj). In other words, the execution of semi-critical branch would
lead the execution away from the target, but not necessarily permanently since it may still
lead to the target node through a backward edge of a loop. Branches (13, 15), (18, 20),
and (17, 31) in Figure 2 are hence semi-critical. Theoretically, since the execution of non-
essential branch leads the execution away from the target node, a program executing non-
essential branch should be terminated. However, this rule can be “relaxed” since it is still
possible to reach the target node even if a non-essential branch is executed.
4. Required: A branch (ni, nj) is required with respect to node Y iff (1) Y is in the
scope of the control inﬂuence of ni, and (2) There is an acyclic path from ni to Y through
branch (ni, nj). In other words, required branches are those which must be executed for the
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target to be reached; consequently program execution must be allowed to continue through
those branches. Branches (11, 12), (13, 14), (17, 18) and (18, 19) in Figure 2 are clearly
required for the execution of target node (node 19) to take place.
The Chaining Approach: The goal-oriented approach suffers a major limitation due to
the fact that only control-ﬂow graph is used to guide the search process. This limitation
may result in some nodes being very difﬁcult to reach, or a massive number of attempts
may be needed ﬁrst before ﬁnally ﬁnding the proper data to reach them. To illustrate the
problem, let us reexamine Figure 2. Although both branches of node 4 are considered non-
essential by the goal-oriented approach in relation to the target at node 19, it is actually
clear that unless node 7 is executed there will be no way for the target node to be reached.
The chaining approach is an extension to the goal-oriented approach that is aimed to
minimize this kind of problems. Before describing the exact details of the approach, it may
be helpful to ﬁrst point out some of the basic concepts as described by Korel et al. [54].
Generally, a control-ﬂow graph can be represented as a directed graph C = (N,A, st, ed),
where N is a set of node, A is a set of edges (hence a binary relation deﬁned over N ele-
ments), st and ed are respectively the two unique entry and exit nodes of the graph. Nodes
can further be recognized as either simple or test nodes. Test nodes are those nodes where
conditions must be evaluated, and accordingly different transfers of control take place.
Outgoing edges from test nodes are then referred to as branches, where these branches are
controlled by branch predicates, describing the conditions under which a branch is to be
taken. An input variable x is a variable that appears in at least one input statement in a pro-
gram, such as cin >> x;. Assuming I = (x1, x2, ..., xn) is a vector of input variables of a
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program, and Dxi is the domain of input values xi; that is the set of all possible values that
xi can hold, the domain D of a program can then be deﬁned as D = Dx1 ×Dx2 × ...×Dxn .
An input x can then be viewed as a single point of input, x ∈ D, in the n-dimensional input
space D. A path P from node nk1 to nkq is a sequence P = 〈nk1 , nk2 , ..., nkq〉 of nodes
such that for all i, 1 ≤ i < q, (nki , nki+1) ∈ A. A path is feasible if at least one input exists
with which this path can be traversed; otherwise the path is infeasible. A use of a variable
is a node where the value of the variable is used. A deﬁnition of a variable is a node where
the variable is assigned a value. Assuming that U(n) is the set of variables that are used at
node n, and D(n) is the set of variables that are deﬁned at node n, a deﬁnition-clear path
can then be deﬁned. A deﬁnition-clear path from nk1 to nkq with respect to variable v is a
path 〈nk1 , nk2 , ..., nkq〉 that starts at node nk1 and ends at node nkq and for all i, 1 < i < q,
v /∈ D(nki) − that is v is not deﬁned along the path. Similarly, a deﬁnition-clear path
from nk1 to nkq with respect to a set of variables, S, is a path where for all i, 1 < i < q,
(D(nki)
⋂
S) = ∅ − that is none of the variables in S is deﬁned along that path.
The basic idea of the chaining approach is to identify a sequence of nodes that needs to
be executed before the execution of a speciﬁc node. That is, instead of solely depending on
a control-ﬂow graph, the approach uses data dependency analysis to guide the test data gen-
eration process [54]. The approach initially starts by executing the program with random
input. Similar to goal-oriented, the approach decides whether the execution should con-
tinue through a branch depending on whether, or not, the branch would lead to the target.
If the path does not lead to the target, then a new input value is to be found and attempted
at the node controlling the branch. If the search however cannot ﬁnd such input value, then
it attempts to alter the ﬂow at that node by identifying nodes that have to be executed prior
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to the execution of this node; this contrasts the goal-oriented approach, which would have
declared failure by that time. The idea is that by altering inputs at the previous nodes, there
is a chance to derive a desired input value at the concerned node.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have distinguished between the different ﬁelds of security in relation
to software and computing. This distinction is made for the purpose of highlighting the
focus of the work presented in this thesis, which targets software security. We have intro-
duced a classiﬁcation of security properties and detailed both low-level and high-level ones.
Additionally, we have provided background on two major subjects that are related to this
research effort, which are code instrumentation and test-data generation. The different ap-
proaches to software vulnerability detection have been introduced. These approaches have
particularly been classiﬁed as either static-based or dynamic-based approaches. Various
static-based approaches exist. However, all of these approaches suffer common limitations
caused by the nature of static analysis, such as the potential reporting of false-positives.
Similarly, various dynamic-based analysis approaches exist. While the capabilities, effec-
tiveness, and detection powers of these approaches greatly differ from one to another, all
of these approaches share common drawbacks, such as the potential of an intense number
of executions before detections can be made. Furthermore, the issue of test-data gener-
ation becomes very crucial to such approaches, since without being able to generate the
appropriate data, execution cannot be driven as desired. In conclusion, it is clear that
both static-based and dynamic-based approaches carry their advantages and drawbacks.
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We hence need approaches that are rather based on a synergy between the two analyses.
Such approaches have the potential of becoming very advantageous to security testing and
vulnerability detection. This conclusion represents one of the major foundations of our





The research reported in this chapter builds on the ideas that were initially published
in [70, 162]. Actually, the idea of extending the expressiveness of edit automata with team
components and combining them is still the same. However, it is important to mention that
the semantics ascribed is completely different. In fact, in this thesis, we provide a more
rigorous semantics in the sense that is provides a complete formalization of some the ideas
that we formulated in the aforementioned publication. Besides, we brought major modiﬁ-
cations to the deﬁnitions of: conﬁgurations, sequents, transitional relations, and therefore
semantics rules. As such, the research reported in this chapter deviates, in major way, from
the contributions published in [70, 162].
In order for security analysts to test software, they must ﬁrst be able to specify the se-
curity property they wish to test the software against. Hence, a language is needed to allow
such speciﬁcation. Such a language should be expressive, in the sense that it should allow
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analysts to state the desirable safety and security properties that they wish to. In addition,
this language should be formal, i.e., it should be endowed with rigorous syntactic and se-
mantic deﬁnitions. In this chapter, we detail our contribution in relation with this matter.
Recognizing the signiﬁcant need for such a language and the lack of an existing one that
fully addresses our requirements, we design and implement the Security Concern Speciﬁ-
cation Language (SCSL). SCSL is designed with many requirements in mind including:
• It should allow the user to specify a large spectrum of both safety (low-level security)
and security properties.
• It should allow the user to easily specify the desired security properties through a
simple easy-to-learn graphical notation.
• It should be endowed with formal syntactic and semantic deﬁnitions.
• It should cater for the composition of several speciﬁcations of security properties.
• It should allow for the speciﬁcation of mitigation measures upon the detection of a
given security vulnerability.
However, specifying security properties is not a matter that is only applicable to security
testing or evaluation. Other security ﬁelds require such speciﬁcation as well. Various
research proposals have previously addressed this issue. In particular, we ﬁnd that a similar
concern has been looked into in the ﬁeld of security enforcement. A very popular technique
in that ﬁeld is to monitor program execution and then take remedial actions if the execution
violates a given security policy. It should be noted that security policy differs from security
property. The distinction between property and policy is given in Section 3.3.1. Different
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mathematical models, such as security automata [142] and edit automata [101], have been
introduced by researches. The difference between such proposed models lies mainly in
the way they react to violations; for instance some of them would halt the program, while
others would suppress the violation, insert further actions and continue execution.
We particulary view edit automata as a very attractive model in relation to our research.
The model is proven to be capable of enforcing all safety properties as well as many security
properties [101]; hence, it represents a great initial framework for SCSL. However, the
model as proposed is not able to address all the aforementioned requirements. Firstly, the
model is designed to enforce a single security property. Consequently, the model does
not explicitly deﬁne an enforcement action if multiple monitors suggest different remedial
actions. For the purpose of vulnerability detection, we require a deterministic behavior to
be deﬁned based on the group of security properties to be tested. Secondly, since different
components in contemporary software may be tightly related, interaction between different
monitors is also needed. For instance, disabling and enabling system interrupts by one
program unit may very well impact the behavior, and controls the allowable operations by
other units. Deleting a dynamically allocated memory space in languages such as C/C++
would invalidate all pointers referencing it. Such examples illustrate the need of interaction
between various monitors for performing appropriate behavior. Since an edit automaton is
rather an individual unit, it is not possible to achieve this type of interaction capability using
edit automata.
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3.2 Security Properties and Automata
Finite state machines are quite powerful in modeling both the execution behavior of pro-
grams as well as the interaction between different components under execution. Various
research proposals have consequently taken advantage of such capabilities.
Security Automata (SA) [142] have been introduced by Schneider. One of the main
goals of SA is to guarantee that nothing bad will ever happen. This is achieved by monitor-
ing the execution and halting the program should any violation occurs. SA also deﬁnes a
speciﬁc set of properties that can be enforced by such automata, namely safety properties.
Edit Automata [101] have been proposed as an extension that enhances security automata
such that security properties can be enforced as well.
Other research proposals have focused on particular aspects of SA. Bounded history
automata [151] have been introduced as a new class of automata, where the focus is on
the characterization of security policies that are enforceable by execution monitors con-
strained by memory limitations. Other proposals [90] have investigated the computability
constraints of the properties being enforced.
Input/Output (I/O) Automata [102] have been introduced as a labeled transition system
model for components in asynchronous concurrent systems, with actions deﬁned as input,
output and internal. An I/O automaton has tasks, and in a fair execution of such automaton,
all tasks are required to get turns inﬁnitely often.
The idea of I/O automata inspired the proposal of Team Automata (TA) [53], which ac-
tually extend I/O automata. TA form a framework of distributed and reactive components,
referred to as component automata. The communication between these components is then
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modeled by the team. Component-interaction automata [21] have then been introduced
based on TA, for the purpose of modeling signiﬁcant interactions between the components
in a hierarchical component-based systems, as well as verifying the system behavior. Timed
component-interaction automata [84] have then been introduced. These automata particu-
larly target the veriﬁcation of components’ interaction behavior under timing constraint.
3.3 Team Edit Automata
The primary contribution of this chapter is the proposal, the design and the implementa-
tion of a speciﬁcation language, with which security analysts are able to formally specify
security properties that they wish to test the software against. In the following, we ﬁrst
provide the background underlying security automata, edit automata and team automata.
Afterwards, we detail our Team Edit Automata (TEA) model, which composes the core of
our security speciﬁcation language.
3.3.1 Security Automata
Alpern and Schneider [12] have distinguished between properties and more general policies
as follows. Assume A∗ denotes the set of all ﬁnite-length sequences of actions on a system
with action set A, Σ ⊆ A∗ is a set of executions, ε denotes a single execution, and σ
denotes a sequence of actions within an execution. A security policy is a predicate P on
sets of executions. A set of executions Σ satisﬁes a policy P if and only if P(Σ). A security
policy P is deemed to be a computable property when it is a predicate over sets Σ ⊆ A∗
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with the following form:
P (Σ) : (∀ε ∈ Σ : P̂ (ε)) (1)
where P̂ is a predicate on individual executions. Hence, a property is deﬁned exclusively
in terms of individual executions and may not specify a relationship between different
executions of the program.
One way of enforcing security properties is with a monitor that runs in parallel with
a target program [142]. Whenever a security-relevant operation is executed, the monitor
checks if the operation conforms to its policy. If so, the execution sequence is allowed;
otherwise the monitor modiﬁes the execution (i.e from σ to σ′) so that the property is
obeyed. A program monitor can be formally modeled by a security automaton, which is
a deterministic ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite state machine [101]. This security automata
introduced by Schneider has been proven capable of enforcing properties specifying that
nothing bad ever happens, namely, safety properties [142].
3.3.2 Edit Automata
Edit automata [101] have been proposed as an extension that enhances security automata, so
security properties can be enforced as well. An edit automaton E is a ﬁnite or a countably
inﬁnite state machine (Q, q0 , δ) deﬁned with respect to some system with action set A,
where:
• Q speciﬁes the possible automaton states,
• q0 is the initial state,
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• δ : Q× A → Q× (A ∪ {·}) is a transition function.
(q, σ)
a−→E (q′, σ′) (Basic)




σ = a;σ′ δ(q, a) = (q′, ·)
(q, σ)
·−→E (q′, σ′) (Suppression)
Figure 3: Edit Automata Semantics
The operational semantics of edit automata is deﬁned in Fig. 3 where:
• a and a′ denote individual actions,
• "·" denotes empty action,
• σ and σ′ denote action sequences, and
• ”; ” denotes concatenation of actions or action sequences (i.e. τ ; σ denotes an action
followed by action sequence). Actions emitted by the automata are indicated above
the arrowed line (−→).
A computation of the edit automaton is a ﬁnite or inﬁnite sequence
(q0, σ0)
a1−→ (q1, σ1) a2−→ . . . an−→ (qn, σn).
In such a computation, on the input σ0 starting from state q0, the edit automaton produces
the output a1; a2; . . . an. We deﬁne the function TE: A∗ → A∗ as the function assigning to
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each execution σ its output σ′ from the initial state q0. The reﬂexive and transitive closure
of −→ is denoted as −→∗.
An edit automaton is powerful since it combines the power of suppression automata and
insertion automata, while also being able to behave as a truncation automaton if desired.
A truncation automaton would simply halt the program upon the detection of a violation.
A suppression automaton can halt a program, but additionally, it is capable of suppressing
individual actions so that the program does not terminate upon a violation. An insertion
automaton can halt a program, but it is also capable of inserting a sequence of actions into
the program action stream. Since edit automata combine these powers, they are capable
of preserving the program’s semantics while assuring that the security property will not be
violated.
Although the edit automata model has been presented for security enforcement, we con-
sider the model as very attractive for describing security properties. The model is capable
of recognizing program sequences and distinguishing between invulnerable and vulnerable
sequences; hence it is possible to take advantage of the model to specify security properties.
However, edit automata are non-deterministic; if identical actions affect multiple proper-
ties, the automata’s reaction is undeﬁned. For the purpose of security testing, deterministic
behavior is mandatory, and so modiﬁcations to the model are necessary prior to being able
to use it for our purpose.
77
3.3.3 Team Automata
Team automata [53] have been introduced as a mathematical model of groupware systems.
The model initially introduces component automata, and shows how multiple component
automata can be interconnected to form a team; that is team automata. Teams can then
be interconnected to form a larger architecture. Component automata differ from ordinary
automata in the way they view actions. Actions of component automata are classiﬁed
as input actions, output actions, and internal actions. These actions are used to connect
multiple automata. For example, two automata can be connected by having the output
action of one of them as the input action to the other. A brief description of component
automata and team automata [53] is given below.
A component automaton C is deﬁned as a four-tuple 〈Q,Q0,ΣC , δ〉 , where:
• Q is a non-empty set of states,
• Q0 is a non-empty set of initial states such that Q0 ⊆ Q,
• ΣC is deﬁned as (Σin, Σout, Σint), where:
Σin deﬁnes input actions,
Σout deﬁnes output actions, and
Σint deﬁnes internal actions.
The distinctions are that input actions are not under the local system’s control and
are caused by another non-local component, the output actions are under the system’s
control and externally observable by other components, and internal actions are under
the local system’s control but are not externally observable.
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• δ : Q× ΣC → Q is a state transition function.
For example, consider the two component automata C1 and C1 shown in Figure 4. The









2, e2 ∈ Σ2,int,
b2 ∈ Σ2,out, and
c2, d2 ∈ Σ2,in.
Figure 4: Component Automata Examples
Now, given a set of component automata {C1, . . . , Cn}, a team automaton T is a four-








= Πni=0Q0i is a non-empty set of initial states,
• ΣT is an action signature deﬁned as (Σin, Σout, Σint), where:
Σout =
⋃n
i=0 Σi,out, the union of all component automata output sets,
Σin = (
⋃n
i=0 Σi,in) \ Σout, the union of all component automata input sets minus
component automata output sets,
Σint =
⋃n
i=0 Σi,int, the union of all component automata internal sets,
• δT : QT × ΣT → QT is a transition function deﬁned on all possible input actions to
the team.
Consequently, given a single action, a team automaton is capable of ﬁnding all com-
ponents in the team which can, from their current states, execute that action, and requiring
all of them to execute it simultaneously. This behavior is similar to our intended approach.
A team automaton can be deﬁned as: (1) cooperating, if it is structured so that one of the
automata is the active master, and all others are passive slaves; or (2) collaborating, if it is
structured so that all of the automata are active peers.
3.3.4 Team Edit Automata
In this section, we present our core approach to SCSL; namely Team Edit Automata (TEA).
The team edit automata model incorporates the powerful enforcing capability of edit au-
tomata into the architectural model of team automata, which allows interaction between
different components of the team. Particularly, a team edit automaton is composed of one
or multiple component edit automata. The team can deﬁne which ﬂaws detected by its
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component automata should be reported and which ones should be suppressed. Since a
team edit automaton is composed of multiple component edit automata, we ﬁrst introduce
component edit automata, and then follow with the description of the team itself. For con-
sistency with similar related work, we use the same notation used for security automata and
edit automata.
Component Edit Automata A component edit automaton is used to simulate program
monitoring for one security property. A component edit automaton is a ﬁve-tuple 〈Q,Q0,ΣC , G, δ〉,
where:
• Q is a non-empty ﬁnite, or countably inﬁnite, set of states,
• Q0 is a non-empty set of initial states such that Q0 ⊆ Q,
• ΣC is deﬁned as (Σin, Σout, Σint), where:
Σin deﬁnes input actions,
Σout deﬁnes input actions, and
Σint deﬁnes internal actions,
• G is a set {g1, . . . , gn} of guard conditions,
• δ : Q × ΣC × G → Q × (ΣC ∪ {·}) × G is a partial function specifying the state
transition function of the automaton.
A guard condition g allows a component edit automaton to verify context information
before making state transition. This increases the expressiveness of our model over edit
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automata, where the state transitions are only based on temporal properties of the input
action.
The partial function determines the output action based on the current state of the au-
tomaton, namely, the input action and the guard condition. Based on this combination, the
function determines whether the automaton should suppress the input action, report errors,
or insert actions to the output. All the undeﬁned transitions by δ are considered to be er-
rors, which would keep the automaton in its current state and report security violation to
the team. The operational semantics of component edit automata is speciﬁed in Fig. 5.
(q, σ, g)
a−→ (q′, σ′, g′) (Basic)
σ = a; σ′ δ(q, a, g) = (q′, a′, g′)
(q, σ, g)
a′−→ (q′, σ, g′) (Insertion)
σ = a; σ′ δ(q, a, g) = (q′, ., g′)
(q, σ, g)
.−→ (q′, σ′, g′) (Suppression)
σ = a; σ′ δ(q, a, g) = (q, ., g)
(q, σ, g)
r−→ (q, ., g) (Report Flaw)
Figure 5: Component Edit Automata Semantics
The semantics of insertion and suppression are similar to the one deﬁned in edit au-
tomata. The "report ﬂaw" case does not conﬁrm that a ﬂaw exists; rather it only reports
that a ﬂaw is possible. Upon an input action a, for which the transition function δ is not de-
ﬁned, the automaton outputs a special action r, standing for report-ﬂaw. The output action
r signals to the team that there is a potential ﬂaw in the program.
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(q, σ, g)
{σ1}−→T {(q′, σ′, g′)} (Basic)
(q1, σ, g1)
σ1−→∗C1 (q′1, σ′, g′1) (q2, σ1, g′1) σ2−→∗C2 (q′2, σ′′, g2)
(q1, σ, g1)
{σ2}−→T {(q′2, σ′′, g2)}
(Pipelining)
(q1, σ, g1)
σ1−→∗C1 (q′1, σ′, g′1) (q2, σ, g2) σ2−→∗C2 (q′2, σ′′, g′2)
(q1, σ, g1)
{σ1,σ2}−→ T {(q′1, σ′, g′1), (q′2, σ′′, g′2)}
(Concurrency)
(q, σ, g)
s−→T s′ σ′ ∈ s σ′ = r
(q, σ, g)
r−→T {(q, ., g)}
(Report Flaw)
Figure 6: Team Edit Automata Semantics
Team Edit Automata It is composed of one or more correlated component edit automata
connected using actions. The team controls the interaction between these automata, and
ensures that all of them will respond to program inputs with explicitly deﬁned outputs. In
the same vein as team automata, given a set of component automata {C1, . . . , Cn}, a team




• QT = Πni=0Qi is a non-empty set of states, where Π denotes the Cartesian product,
• QT
0
= Πni=0Q0i is a non-empty set of initial states,
• ΣT is an action signature. It is composed of all single actions from any one of the
component automata. Consequently, the internal action set of T is the union of the
internal action sets of the components. The T output action set is the union of the
component automata output sets whereas the T input action set is the union of all
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i=0 Σi,in) \ Σout,
• δT : QT ×ΣT ×GT → QT × (ΣT ∪ {·})×GT is a transition function deﬁned on all
possible input actions to the team, where GT is a non-empty set of guard conditions,
deﬁned as: GT = Πni=0Gi.
A team edit automaton can be deﬁned as:
• Pipelining team edit automata. A team edit automata is pipelining if the output from
one of its components is the input of another component. Given a single action, a
team edit automaton is capable of ﬁnding all component edit automata in the team
which can, from their current states, execute that action, and requiring all of them to
execute it.
• Concurrent team edit automata. Given an output action from any component edit
automaton in the team, a team edit automaton is capable of ﬁnding all component
edit automata in the team which can, from their current states, execute that action,
and requiring all of them to execute it.
• Combinative team edit automata. It contains component edit automata that have both
pipelining and concurrency relationships.
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The operational semantics of team edit automata is presented in Figure 6, where rule
Pipelining represents the pipelining team edit automata and rule Concurrency represents
the concurrent team edit. Rule Report Flaw describes the case when the team edit au-
tomata reports a ﬂaw. In the dynamic context, this ﬂaw represents a vulnerability, whereas
in the static context, this ﬂaw may represent a vulnerability. Final decisions should be pro-
vided by the team should ﬂaws occur. These decisions should be speciﬁed according to the
particulars of the security properties that have been checked.
Example Consider a system that enforces (1) a disable/enable-interrupt policy, (2) a priv-
ileged directory access policy, and (3) a user/process authentication policy. Only processes
running on a supervisor mode should be able to access/modify/delete ﬁles in a privileged
directory, or disable/enable system interrupts. In order to enforce these policies, three com-
ponent edit automata are constructed for each policy to form a team. The output of the
authentication automaton is piped to both automata of directory access and disable/enable
interrupt. In such architecture, the authentication automaton has a pipelining relationship
with the other two automata. However, both automata of directory access and disable/en-
able interrupt have concurrency relationships.
3.4 Design and Implementation of Team Edit Automata
In this section, we highlight the design and the implementation of Team Edit Automata
(TEA). Further details of the implementation are deferred to Chapter 7.
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3.4.1 Design Overview of TEA
In general, a TEA is composed of one or more component edit automata. Both the team
and the components are triggered through events. Components are related to each other
(belong to the same team) using actions. Should a team receives multiple outputs from
different components, the team must determine the ﬁnal action to be taken. In our design,
the team actually refers the outputs to another component, referred to as Suggestion Solver
to ﬁnally determines the action to be taken.
We utilize Object-Oriented Programming, particularly C++, for our implementation of
TEA. Four main classes compose our design, namely Event, ComponentAutomata,
TeamAutomata and SuggestionSolver.
• Class Event is provided as an abstract class, and is to be implemented by inherited
concrete classes based on the particulars of the application being tested. An Event
object is the entity that triggers both component and team automata, which may lead
to a state transition of these automata.
• Class ComponentAutomata is provided as an abstract class. Security properties
are represented as objects of this class; more particularly as objects from concrete
classes inheriting that class.
• Class TeamAutomata relates and enables interactions between different compo-
nents. The class implements the functionalities needed to allow such interaction,
as well as, other functionalities needed for team management. Upon any program
action, the team guarantees a proper and deterministic response to that action.
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• Class SuggestionSolver provides the actual capability for taking ﬁnal deci-
sions should ﬂaws occur. Our implementation provides a simple decision solver that
determines the ﬁnal decision based on a pre-deﬁned set of prioritized different sug-
gestions. However, security analysts should implement their own suggestion-solver
according to the particulars of the security properties they are checking.
Figure 7: Partial Overview of Team Edit Automata Classes
3.4.2 Implementation of TEA
The relations between the different classes together with their main contents are illustrated
in Figure 7. The ComponentAutomata class is provided as an abstract class. Objects
from this classes are associated to a team through the _team private attribute. A compo-
nent is capable of changing teams through the utilization of the public methods Unreg-
isterToTeam() and RegisterToTeam().
The Ok(), Suppress(), Halt() and Insert() methods are used to enforce the
proper reaction of the automata. For instance, should a violation is detected, the automaton
may halt program execution or suppress the violating action then continue execution. The
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automaton may alternatively insert an additional action, for corrective measures, before
execution continues.
Upon the occurrence of an input event, the component would perform two operations
through the execution of the QueryEvent() and ExecuteEvent() methods accord-
ingly. First, the component responds to the input action with a suggestion without actually
performing state transition. The actual transition is then performed through the execution
of the later method.
The TeamAutomata class provides the implementation of the TEA. The Regis-
terComponent() and UnregisterComponent() methods are used to register/un-
register component automata into the team. A team is capable of managing those automata
that are registered to it. The class maintains a private data structure, _events, where it
stores unprocessed events. Events from components automata are enqueued into this data
structure through the utilization of the AddInternalEvent() method.
As a separation of concerns, and to allow security analysts to deﬁne how outputs iclud-
ing ﬂaws will be dealt with in any way they wish, the issue of handling outputs is isolated
from the team. The team refers this operation to the SuggestionSolver. Upon the oc-
currence of an input action, the Query()method broadcasts that action to all components
of the team to obtain their suggestions. These suggestions are then sent to the Sugges-
tionSolver to produce a team-wise suggestion. Security analyst should implement their
own suggestion-solver according to the particulars of the application under test.
Finally, to facilitate the work of security analysts, we provide a graphical user interface
facility with which security analysts can express the property to be tested by drawing the
automaton instead of writing its object-oriented code. Figure 8 provides a view of our
88
interface. More information of our graphical utility is provided in Chapter 7.
Figure 8: Graphical User Interface for Writing Security Properties
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced a mathematical model, namely Team Edit Automata
(TEA). With this model, security analysts are capable of precisely specifying the security
properties that they wish to test the software against. In addition to achieving the main
requirement of allowing the analysts to specify the security properties, this research effort
has achieved the following goals: 1) allowing the user to easily specify the desired security
properties through a simple easy-to-learn graphical notation. 2) allowing the composition
of several speciﬁcations of security properties. and 3) allowing the speciﬁcation of mitiga-
tion measures upon the detection of a given security vulnerability. We have highlighted the







It is sometimes necessary to inject additional code at particular points in a software. The
execution of the injected code can then be used for different reasons, such as providing
proﬁling information about the software behavior, or even controlling/altering the original
behavior of the software. Code instrumentation is hence considered a crucial subject in
relation to various software security ﬁelds, such as security testing and security hardening.
In spite of the fact that code instrumentation has the potential of disrupting the original
behavior of software, and that other alternatives to code instrumentation could be used, it
is likely that code instrumentation would provide the best results for such purposes. An
alternative to code instrumentation is statistical sampling. With statistical sampling, indi-
vidual observations are recorded then used, statistically, to form the needed knowledge.
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While statistical sampling is less disruptive to program execution, it cannot provide com-
plete accurate information [99]. For instance, statistical sampling may be able to reveal
the percentage of time spent by CPU for execution of some frequently-called functions,
whereas code instrumentation can provide the exact number of calls made to each of them,
as well as the time spent in each call.
While the general idea of code instrumentation is common; that is just inject additional
monitoring code in the base code, various code instrumentation techniques exist, as we
previously discussed in Chapter 2. These techniques however carry various tradeoffs. The
main contribution of the work presented in this chapter is a code instrumentation approach
that is more suitable for software security testing and vulnerability detection. The approach
takes special interest in Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) as a framework and a tech-
nology for code instrumentation. More precisely, the approach is based on both AOP and
the compiler-assisted approach. In that context, we ﬁrst discuss the applicability and us-
ability of AOP for code instrumentation. A detailed introduction of our approach to code
instrumentation is then presented. We ﬁnally present our extension to the GCC compiler to
support our code instrumentation technique.
4.2 Aspect-Oriented Programming Instrumentation
As a part of this research effort, we investigate the applicability and usability of Aspect-
Oriented Programming (AOP) [87] as a tool for code instrumentation for security testing.
In this section, we provide a brief introduction of AOP, explain our interest on it as a tool
for code instrumentation, and highlight its applicability and limitations for such purpose.
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Following that, we highlight the needed extensions to AOP to become usable for security
testing code instrumentation, and detail our contribution to that subject.
4.2.1 Aspect-Oriented Programming
Aspect Oriented Programming (AOP) [87] is a paradigm that improves software modularity
by allowing encapsulation of crosscutting concerns such as security, synchronization, etc.
AOP uses a weaving mechanism to merge code in a natural and systematic way. Generally,
weaving is the process of composing core functionality modules with aspects into one sin-
gle application. Additionally, one of the most used AOP approaches is the pointcut-advice
model. The fundamental concepts of the pointcut-advice approach are: join points, point-
cuts and advices. A join point is a point in the execution of an application. A pointcut is a
constructor that designates a set of join points, and an advice is a code segment attached to
speciﬁed pointcuts. Advice is executed when join points satisfying its pointcut are reached.
Generally, there are three kinds of advices: before, after and around. AOP executes the
before and after advices before and after intercepted join points, respectively. The around
advice allows the possibility to either execute or skip the join point.
Other AOP approaches are available such as multi-dimensional separation of concerns
[152] and adaptive programming [100]. Multi-dimensional separation of concerns allows
simultaneous separation according to multiple, arbitrary kinds (dimensions) of concerns.
Adaptive programming motivates speciﬁc programming style that produces as much as
possible loose coupling between the program structure and the concerns.
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4.2.2 AOP for Security Testing
We consider AOP, and in particular the pointcut-advice model, as a very attractive alter-
native for code instrumentation for the purpose of security testing. AOP allows for the
separation of crosscutting concerns. Security analysts are capable of injecting monitor-
ing code at those particular points where proﬁling is needed, and such injections can be
done in an automatic way. Further, if the proﬁling code is instrumented as aspects, it can
then be merged with the original code to produce ﬁnal instrumented code that is suitable
for the intended security testing. Another signiﬁcant advantage of AOP is that many AOP
languages have already been developed as language-dependent for various programming
languages. For instance, AspectC [35] is built on the top of the C programming language,
AspectC++ [147] is built on the top of the C++ programming language, AspectJ [86] is
built on the top of the Java programming language, AspectC# [89] is built on the top of
the C# programming language, and Apostle, an AOP for the Smalltalk programming lan-
guage [13]. The attractiveness of AOP motivates us to elaborate a framework for security
testing using the aspect-oriented paradigm. However, the current set of available point-
cuts is insufﬁcient for the purpose of security testing and hence an extension to this set is
needed, as we explain in Section 4.2.3.
Since multiple AOP languages exist, we focus our research on one of them, AspectC++
[147], an AOP extension for C++. AspectC++ provides two types of pointcuts: name
pointcuts, which describe some known entities in the program, and code pointcuts, which







6: char *ptr_a, *ptr_b;
7: ptr_b = new char[200];
8: strcpy(ptr_b, "Benign string.");
9: cout « ptr_b « endl;
10: delete [ ] ptr_b;
11: ptr_a = ptr_b;
12: strcpy(ptr_a, "Malicious code.");
13: cout « ptr_a « endl;
14: return 0;
15:}
Figure 9: Illustrative Example of Current Limitations of AspectC++ Pointcuts
For instance, assume the existence of a C++ class called SomeClass, it is possi-
ble to match all methods in that class that return an integer through the utilization of
“int SomeClass::%(...)” name pointcut. Describing the calls of such methods
at runtime is made through the utilization of a pointcut as follows: “call(int Some-
Class::%(...))”.
While these two types of pointcuts are quite useful, they are insufﬁcient for our intended
instrumentation for security purposes. The main problem is the incapability of these point-
cuts to target local and global variables in C/C++ code. Figure 9 provides an illustrative
example that shows the problem. The code shown in Figure 9 is rather a simple example of
a vulnerable memory manipulation. The code deletes an allocated memory at line 10 then
utilizes this memory again at line 12. Although this code would compile and execute, it is
clearly vulnerable since data are written to unallocated memory.
These types of errors can clearly be detected by injecting monitoring code within the
method; particularly before and after the variable is being accessed. However, this is not
currently possible since AspectC++ pointcuts do not support this type of injection. Con-
sequently, if AspectC++ is meant to be used for the intended security testing purposes, a
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<VariablePointcut> ::= <NameVariablePointcut> | <CodeVariablePointcut>
<CodeVariablePointcut> ::= get(<NameVariablePointcut>) | set(<NameVariablePointcut>) |
declare(<NameVariablePointcut>)
<NameVariablePointcut> ::= <Type> [<NameSpace>][<Class>|<Struct>]::[<Function>]::<VariableName>
Figure 10: New AspectC++ Pointcuts
new set of pointcuts has to be designed and implemented. We introduce these pointcuts in
Section 4.2.3.
4.2.3 New Pointcut Extension for AspectC++
In order to allow the utilization of AOP for the intended security purposes, we introduce an
extension of four new pointcuts. Since we need to match local/global variables in C/C++
code, we ﬁrst introduce a name pointcut that allows us to match these variable names.
We then deﬁne three code pointcuts that allow us to keep track of the declaration and
manipulation (read and write) of these variables. Figure 10 shows our new pointcuts.
To illustrate how the new pointcuts can be used to detect runtime errors, such as the
ones shown in Figure 9, we ﬁrst need to deﬁne an aspect for monitoring pointer operations.
This aspect, which utilizes our new pointcuts, is shown in Figure 11. In the Pointer-
Tracker aspect, shown in Figure 11, MemoryTrackingList and PointerTrack-
ingList are our user-deﬁned lists that keep track of allocated memory space and declared
pointer variables. The declared() and write() pointcuts deﬁne pointcuts for pointer
declaration and assignment respectively. The writeToContent() and readToCon-
tent() pointcuts deﬁne pointcuts for writing and reading memory spaces referenced by




3: static MemoryTrackingList mtl;
4: static PointerTrackingList ptl;
5:
6: pointcut declared() = declare("%* %");
7: pointcut write() = set("%* %");
8: pointcut writeToContent() = set("* (%* %)");
9: pointcut readToContent() = get("* (%* %)");
10:
11: advice declared() : after() {
12: // register pointer variable in ptl
13: }
14: advice write() : after() {
15: // update pointer’s right-hand value (rvalue) in ptl
16: // detach pointer from old memory space
17: // attach it to new memory space or NULL
18: }
19: advice writeToContent() : before() {
20: // report error if pointer attaches to NULL
21: }
22: advice readContent() : before() {
23: // report error if pointer attaches to NULL
24: }
25:}
Figure 11: Utilization of the New Pointcuts for Tracking Memory Management Operations
the actions taken at the four pointcuts. Whenever a pointer is declared, the weaved code
registers the pointer to the PointerTrackingList. A change to an allocated memory
space is registered to the MemoryTrackingList, which keeps track of this memory as
well as pointers pointing to it. All pointers not pointing to properly allocated memory space
are associated with a special NULL record in the list.
The utilization of this aspect allows overcoming the limitation of the current AspectC++
implementation. For instance, by weaving this aspect into codes that are similar to the one
shown in Figure 9, the weaved application is capable of reporting errors should an attempt
to utilize a NULL pointer is detected.
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4.3 AOP-Compiler-Assisted Code Instrumentation Approach
Understanding the beneﬁts of the pointcut model of AOP, we designed and implemented a
new approach, namely AOP-Compiler-Assisted Code Instrumentation. This approach takes
advantages of the powerful capabilities of both AOP pointcuts and the compiler-assisted
approach, described in Section 2.5.5.
The following major facts are behind our choice for combining AOP with the Compiler-
Assisted approach in particular:
• Program structures are naturally known to compilers. Compilers know the lexical
structure and semantics of the code being compiled. Hence, they are capable of build-
ing a more structured representation of the code (i.e. Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) and
Control Flow Graphs (CFG)). Consequently, instrumentation can be performed very
precisely at any program points.
• Better execution performance can be achieved as a result of utilizing compilers. This
issue is crucial to dynamic analysis, where multiple executions of the program, pos-
sibly a very large number, may be needed before vulnerabilities can be detected.
Since compilers perform program optimization, they are capable of optimizing the
instrumented code as well. There is also another performance enhancement. Since
the monitoring code is complied as part of the instrumented code, a faster executable
is obtained.
Our decision to use the compiler-assisted approach in fact raises three major concerns:
1. Which compiler?
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2. Is this compiler capable of supporting various programming languages?
3. Does this compiler provide what we need for security instrumentation?
The answer to the ﬁrst two questions was the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) [55].
There are many reasons behind our choice of GCC. Beside the fact that GCC is well-
developed and has heavily been used and tested in multiple platforms, the compiler sup-
ports the compilation of various programming languages such as C, Objective C, C++,
Java, Fortran, and more. GCC uses a universal intermediate language, called GIMPLE, to
represent programs written in different languages. Consequently, by instrumenting at the
GIMPLE level, support for various languages can be achieved. The answer to the third
question is “no”. Hence, in order to use GCC, we need to ﬁrst extend it. In fact, various
extensions are needed in order to support various programming languages.
Figure 12: Workﬂow of the GCC Extension for Code Instrumentation
Considering the security issues that the C language is known to suffer due to its un-
derlying implementation of data types and operations, we view the language as one that
highly deserves attention, in terms of security. Consequently, we implement an extension
to the GCC compiler for C. Figure 12 shows a workﬂow of the GCC extension for code
98
instrumentation.
With this extension, GCC is capable of providing automatic code instrumentation. The
rules of such instrumentation, i.e., what and where to instrument, is provided through an in-
put ﬁle, referred to as the Instrumentation Guide. The code to be instrumented is provided
as a shared library. As shown in Figure 12, three components are provided to the GCC
extension: the original source code, an instrumentation guide, and the instrumentation rou-
tines, which are provided as a static library to the middle-end component of GCC. Further
details of CCC internals are provided in Section 4.4.1. While adding the instrumentation
routines statically; i.e. at compile/linking time, may be sufﬁcient in many cases, it has
some limitations. For instance, the instrumentation routines must be written in the same
language as the one used to write the original source code, which may not be convenient
in some cases. To provide further ﬂexibility, our extension allows for the instrumentation
routines to be provided as a shared library that are dynamically linked to the instrumented
program. It is possible for the analyst to write the instrumentation routines in a different
language than the wrap these routines into interfaces of the language used for the source
code. The wrapped routines can then be supplied as part of the shared library.
The extension is capable of instrumenting code at any of the following points in a C
program:
• Function call: Programs are often composed of many functions/methods that in-
teract to provide the full functionality of the software. Hence, it may be crucial to
collect proﬁling information at points where a method is being called. Our instru-
mentation allows the injection of proﬁling information both before and after a method
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is being called. Additionally, our instrumentation allows security analysts to supply
arguments that are needed for the function to proceed, as well as obtaining values
returned by the method after execution.
• Function exit: With this instrumentation, it is possible for security analysts to obtain
proﬁling information at the point where the function is about to return/exit. Such
instrumentation allows the tracking of intraprocedural context of a function.
• Variable declaration/read/write: This instrumentation allows the tracking of global
and local variables in C/C++ programs. With such instrumentation, it is possible
to detect a large spectrum of vulnerabilities caused by improper use of variables,
such as illegal pointer manipulations and buffer overﬂow. Our instrumentation tracks
variables through their names and locations in a source code and enables the tracking
of all variables types in C programs.
• End of a variable’s binding scope: This instrumentation is mainly needed for efﬁ-
ciency purposes. Local variables have a limited scope, which starts at the point they
are declared and ends just before the method/block, where they are declared, return-
s/ends. Global variables have a longer-life starting form the point they are declared
until the program, where they are declared, exits. This type of instrumentation allows
the release of program monitors that keep track of a variable, once this variable goes
out of scope.
• Pointer dereference: It is reasonable to state that pointers are the most powerful
operators in C/C++ programs, with their capability to access, or attempt to access,
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any memory space, including those out of the proper process/user-space. Hence,
pointer misuse has always been one of the major techniques for security attacks.
This type of instrumentation is dedicated for keeping track of pointers, which allows
security analysts to monitor pointer dereference and validate pointer actions.
In addition to the instrumentation capabilities at all the above points in a program, our
extension allows the injection of additional proﬁling code that is needed to control the
program execution upon the detection of a vulnerability. The taken action is classiﬁed as
suppress, insert, or halt, as mentioned in Section 3.3.4.
• Suppress instrumentation: With this type of instrumentation, it is possible for an-
alysts to inject monitoring code at known security-sensitive points in a program for
the purpose of skipping the execution of these points. There are many reasons behind
such instrumentations, such as to allow program execution to continue in spite of the
existence of a known vulnerability. Such execution allows the skipped vulnerabil-
ity to hence become ineffective, so that further independent vulnerabilities can be
detected.
• Insert instrumentation: With such instrumentation, security analysts can rather in-
ject additional code upon the detection of a vulnerability and continue execution.
Such inserted code may perform corrective handling/measures. Our extension in-
serts the needed routines in shared or static libraries. It is hence quite ﬂexible for
analysts to add their own deﬁned routines to these libraries, which are then linked to
the instrumented program.
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• Halt instrumentation: This instrumentation allows the program execution to termi-
nate upon the detection of a vulnerability. This is simply done through the instru-
mentation of code that include the exit() call.
4.4 Design and Implementation of GCC Code Instrumen-
tation Extension
In this section we present our design and implementation of GCC extension in order to
support code instrumentation. To facilitate the understanding of the subject, we ﬁrst provide
a brief background of GCC internals [57], the different phases of the compiler as well as its
GENERIC and GIMPLE intermediate languages. The details of our extension is provided
afterwards.
4.4.1 GCC Internals - Optimization and Code Generation Passes
GCC compilation of a source code is performed through various consecutive compilation
passes. The main passes can be described as Parsing pass, Gimpliﬁcation pass, Tree Static
Single Assignment (SSA) pass, and Register Transfer Language (RTL) pass. These passes
perform the needed conversion of text into bits, which can be optimized. Optimization is
performed on both high-level and low-level representation of the code. To allow for a better
modularity, GCC architecture deﬁnes three distinct logical portions where the compilation
and optimization are performed, namely the Frontend, Middle-end, and Backend. GCC
architecture is shown in ﬁgure 13.
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Figure 13: GCC Architecture
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The source code to be compiled is accepted at the frontend. Instead of generating var-
ious language-dependent representation of the code, GCC parses the code and generates
a universal language-independent output, which is referred to GENERIC Abstract Syntax
Tree (AST). The GENERIC AST is a part of the middle-end portion of the architecture.
However, the GENERIC representation is complex, so lowering stage as well as various
further transformations are then performed at the middle-end to produce a much simpler
representations. These operations result in a simpler representation, referred to as GIM-
PLE. Generally, nested expressions are decomposed to a three-address form where inter-
mediate values are stored using temporary variables. Control structures, such as loops, are
replaced by gotos. Figure 14 [57], shows an example of a GIMPLE representation for
some C++ source code.
The resulted GIMPLE representation is then simpliﬁed further by transforming it into
GIMPLE Control Flow Graph (CFG). These transformations take place at the middle-end
part of GCC, where various optimization take place as well. The resulting GIMPLE CFG is
then provided to the back-end of GCC. In that last part of the compiler, the work is done on
a low-level intermediate representation called Register Transfer Language (RTL). Hence,
the back-end performs further transformation of the GIMPLE into RTL, where ﬁnally the
code generation takes place.
4.4.2 Extending GCC for Code Instrumentation
GCC performs its operations as a sequence of passes. These passes are controlled by a
speciﬁc component referred to as the pass manager. The pass manager runs all of the
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int j = (--i, i ? 0 : 1);
for (int x = 42; x > 0; --x)
{







int i.0, T.1, iftmp.2;







T.1 = i.0 - 1;
i = T.1;
i.0 = i;
if (i.0 == 0) iftmp.2 = 1;







T.3 = g ();
T.4 = T.3 * 4;
i.0 = i;
T.5 = T.4 + i.0;
T.6 = T.5 + 32;
i = T.6;
x = x - 1;
test:;









} // end of code
(b) GIMPLE Representation
Figure 14: GIMPLE Representation for a Sample C++ Source Code
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individual passes in the correct order, and takes care of standard bookkeeping that applies
to every pass. The theory of operation is that each pass deﬁnes a structure that represents
everything of that pass, such as when and how it should run, and what form of intermediate
language it requires. The passes are hence registered to run in some particular order. This
order of execution is guaranteed to be followed by the pass manager.
Consequently, for our extension to become effective, we ﬁrst need to deﬁne our new
passes, register them to the pass manager and add the functionality needed by such exten-
sions to these passes.
Deﬁning Code Instrumentation Extension Passes For our code instrumentation exten-
sion, we deﬁne two new passes. The structure representing each of the different passes of
GCC is called tree_opt_pass. Figure 15 shows the structure of the ﬁrst pass of our
extension. The details of our passes are provided next.
struct tree_opt_pass pass_tree_security_instrument_vardecl =
{
"sintrument_vardecl", /* name */
gate_tree_security_instrument_vardecl,/* gate */
tree_security_instrument_vardecl, /* execute */
NULL, /* sub */
NULL, /* next */
0, /* static_pass_number */
0, /* tv_id */
PROP_gimple_any, /* properties_required */
0, /* properties_provided */
0, /* properties_destroyed */
0, /* todo_flags_start */
TODO_Dump_func, /* todo_flags_finish */
0 /* letter */
};
Figure 15: Structure of First Pass for Code Instrumentation Extension
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Pass Registration The pass manager is located in three ﬁles in GCC, passes.c, tree-
optimize.c and tree-pass.h. The new pass is registered to the pass manager by
including it in the init_optimization_passes() method in the passes.c ﬁle.
Figure 16 shows an extract of the init_optimization_passes()method, which


















Figure 16: Registering Code Instrumentation Passes
Execution Functionality of Extension Passes The functionality of our passes is deﬁned
in the execution part of the init_optimization_passes() method. For in-
stance, as shown if ﬁgure 15, the functionality of our ﬁrst pass is deﬁned in the tree_-
security_instrument_vardecl method.
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Scope-Wise Code Instrumentation Extension: Pass 1
For security testing purposes, code instrumentation is required at sensitive program points,
such as function calls, variable read/write, and pointer de-referencing. The ﬁrst pass of
our extension targets some of these points. The ﬁrst three instrumentation points shown in
Table 1, which are particularly related to program scope, are performed by pass one of our
extension. Referring back to Figure 13, our instrumentation takes place in the middle-end
part of GCC. In particular, at the higher-level GIMPLE representation before lowering. As
part of the lowering operation, GCC moves all variables out of their binding context so
important information needed for our instrumentation is lost.
# Instrumentation Point Instrumentation Pass
1 function return Pass 1
2 variable declaration Pass 1
3 end of variable’s binding scope Pass 1
4 function call Pass 2
5 variable read Pass 2
6 variable write Pass 2
7 pointer dereference Pass 2
Table 1: Instrumentation Points of Extension Passes
Figure 17 shows the deﬁnition of the tree_security_instrument_vardecl
method, which provides the instrumentation functionality of Pass one. This method makes
two calls to secinstr_xform_decls and secinstr_xform_out_of_scope,
which instrument the code at variable declarations and end of binding scopes respectively.
The walk_tree_without_duplicates method traverses the chain of the GIMPLE
tree nodes keeping track of program scopes. While traversing, the method performs the
needed instrumentation as instructed through the instrumentation guide.
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static unsigned int tree_security_instrument_vardecl(void)
{















walk_tree_without_duplicates (&fnbody, secinstr_xfn_xform_decls, &d);
}







Figure 17: Functionality of Instrumentation Pass One
CFG-Based Code Instrumentation Extension: Pass 2
Pass Two of our extension target instrumentations in relation to function calls and vari-
able use. The instrumentation is done through the traversal of the GIMPLE CFG for each
method, and matching function calls and variable use as instructed by the instrumentation
guide. If a pattern match is found, the instrumentation is performed according to the analyst
instructions in the instrumentation guide.
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The last four entries in Table 1 provide the instrumentation performed by Pass two of
the extension. The following provides a brief explanation of the way we implement the
matching for the required program points.
Matching Function Calls: Function calls are represented by GCC GIMPLE as particular
tree nodes referred to as CALL_EXPR. The CALL_EXPR nodes can appear in a GIMPLE
tree either as separate statement, or as the right-hand operand of an assignment statement,
which GIMPLE represents through a tree node called MODIFY_EXPR. Our implementa-
tion hence searches each statement and each right-hand operand for these nodes. Once a
match is found for a CALL_EXPR, we need to obtain the actual name of the calling method
to compare it with the ones provided by the instrumenting guide. We obtain the method
name thorough the utilization of the following API:
lang_hooks.decl_printable_name(CALL_EXPR_typed_tree, 2).
Matching Variable Read/Write: GIMPLE trees are stated in three-address form. Hence,
our implementation searches the left-hand side of assignment statements to identify those
variables that can be written. Similarly, searching the right-hand side of the statements
identify those variables that are only read. The two searches precisely identify the correct
type of variable use in the program.
Matching pointer de-referencing: In a similar fashion to the above matches, we search
those speciﬁc nodes in the GIMPLE tree that are related to pointer de-referencing. Those
nodes are called INDIRECT_REF. The INDIRECT_REF are allowed by GIMPLE to ap-
pear as right-hand or left-hand operands of an assignment statement. Our search targets
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both for matching. We additionally keep track on whether the de-referencing was read or
write depending on its location on the statement. This differentiation is insigniﬁcant in
terms of the required matching, but it can be used for future extensions if needed.
4.4.3 Execution of GCC Extension
Security analysts can utilize our GCC extension for code instrumentation either through
the utilization of command line option, or by deﬁning environment variables.
Command Line Option Security analysts can execute GCC extension by including a
particular command line option when initiating GCC, and additionally indicating speciﬁc
linking options to speciﬁc libraries. The command line both enables the instrumentation
functionality, as well as determines the speciﬁc instrumentation guide to be used. The
details of the instrumentation guide is given later in this section. Typically, this option is as
follows:
-ftree-security-instrument=instrumentation_guide_input_file
The “-ftree-security-instrument” portion of the command results in including our
security instrumentation routines. The value “instrumentation_guide_input_file”
determines which input ﬁle to be used as the instrumentation guide.
Security analysts additionally need to add speciﬁc linking options, which specify the
library containing the needed program monitoring routines. This is done through the uti-
lization of the usual GCC linking command options “-l” and “-L”. A typical command





Deﬁning Environment Variables Option The command line option is very suitable for
compiling one, or few, source ﬁles. For building larger projects, which is generally the
expected case, a better utility, such as MAKE [56], is to be used. However writing Make-
ﬁles requires some manual intervention and effort by the analysts, who also must have the
knowledge of writing such ﬁles. Since our goal is to allow for more automation, we pro-
vide this option, which eliminates the need to modify the original Makeﬁle. To enable the
instrumentation functionality, we need to provide the instrumentation guide, as well as the
shared library including the instrumentation functionality. Deﬁning environment variables
allows us to do so with a minimal effort by the analysts. Typically, the analyst needs to





The export FTREE_SECURITY_INSTRUMENT enables the analyst to indicate the
instrumentation guide to be used. The export SHARED_LIB_NAME enables the setting
of the code instrumentation shared library to be used. Finally, the call to make is needed
to build our new extended version of the compiler.
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GCCExtension - Instrumentation Guide Depending on the given security property and
the software to be tested, various instrumentations are needed at speciﬁc program points.
Hence, the exact rules of the instrumentation and the locations where it should take place
must precisely be given. To allow this, an instrumentation guide is provided, with which
the security analyst can supply the instrumentation rules. This information is supplied for
an efﬁcient processing by the compiler to take place. Typically, the instrumentation guide
includes various instruction lines, where each is composed of eight different ﬁelds. Since
these instructions are not that easy to read or construct, we refer to the guide as low-level
instrumentation guide.
Low-level Instrumentation Guide Each instrumentation instruction is composed of eight
ordered different ﬁelds. Table 2 provides the details of these ﬁelds. Hence, a low-level in-
strumentation instruction may look as follows:
fun1 1 4 program1.c::1843::p SecInstr_PtrDeref 1 0 0
Such statement would instruct our extension to performs an instrumentation of a function
called SecInstr_PtrDeref after the de-referencing of a pointer called p at line number
1843 in a method called fun1 in program1.c. Additionally, the instruction indicates
that the SecInstr_PtrDeref method is returning an integer value, and that both the
return value from the function and the passed argument to the function are of no use in this
case, and hence they are not to be exposed.
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Order Purpose Format and Value
1
Scope of the concerned program
point
“function_name” for a function scope
“*” for any scope
2 Instrumentation position
0 for instrumenting before a program point




0 for instrumenting at function call
1 for instrumenting at variable read
2 for instrumenting at variable write
4 for instrumenting at pointer dereference
8 for instrumenting at function return
16 for instrumenting at variable declaration
32 for instrumenting at end of variable’s binding
scope
4
Name of a concerned variable or
function
“function name” for a function call or “*” for any
functions
“Filename::lineNum::VariableName” for a variable
name, where Filename and VariableName are strings
and can both use wild character “*” and lineNume
is a positive integer with 0 representing all line
numbers of a source ﬁle
5
Name of the function to be
instrumented in the program
a string of the function name
6
Return type of the instrumented
function
0 for void type
1 for int type
7
Determine whether return value
of a function call should be
exposed
0 for not exposing the value
1 for exposing the value
8
Determine whether the
arguments of a function call
should be exposed
0 for not exposing the arguments
1 for exposing the arguments
Table 2: Fields of the Instrumentation Guide Input File
High-level Instrumentation Guide While our extension requires such low-level instru-
mentation instruction to process the needed instrumentation, these instructions may fairly
be viewed as not being that user-friendly. To alleviate the problem, we implement a small
language with which the analyst is capable of stating the instrumentation instructions in a
simpler way. We refer to such instructions as high-level instrumentation instructions. The
above low-level instrumentation instructions are stated as high-level instructions as follows:
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after derefptr (program1.c::1843::p) inject "SecInstr_PtrDeref";
The high-level instructions are compiled into low-level instructions suitable for processing
by our extension. The grammar of our high-level langauge is provided in Appendix A.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented our approach to code instrumentation for security testing,
which is based on Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) and the compiler-assisted instru-
mentation approach. This code instrumentation is crucial since it allows for the required
instrumentation to obtain proﬁling information of the software being tested as well as for
test-data generation as we explain in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
There are three major folds to the contribution presented in this chapter. Firstly, we
have explored the current limitations of AOP for such security instrumentation purposes,
and have proposed the needed extensions to AOP to support such functionality. In par-
ticular, we have proposed four new pointcuts to the pointcut model of AspectC++, with
which the needed security instrumentation can be achieved. Secondly, we have presented
our novel approach to code instrumentation, namely AOP-compiler-assisted code instru-
mentation. Thirdly, we have presented our extension to the GCC compiler, as well as our






There is a wide spectrum of software security vulnerabilities. Such vulnerabilities can be
classiﬁed in different ways. For instance, classiﬁcation can be made based on the level
of harmfulness, the way they can be manifested, the difﬁculty level to detect them, etc.
Particularly, in relation to detection, one classiﬁcation can be made based on the matter of
reachability, where the execution of some, possibly orderly, events is sufﬁcient to violate a
security property. In that context, we refer to those properties as reachability properties.
Another important matter that need to be examined is in relation to the analysis used for
detection. In particular, we need to examine whether, or not, static analysis can be sufﬁcient
for vulnerability detection. The intent of this chapter is to elaborate on both of these two
concerns.
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We ﬁrst deﬁne the matter of reachability, its details and applicability. Considering such
reachability analysis, we then examine the capability of sole static analysis for vulnerability
detection and elaborate a new approach to test-data generation for reachability. The work
performed to reach our objectives results in three main contributions:
• The proposal of reachability analysis, which can be applied for detecting reachability
security properties;
• A static analyzer that automatically identiﬁes vulnerable points in a control-ﬂow
graph;
• Test-data generator based on program slicing and pushdown automata model-checking
[88].
As a summary, the chapter provides a framework for security testing against violations
to reachability properties. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section
5.2, we detail our analysis of reachability and our classiﬁcation of security vulnerabilities.
In Section 5.3, we illustrate our approach for static generation of test-data, and provide
the details of our static analyzer, namely the Static Vulnerability Revealer (SVR). Section
5.4 provides the details of our test-data generator, which is based on Moped checker [88].




In order to prove that there is a security violation of a property, we need to generate data
with which the vulnerable code violating this property can be executed. In that sense,
a vulnerable piece of code that is not reachable is actually harmless, since it cannot be
executed. While it is true that concrete data needs to be generated to execute the vulnerable
code, we need to clearly distinguish two different types of data-generation that might be
needed for that purpose.
The ﬁrst type of data generation is related to the controlling variables and parameters
along the execution path to the potentially vulnerable site of the code. With such data,
program execution can be driven to the site in question. However, reaching this execution
point does not really mean that the violation will be triggered. For this, data generation for
those variables and parameters that are controlling the behavior of the potentially vulnera-
ble site is needed. These two sets of data could be different. Consequently, in such cases,
we need to generate data twice before we can prove that any violation exists. The ﬁrst data
generation is needed to reach to the potentially vulnerable site, while the second generation
is needed to successfully execute the violation. To illustrate the matter, let us consider the
code sample shown in Figure 18.
As shown in Figure 18, the code creates an array with an allocated size in line 4 then sets
the values of a number of elements of the array buffer in line 11 and line 12. However, the
initialization only takes place based on speciﬁc combinations of the values of d, x1, and x2
as shown in line 10. The code clearly has a potentially vulnerable segment spanning lines
11 and 12. Now to prove that this code is indeed vulnerable, a set of data generation must
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...
int main (int argc, char *argv[])
{
1 double d;
2 int x, y, size;
// d, x, y & size are intialized below
3 ...
4 int A[size];
// Initialize the array
5 for(int i = 0; i < size; i++)
{
6 A[i] = -1;
}
7 printf("Please enter the number of elements to place in the
buffer: \n");
8 int num;
// num is initialized below, possibly from a file
9 ...
// Follow some business rules before setting the
// array value to the proper values
10 if(d > 9876.54 && x1 > 999999 && x2 < 700000){
11 for(int i = 0; i < num; i++)
{
12 A[i] = i * 10; // Potential buffer-overflow
}
}else{





Figure 18: Sample Code for the Generation of Different Test-data Sets
ﬁrst be possible for the following variables: d, x1, and x2. Having such generated values
is necessary but yet insufﬁcient. In such case, the generation of values for the variables
size and num is needed to prove that the vulnerability indeed exists.
Consequently, in such similar cases, a ﬁrst set of data is to be generated to merely
reach the vulnerable site. Should the segment be reachable, a completely different set of
generation may then be required depending on the internals of such code segment and the
variables that control its operations. It should also be noted that, in such cases, the genera-
tion of a particular ﬁrst set may not be that crucial, since that set is possibly substitutable.
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For instance, if there are multiple paths in the program to the potentially vulnerable site,
then the generation of one set of data to reach this point is sufﬁcient to start attempting the
second generation.
However, there are many other cases, where the mere creation of the ﬁrst set is sufﬁcient
to prove a violation. This is often the case through the execution of a speciﬁc path(s), where
the sequence of events performed at these paths directly triggers the vulnerability.
Assume a system that deﬁnes the following security property: "Files must be encrypted





void encrypt(char * buffer, char *key);
void save(FILE *outfile, char *buffer);
int main (int argc, char *argv[])
{
...




4 if(keyval > 9999){
5 if(keyval > 999999){
6 printf("Invalid key.\n")
}else{
7 char *key = (char *)malloc(MAX_LEN);
8 memset(key, ’\0’, MAX_LEN);












Figure 19: Illustrative Sample Code for Reachability Properties
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In many cases, the code shown in Figure 19 is capable of enforcing the property. How-
ever, it will be directly violating the property if the value of keyval results in the execution
of line 6, which is then followed by line 13. Under such particular value and execution path,
the ﬁle will be saved without being encrypted, violating the property under concern. It is
clear that in such cases, only one set of data generation is sufﬁcient to prove the violation.
This set would include the controlling variables along the vulnerable path. Should it is
possible to generate concrete values for that set, the violation is directly proven. Many of
the security properties listed by the security coding rules of the United States Department
of Homeland Security [45] are reachability properties. We design and implement a static-
analysis based test-data generator for the purpose of producing test-data needed to detect
violations to reachability properties. The details of this generation are indicated in Sections
5.3 and 5.4. However, prior to going through such details, we will ﬁrst explore the matter of
reachability further. In particular, we need to provide an answer to the following question:
Is it possible to reduce/transform some non-reachability properties to reachability ones?
The answer to this question is important since it may signiﬁcantly broaden the range of
violations that can be detected through reachability analysis.
Reduction to Reachability
To reach a speciﬁc point in a program, proper data, with which the execution is driven to-
wards such a point, is to be generated. The data generation can hence be viewed as a set
of constraints that must be satisﬁed along the execution path. For instance, to reach the
potentially vulnerable point located at line number 12 in Figure 18, the set of execution
constraints can be speciﬁed as: {d > 9876.54, x1 > 999999, x2 < 700000}.
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The vulnerable point is reached if it is possible to generate data that satisﬁes that set. How-
ever, this does not yet prove any violation. To prove that a violation indeed exists, it is
needed to generate a different set of data in relation to num and size. Consequently, these
types of vulnerability are not reachability ones.
However, in many cases, it is possible to reduce non-reachability properties into reach-
ability ones by adding additional constraints along the path that will prove the violation
should the vulnerable point be reached. For instance, it is possible to prove the vulner-
ability shown in Figure 18 through the generation of a single set of data that satisfy the
following new set of execution constraints: {d > 9876.54, x1 > 999999, x2 <
700000, num >= size}. Consequently, the problem at hand is reduced to a reacha-
bility one.
There are several non-reachability properties that can be reduced into reachability ones.
Examples of such include vulnerabilities related to buffer overﬂow, numeric-overﬂow,
numeric-underﬂow and division-by-zero. Hence, our reachability analysis can be used
to detect a larger spectrum of vulnerabilities by reducing such non-reachability properties.
For instance, looking at each of the 174 security vulnerabilities reported by the United
States Department of Homeland Security [45], we ﬁnd that 71 of these vulnerabilities are
related to buffer-overﬂow and hence can be reduced to reachability analysis.
Consequently, our approach to reachability is capable of detecting a large number of
vulnerabilities that are either naturally reachability ones, or non-reachability that can be
reduced to reachability properties. This has led to further contributions, and in particu-
lar, our research is then extended towards the creation of an entire framework that targets
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the detection of reachability properties. Section 5.3 describes the components of our vul-
nerability detection framework, namely Static Vulnerability Revealer (SVR). Section 5.4
describes our approach to test-data generation for reachability analysis. Both of these com-
ponents are heavily based on static analysis, which we investigate carefully in Section 5.5
and reexamine it again in further details in Chapter 6.
5.3 Static Vulnerability Revealer
In this section, we introduce one of the main components of our model, namely the Static
Vulnerability Revealer (SVR). Given a source code of a program, and a formally speciﬁed
security property, SVR main concern is to ﬁnd out all program paths that have the potential
of violating the security property in concern. We refer to these paths as suspicious paths.
SVR is based on two major techniques, static analysis and model-checking.
Static analysis takes advantage of control-ﬂow, data-ﬂow, and type information gener-
ated by the compiler to construct program models that could be used to predict undesirable
behaviors. Model-checking techniques excel in the efﬁcient exploration of program models
for the purpose of matching them with respect to a logical or a behavioral speciﬁcation. In
this research, we use a static analysis technique to automate the model construction pro-
cess, and we use model-checking to explore these models. As such, we establish a synergy
between these two techniques.
SVR targets the detection of security vulnerabilities in software source code. In order
to provide multi-language support, we base our system on the GCC compiler [55]. Starting
from version 4, GCC mainline includes the Tree-SSA [122] framework that facilitates static
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analysis with a universal intermediate representation (GIMPLE) common to all supported
languages. SVR works on the GIMPLE representation and abstracts required information
to construct program models.
Another component utilized in SVR is a conventional pushdown system model-checker
called Moped [4,88], which comes with a procedural language, Remopla, for model spec-
iﬁcation. Moped performs reachability analysis of a speciﬁc statement in the Remopla
code. SVR utilizes the reachability analysis capability for the purpose of verifying security
properties. In our system, a security property is modeled as a Team Edit Automaton (TEA),
specifying the erroneous behavior using sequences of program actions. An error state is
introduced to represent the risk state for each automaton. The automaton is then translated
into Remopla representation. During veriﬁcation, program actions would trigger the state
changing of the automaton. If the error state is reached, a sequence of program actions
violating the given property is then detected. In other words, SVR converts the security
detection problem to a reachability problem. However, since not all security properties can
be reduced to reachability ones, further work is needed to validate those non-reachability
properties.
Figure 20 gives an overall view of the SVR system, which integrates the aforementioned
components. As shown in Figure 20, different phases compose our SVR system. The ﬁrst
phase addresses the property speciﬁcation and its model extraction. To ease the work done
by the security analyst, we provide a graphical capability with which the security property
can be stated. Each property is speciﬁed in TEA. Given the graphical representation, our
tool automatically translates the speciﬁed properties into a Remopla speciﬁcation, which
is then used as part of the input to the Moped model-checker. The output of this phase is a
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Figure 20: SVR System Architecture
Rempola model representing the given property.
The second phase addresses program model extraction. The input to this phase is the
source code of the program under test. The output is a Remopla model that synchronizes
the Remopla representation of the program with the Rempola representation of the se-
curity property. Speciﬁcally, a pass is added to the GCC compiler where the GIMPLE
representation is dumped into XML ﬁles, from which the program model is extracted and
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represented using Remopla. The generated program model is then combined with the
Rempola representation of the property. The combination is done for the purpose of:
(1) achieving synchronization between the program pushdown system and the security au-
tomata, (2) binding the pattern variables of security automata with actual values taken from
the source code, and (3) reducing the size of the program’s model by only considering
program actions that are relevant to the speciﬁed security properties.
In the third phase of our system, the resulting Remopla model from previous phases
is provided as input to the Moped model-checker for reachability analysis. An error is
reported when a security automaton speciﬁed in the model reaches an error state. The
output of this phase is a set of suspicious paths that would possibly violate the security
property in concern. It should be clearly noted that, due to the static analysis nature of
SVR, some of the reported vulnerabilities could be false positives, an issue that we revisit
shortly. Generally, the model-checking is the ultimate step of the SVR process.
5.3.1 Constructing Remopla Models
This subsection describes the construction of Remopla formal model in details, including
the generation of the Remopla representation for both security properties and the program
being analyzed.
Modeling Security Properties The security property is speciﬁed using TEA, and we
focus on temporal properties. A start node and an error node are introduced, respec-
tively, to represent the initial and the ﬁnal state of a TEA. Notice that if a temporal property
deﬁnes a correct behavior, the property is modeled by representing its negation. Hence, the
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error state is the risky state.
Figure 21: Security Property Specifying File Encryption Prior to Saving
From Security Automata to Remopla Given a property automaton, we serialize it into
Remopla representation, which we also refer to as Remopla automaton. The latter is rep-
resented using a Remopla module. As an exmaple, Figure 22 shows the Remopla module
of the ﬁle-encrypt-save security automaton in Figure 21. The nodes and the transition labels
of a security automaton are mapped to Remopla constructs, as deﬁned hereafter:
• Integers are used to identify the automaton nodes, each of which corresponds to an
enumerator of a Remopla enumerated type (i.e. the enumeration variable states
in Figure 22). For tracking the state of the automaton, an integer variable (i.e. cur-
rent_state in Figure 22) is introduced and initialized to the automaton’s initial
state (i.e. start in Figure 22) using the Remopla keyword INITIALIZATION.
• Transition labels are used to identify security relevant program actions. Table 3
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shows the program actions we capture, together with the corresponding Remopla
representation. The Remopla constructs preﬁxed with ACTION_ are deﬁned as ele-
ments of a Remopla enumeration type, which includes the relevant program actions.
A transition is triggered if its label matches the input program action. A transition
with the label in the ﬁrst entry, for instance, is activated when the program action
matches ACTION_PROGRAM_START (i.e. the main entry of a program). The sec-
ond row represents the termination of the program execution, and the next two entries
denote respectively the entry point of a function and its return. The mapping for a
function call is deﬁned in the ﬁfth entry. Each function argument is an element of
a global Remopla array ARG[], which is inquired during the model-checking pro-
cess when function parameters are involved in the property veriﬁcation. Notice that
the mapping in the last entry, representing an assignment, is focused more on the
program action and not on the data value being passed.
The translation from a security automaton to its Remopla representation follows the
mapping deﬁned in Table 3, and each security automaton is represented as a Remopla
module. Figure 22, for instance, shows an example of such representation. The mod-
ule takes the current program action as input, checks it against the deﬁned transitions,
and changes the automaton state accordingly. For example, lines 8 to 14 represent the
start node of the property in Figure 21. If the action matches ACTION_FUNC-
TION_CALL_encrypt with parameter ARG_X, the state is changed to encrypted. A
violation of the given property is detected should the error state is reached.
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1 enum states{start, encrypted, saved, error};
2 int current_state;
3 INITIALIZATION: current_state = start;
4
5 move_state (int action)
6 {
7 if
8 :: current_state == start ->
9 if
10 :: action == ACTION_FUNCTION_CALL_encrypt
11 && ARG[0] == ARG_X -> current_state = encrypted;
12 :: action == ACTION_FUNCTION_CALL_encrypt ->
current_state = error;
13 :: else -> break;
14 fi;
15 :: current_state == encrypted ->
16 if
17 :: action == ACTION_FUNCTION_CALL_save
18 && ARG[1] == ARG_X -> current_state = saved;
19 :: else -> break;
20 fi;
21 :: current_state == saved -> break;
22 :: current_state == error -> break;
23 :: else -> break;
24 fi;
25 }
Figure 22: Generic Remopla Representation of the Automaton in Figure 21
Program Model Extraction The model extraction is the process that translates program
source code to Remopla representation. The translation consists of two phases: (1) The
GIMPLE representation of parsed source code is converted and dumped into XML ﬁles,
and (2) Remopla model representing the source code is extracted from the XML ﬁles.
To reduce the size of the extracted program model, a preprocessing phase is incorporated
before model extraction. Since the set of properties to be veriﬁed has been speciﬁed, we
have the knowledge of a set of security-related functions. By analyzing the call-graph of the
program in concern, we are able to identify functions that are relevant to the veriﬁcation.
The size of the extracted model can hence be smaller, since it only preserves the security-
relevant behavior.
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Program Action Remopla Representation
Program entry ACTION_PROGRAM_START
Program exit ACTION_PROGRAM_END
Entry of f ACTION_FUNCTION_CALL_f
Return of f ACTION_FUNCTION_RETURN_f
f(v0,...,vn); ARG[0]=ARG_v0;...;ARG[n]=ARG_vn; f( );
var = v; ACTION_VAR_MODIFICATION_var;
Table 3: Remopla Representation of Program Actions
The translation from program constructs to Remopla representation follows the map-
ping deﬁned in Table 4. The ﬁrst entry of Table 4 shows the Remopla construct for the
control-ﬂow structure in source code. Note that each condition in the source code is rep-
resented using the Remopla keyword true. With such a condition, the model checker
would choose either branch non-deterministically during veriﬁcation, considering both
branches are feasible. At this stage, we take into account all paths in the source code with-
out pruning infeasible paths, which naturally leads to false positives. These false positives
will later be mitigated by our model as will be explained in Chapter 6.







:: true -> ...;














Table 4: Remopla Representation of Program Constructs
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As shown in the second entry, a function is represented as a Remopla module of type
void and without parameters. Two important program actions are associated with each
function: the entry of the function and its exit. We express these actions explicitly and
embed them in the program model. These actions are passed as parameters to the move_-





void encrypt(char * buffer, char *key);
void save(FILE *outfile, char *buffer);
int main (int argc, char *argv[])
{
...




4 if(keyval > 9999){
5 if(keyval > 999999){
6 printf("Invalid key.\n")
}else{
7 char *key = (char *)malloc(MAX_LEN);
8 memset(key, ’\0’, MAX_LEN);












Figure 23: Sample Code for Illustration of Remopla Model Generation
The last two entries deﬁnes respectively the mapping for function calls with and with-
out parameters. Before a function is called, its arguments are stored in the global Remopla
array ARG[], indexed by the parameter’s position in the function’s signature. When the
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property module is checking a given program action, this global array is inquired for the
passed parameters. For example, Figure 24 shows the Remopla program for the sample
code in Figure 23. For clarity, Figure 24 shows only statements relevant to our discussion.
The variables actions and args contain all the program actions and the passed param-
eters, respectively. The initial state of the program corresponds to the initial state of the
considered security automaton. The program model can be in one of the states deﬁned in
the given property automaton (i.e. the enumeration variable states in Figure 22). The
state of the model (i.e. current_state in Figure 24) is synchronized with the property
automaton (i.e. the one in Figure 22) by invoking the move_state() module with the
current program action as a parameter. In this example, line 32 in Figure 24 is reported by
our tool as a violation of the property in Figure 22.
Suspicious Paths Detection and Reporting SVR process concludes by detecting pro-
gram paths that could potentially violate the security property in concern. While SVR is
one of the components composing our model, it should be noted that SVR can be executed
as an independent security violation detection tool. However, due to the nature of static
analysis, the detected vulnerabilities reported by SVR may very well include false posi-
tives. While this may be acceptable in some cases, in other cases it may be massive and
overwhelmingly unacceptable. Consequently, the decision of whether to run SVR indepen-
dently is left to the security analyst. Since our goal is to eliminate any reporting of false
positives, we do refer to the detected paths as suspicious paths. We then inject those paths
to the other components of our model, where dynamic analysis is conducted to verify the
real existence of such reported vulnerabilities, as we explain in Chapter 6.
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1 //Automata actions declaration:
2 enum actions {ACTION_FUNCTION_CALL_encrypt,
ACTION_FUNCTION_CALL_save,
ACTION_PROGRAM_END};
3 //Function call possible arguments:
4 enum args {ARG_buffer,ARG_key,ARG_outfile};












17 module void main (){
18 if //if(keyval > 9999)
19 :: true ->
20 if //if(keyval > 999999)
21 :: true -> skip;
22 :: else ->
23 ARG[0] = ARG_buffer;
24 ARG[1] = ARG_key;
25 encrypt();
26 fi;
27 :: else -> break;
28 fi;
29
30 ARG[0] = ARG_outfile;





Figure 24: Remopla Model of Code in Figure 23
5.4 Moped-Based Test-Data Generation for Reachability
Analysis
As we have previously indicated in Chapter 2, various test-data generation approaches
exist. Such approaches include random test-data generation [18], directed random test data
generation [63], path-oriented test data generation [20, 28, 34], genetic and evolutionary
algorithms [30, 32], and goal-oriented [92] such as the chaining approach [54]. These
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approaches vary in nature and target different goals.
If vulnerabilities are present in a software, then they are present at speciﬁc program
points, which we refer to as security targets. Test-data generated by random testing may
never lead to these points. Full-path coverage may result into a massive effort being wasted
in exploring paths in the software that are not at all related to the vulnerability targets in
question. A goal-oriented approach may succeed in generating data to reach the goal, but
through an irrelevant path; in other words, a path that is not vulnerable. Consequently, to
achieve our security detection goals, we had to design another test-data generation model,
which takes advantage of a reachability checker, referred to as Moped checker. The fol-
lowing subsections provide the details of our reachability test-data generation component.
5.4.1 Reachability Checker
The reachability checker used in our model, namely Moped, is a model-checker for push-
down systems [88]. The checker simulates program execution for all possible arguments
within a ﬁnite range of values and generates trace information of these executions. Given
a target in a Remopla representation, the checker attempts to verify whether that target is
reachable. If the target is reachable, then the checker would generate a trace, including test-
data values, which would lead the execution to the target. Consequently, there is a large
performance overhead for these generations to be made. Generally, there are two major
factors that affect the performance of the model-checker: the value ranges and the number
of the variables.
The checker as designed is not suitable for our purpose of security test-data generation
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since its concern is to produce data to reach a speciﬁc target without any regard to a speciﬁc
path. For our system, we require the data to be generated for a speciﬁc path; in other words,
reaching the target through any path is insufﬁcient. Consequently, we needed to modify the
way the checker works so that the checker is forced to either generate data for a certain
path, or to fail to generate data for the path, on which we consider as infeasible in such
case. Additionally, we need to enhance the performance of the checker. To achieve these
goals, we revert to program slicing to optimize the Remopla representation. Section 5.4.2
details the program slicing component of our model.
5.4.2 TDG through Moped Checker and Program Slicing
Program Slicing has been introduced in [159] as a method of abstracting programs and
reducing them to a minimal form that is still capable of producing an original subset of a
behavior. A slice is an executable program that performs identical actions to a speciﬁed
subset of the original program. Depending on how minimal a slice is desired, a slicing
criterion is set, which speciﬁes a window for observing the program behavior.
Figure 25 shows the process of generating appropriate vulnerability reporting using
Moped checker and program slicing. The program is ﬁrst passed to SVR, which reports a
set of suspicious paths that could violate the property in concern. These paths along with
the source code are then passed to a static analyzer, which performs data and control ﬂow
analyses to determine what is required for these paths, such as the set of relevant variables.
Based on these analyses, program slicing is performed and the sliced program is ﬁnally
passed to the Moped Checker for test data generation, and vulnerability reporting.
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Figure 25: TDG using Moped Checker and Program Slicing
Figure 26 and Figure 27 provide an illustrative example of the process, where the soft-
ware is to be tested against violations of security property involving vfork() and exec-
cve() system calls. Subsequent calls to vfork() that precede the call to execcve()
have the potential vulnerability of modifying the state of the parent process instead of the
child process. As shown in Figure 27, the slicing window includes the suspicious path as
well as variables x1 and x2, which are the only relevant variables to that path.
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1 define DEFAULT_INT_BITS 20
2 module void vfork();
3 module void execve();
4 init main;
5 module void main(){
6 int x, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6;
7 if
8 :: x1 > 1000 ->
9 if
10 :: x2 > 1000 ->
11 vfork();
12 :: else -> break;
13 fi;
14 :: else ->
15 if
16 :: x3 > 1000 -> target1: x=20;
17 :: else ->
18 if
19 :: x4 > 1000 -> target2: x=30;
20 :: else ->
21 if
22 :: x5 > 1000 -> target3: x=40;
23 :: else ->
24 if
25 :: x6 > 1000 -> target4: x=50;









35 module void vfork(){}
36
37 module void execve(){}
Figure 26: Sample Remopla Representation without Slicing
5.4.3 Reachability Analysis Case Study
We conducted some experiments on our developed system. All the experiments are per-
formed under the following environments: Operating System: Ubuntu Linux release 6.10,
Linux Kernel: Linux kernel version 2.6.17-11-generic, Java Runtime Environment: Java(TM)
SE Runtime Environment (build 1.6.0 02b05), Shell: GNU bash version 3.1.17(1)-release,
autoconf: GNU Autoconf version 2.60, make: GNU Make 3.81, and Moped version 2.
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1 define DEFAULT_INT_BITS 20
2
3 module void vfork();
4 module void execve();
5
6 init main;
7 module void main(){
8 int x1, x2;
9 if
10 :: x1 > 1000 ->
11 if







19 module void vfork(){}
20
21 module void execve(){}
Figure 27: Sliced Remopla Representation of Code in Figure 26
These experiments target various aspects including the detection power of the system, the
performance of the test-data generator component, and the scalability of the analysis. Our
system is veriﬁed against various software, including gzip verion 1.2.4, httpd version 2.2.8,
Openca-tools version 1.1.0, OpenSSH version 5.0p1, Shadow version 4.1.2.2, and Sudo
version 1.7.0. Concerning scalability and detection power, our tool successfully veriﬁes
more than 20 reachability properties over the tested software.
For measuring the performance enhancement using our slicer for test-data generation,
we conduct various experiments over small software, as well as over larger-size software;
in particular gzip verion 1.2.4 (96 ﬁles totalling to 24247 lines of code). Figure 28 shows
the results of these tests. In general, our model provides a large performance enhancement,
of up to 99.8%, especially when the value range of the variables is increased. In addition to
this experiment, further experiments are conducted on the system for both validation and
comparison reasons. The details of such experiments are deferred to subsection 7.6.3 in
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Chapter 7.
Figure 28: Slicing’s Inﬂuence on Test-Data Generation
5.5 Examination of Static-Analysis Based Approaches
As described in Section 5.3 and Section 5.4, both SVR and Moped-based test-data genera-
tion approaches are heavily based on static analysis. Consequently. they are limited to the
detection powers of such analysis. For SVR, the detection of vulnerable paths is reported
by statically investigating the paths of the source code against potential vulnerabilities.
Hence, and due to the nature of the static analysis, false-positive reports are very possible.
Depending on different factors, such as the size and the complexity, of the software being
tested, the amount of false-positive reports may be signiﬁcantly unacceptable. To mitigate
the problem, some sort of dynamic analysis is needed so that all reports are guaranteed to
reﬂect real vulnerabilities.
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Furthermore, Moped-based test-data generation is restricted by the static-analysis na-
ture of the model-checker as well as other Moped limitations. In particular, the checker
is capable so far of handling only integer and boolean types. The integer range for data
generation is also limited, which adds another restriction.
5.6 Conclusion
We have presented in this chapter our approach to reachability analysis. In this context,
we have presented our classiﬁcation to security properties as being either reachability or
non-reachability ones. We have then explained how some non-reachability properties can
be reduced to reachability ones. There are two major issues that are related to this subject,
which are the detection of potential vulnerabilities in a software and the generation of test-
data to prove that such vulnerabilities can indeed be exploited at runtime. The latter is
needed to eliminate false-positive reporting.
As part of this research effort and contribution, we have implemented a framework
that targets the detection of vulnerabilities and the generation of test-data to prove their
existence. Two major components compose our framework. First, a vulnerability detector,
namely, Static Vulnerability Revealer, and second, a test-data generator based on Moped
model checker. Case studies have been conducted to validate our approaches.
We have further analyzed the framework and its components against limitations caused
by their dependence on static analysis. Due to these various limitations, we conclude that
such tools, which are heavily based on static analysis, can be very useful and more suitable
for testing relatively small software, such as embedded software. For testing large systems,
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we need to have other approaches and tools that combine the powerful capabilities of both
static analysis and dynamic analysis. We refer to such approaches as hybrid analysis ap-
proaches. This represents the subject of our next contribution in this research, which will
be detailed in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 6
Hybrid Approach to Test-Data
Generation
6.1 Introduction
The main intent of this chapter is to ascribe a novel approach to test-data generation that
takes advantage of the combined powerful capabilities of both static and dynamic analyses.
The research reported in this Chapter, leverages some of the ideas that emerged from our
fruitful collaboration with H. Z. Ling [69], that were published in [9,70,71]. Nevertheless,
we extend them by adding more rigor components and approaches when it comes to the
test data generation for linear and non-linear constraints. Indeed, we provide a detailed
investigation of the needed algorithms to solve the linear/non-linear collected constraints.
For instance, we propose the idea of root-crossing minimization. Moreover, we explore the
use of the Broyden method [24] for multi-dimensional root ﬁnding. Our contributions in
this domain can be summarized as follows:
142
• Elaborating a novel approach to test-data generation, namely hybrid static-dynamic
test-data generation approach.
• Elaborating a general framework for automating security testing, including security
vulnerability detection and test-data generation.
As discussed in Chapter 2, various test-data generation techniques exist. However, these
techniques are heavily based on either static analysis or dynamic analysis. Consequently,
such techniques suffer limitations caused by the utilized approach. Additionally, many of
these techniques may be capable of generating test-data for general testing purposes, which
makes them inappropriate for security testing in particular. For instance, techniques that
are capable of generating test-data to reach a particular program point may indeed generate
such data. Yet the execution with the generated data may lead the program to traverse
a non-vulnerable path, disallowing any vulnerability detection. Techniques that use full-
path coverage have the potential of producing an overwhelmingly unacceptable number of
generation attempts, where a lot of effort may be wasted on traversing irrelevant paths to
the potentially vulnerable ones.
In Chapter 5, we have examined the utilization of static analysis. The obtained results
concluded that such approaches suffer some limitations and result in the generation of
false-positives. In order to overcome such deﬁciencies, we resort to dynamic analysis.
More precisely, we use a synergy between the two types of analyses. In effect, as part of
this research, we examine two major concerns: 1) What type of analysis is appropriate for
security testing purposes?, and 2) What is the needed approach for generating test-data for
the purpose of security vulnerability detection?
143
The remainder of this chapter details the results of such an effort. In Section 6.2, we
introduce our approach to test-data generation, namely Goal-Path-oriented System (GPS).
Section 6.3 details our dynamic approach to test-data generation, which considers both
linear and non-linear programming. In that context, we also introduce a novel approach to
the subject, namely Root Crossing Minimization (RCM). Section 6.4 introduces our hybrid
framework for automating vulnerability detection, and provides the details of the main
components composing this system. Finally in Section 6.5, we provide a summary and
conclusion of the subjects covered in this chapter. We defer the details of the experiments
conducted over our system to Chapter 7.
6.2 Goal-Path-Oriented System - GPS
Various approaches exist for data-generation as described in Chapter 2. These approaches
can be classiﬁed based on their scope of coverage. For instance, random generation at-
tempts to repeatedly generate data that may eventually satisfy the purpose of the genera-
tion. This approach however does not guarantee that such data can ever be produced in a
bounded time, neither it guarantees that the generated data would cover all possible paths
of the software being tested. Directed-random generation approaches attempt to reduce
some of the shortcomings of random generation. While the data is still randomly gen-
erated, it would drive program execution through particular paths. In contrast to random
generation, approaches based on full-path coverage would attempt to generate at least one
set of data that would allow the traversal of each path in the program. Goal-oriented ap-
proaches, such as the chaining approach, have rather a signiﬁcantly different focus where
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neither random generation of data is performed, nor full-path coverage is required. Instead,
such approaches attempt to generate data with which a speciﬁc program point is reached.
For the purpose of security vulnerability detection, none of these approaches is ap-
propriate. We hence need to view the problem at hand differently. Our deﬁnition of the
problem is stated as follows: “Given a target point t in a program, and a path p to reach
that target, ﬁnd program inputs x1, x2, . . . , xn, with which t can be reached through the
execution of p”. Our view of the problem is driven by the fact that a speciﬁc security vul-
nerability violating security property presents itself at a speciﬁc program point. Yet, merely
reaching this point through any execution path may not result in the violation of the secu-
rity property. We consequently deﬁne a new approach to test-data generation, namely the
Goal-Path-oriented System (GPS). An overview of GPS is shown in Figure 29. Below, we
provide the details of the major components composing our system.
6.2.1 Route/Path Navigator
Before proceeding to the details of the components, the following deﬁnitions in relation to
a program path are given:
Basic Block: A sequence of contiguous instructions that contain no jumps or labels.
Hence, a basic block has only one entry point and one exit point. If the ﬁrst instruc-
tion in a basic block is executed, all instructions of the block will then be executed
as well.
Conditional Basic Block: A basic block that ends with a conditional statement. A condi-
tional statement has the following format: lhs op rhs, where the lhs and rhs
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Figure 29: GPS Architecture
respectively represent the operands on the left-hand and right-hand sides of a compar-
ison operator op. Generally, op is one of the following operators: ==, ! =, >,≥, <,≤.
Execution Path: A sequence of basic blocks.
Suspicious Path: An execution path in a program that has the potential of violating a
security property.
Critical Branch: A program branch that would permanently drive execution away from
a suspicious path.
Problem Node: A conditional basic block where the execution of the program leads to a
critical branch.
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Required Branch: A branch of a suspicious path that is initiated at a conditional state-
ment.
Controlling Variable: A variable appearing in a conditional statement along a suspicious
path.
Pertinent Variable: A variable appearing along a suspicious path in the program.
Master Controlling Variable: A pertinent variable that is inﬂuential to controlling vari-
ables. Data generation is needed for such variables.
Constraint Function: A function deﬁning some prescribed conditions. The format of
such conditions depends on the truth value of a conditional statement, where the
execution of a particular branch is to take place.
Root Direction: The execution direction towards ﬁnding the root of a constraint function.
The root, x, of a function f is deﬁned such as f(x) = 0, where x is a member of the
domain of f.
Root Crossing Minimization (RCM): The process of ﬁnding a member, x, from the
domain of a function f, such that f(x) < 0.
Constraint Value: This is a concrete generated value achieving root crossing minimiza-
tion of a constraint function. Such value is required for dynamic execution of the
program.
We tend to view the different paths of a software execution as routes of a city. Applying
this conceptual view, the problem of ﬁnding test-data that allow a speciﬁc route to be taken
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can be looked at as ﬁnding all relevant conjunctions along a route and determining which
route to be taken at each of these conjunctions. Following the same analogy, we also
understand that there may be controlling trafﬁc signals or gates along the route. Such
controlling entities do in fact determine/control the ﬂow to the destination. Additionally,
the existence of a massive number of trafﬁc lights and gates within the city is possible.
While this may indeed be the case, only a bounded number of these controlling entities
may be pertinent/relevant to the speciﬁc route to be taken. Hence, given a suspicious path,
the goals of the path navigator component of our model can be described as follows:
• Determine the exact set of pertinent variables to be generated for a given path;
• Determine the exact set of controlling variables along the path;
• Determine, for every conditional statement, the exact set of variables that are in-
ﬂuential to the controlling variables. This set hence includes the master controlling
variables of that path. The generation of data actually takes place for those variables;
• Determine the RCM directions to be taken at the different conjunctions along the
path, so that the execution of a required path is achieved.
Consequently, further static processing is needed for the path navigator to achieve the
needed operations. Particularly, both static data-ﬂow and control-ﬂow analyses need to be
performed.
Our static analysis is not performed directly over the source code; rather over a GCC
GIMPLE representation of it. As shown in Figure 29, we ﬁrst perform a transformation
of GIMPLE into XML, using a GCC patch [51] that creates an XML dump. The resulting
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XML ﬁles are parsed to produce an object-oriented class representation of GIMPLE. The
path navigator then performs its static analysis over the data-ﬂow and control-ﬂow object-
oriented representation of GIMPLE. Figure 30 shows a partial GIMPLE class diagram
representation.
Figure 30: Partial GIMPLE Class Diagram
Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 highlight the static analysis phases performed by the path nav-
igator.
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6.2.2 Static Data-Flow Analysis Phase
In this phase, we perform a set of static analysis, which is particularly needed in order to
support data-ﬂow analysis. This analysis takes place over the GIMPLE representation of
the program. The purpose of this analysis is to trace the particular variables that are related
to the suspicious path that is under investigation. Speciﬁcally, we trace the following:
• Pertinent variables to the suspicious path. This allows us to trace all program vari-
ables, including input variables, that may affect the execution of the suspicious path
being investigated. This analysis consequently ﬁlters out all other program variables
that are irrelevant to that path. Practically, this could be a very large set of variables;
• Controlling variables at all nodes along the suspicious path;
• Relations between pertinent variables, including input variables and controlling vari-
ables. With this, it is possible to trace all the variables actually controlling the execu-
tion of the path, which we refer to as master controlling variables. Data generation is
needed for these variables.
Tracing the dependency between pertinent variables and controlling variables is crucial
for our test-data generation. While controlling variables seem to be the ones controlling
the nodes of the path, and hence data generations attempts are needed over them to enforce
path execution, this may very well not be the case in reality. The reason behind that lies
on the dependency between these variables and other ones, especially input variables. To
brieﬂy illustrate, assume a node along the suspicious path is controlled by the following
statement “if (x > 1000)”, where the truth value of the statement must evaluate to
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false for the execution to follow the required path (i.e. execution of the else branch of
this if statement). Further, assume a previous statement leading to this node is as follows:
“x = 2 * y + 20;”, where y is an input variable. Attempts to generate values for x
would rather be inappropriate since x is actually inﬂuenced by y. Hence the generations are
actually needed over y to force the execution to follow the required path. Our static data-
ﬂow analysis traces all these types of relations, allowing us to conclude the exact variables
that are needed for the generation process.
Beside performing the needed functionalities, the analysis results in performance en-
hancement. Since a great set of program variables may be ﬁltered out as irrelevant by
such analysis, no generation will ever be attempted for variables in that set. In a reason-
ably large-size software, eliminating generation attempts over such irrelevant variables may
have a signiﬁcant impact on performance, compared to other approaches such as random
test-data generation for instance.
6.2.3 Static Control-Flow Analysis Phase
The purpose of this analysis is to trace and classify all branches out of conditional nodes
along the suspicious path being investigated. This analysis is actually needed in support
to the dynamic analysis phase as we explain in Section 6.3. Upon the generation of con-
crete variables for the master controlling variables, program execution is needed to validate
whether the generated values actually lead the execution as desired. In general, there are
no guarantees that the generated values would lead to the proper execution. Such values
may actually result in the execution being permanently driven away from the path. In this
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phase, all conditional branches at the nodes of the path are traced and qualiﬁed as either
required, or critical. A critical classiﬁcation is given to paths permanently leading the ex-
ecution away from the required path. Dynamic examination of these classiﬁcations takes
place at execution time.
6.3 Dynamic-Based Approach to Test-Data Generation
One of the major disadvantages of static-based approaches is the potential generation of
false-positives. In many cases, especially when testing relatively large-size software, this
can be massive and possibly beyond being acceptable. To eliminate such invalid reports,
dynamic analysis is needed. In particular, concrete data is to ﬁrst be generated then program
execution is to be conducted with such data to prove the actual existence of the vulnerabil-
ity.
In this phase, our approach conducts a set of dynamic analysis to fulﬁll such require-
ments. In general, the analysis performs various runtime computations and history tracking
for the purpose of generating concrete data, with which the vulnerability is executed. Vari-
ous components are needed to achieve our goals, including different code instrumentations
and runtime monitoring. Sections 6.3.1, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 detail the different components
composing our dynamic test-data generation model.
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6.3.1 Code Instrumentation for Dynamic Monitoring
Various code instrumentations are needed for the purpose of dynamic monitoring of the
program as well as for the automation of test-data generation. The instrumentations con-
ducted by our model to achieve such goals are as follows:
Input Abstraction Instrumentation: Software programs are composed of two phases,
execution phase and Input/Ouput (I/O) phase. The I/O phase is needed to provide the
program with the needed data required for the execution to take place. These data can be
obtained from different sources, such as input ﬁles, database tables, interactive user-input,
etc. Since our model targets the automation of the test-data process, user interaction is to be
elimenated/minimized. Input abstraction code instrumentation is needed for that purpose.
With this instrumentation, the original program is modiﬁed so that all user-interactive
inputs are suppressed. In particular, these interactive calls are substituted with various calls
that allows the data to be provided without any user interaction. For instance, calls to meth-
ods such as scanf() are ﬁrst suppressed by this instrumentation, and replaced by other
calls that automatically supply the proper needed input without user interaction. Currently,
our input abstraction instrumentation is capable of substituting a speciﬁc set of known
C/C++ input calls. Further extensions are however possible without much difﬁculties.
History-tracking Instrumentation: Data generation is needed for the purpose of allow-
ing the execution to follow the desired vulnerable path. However, there are no guarantees
that the generated data would lead to such execution. In such cases, generated data may
actually lead the execution permanently away from the desired path. While the generated
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data in such cases is not satisfactory, this improper data may yet represent very useful in-
formation that can drive the following generation attempts. This type of instrumentation is
needed for our model to keep track of such previously generated improper data. The model
uses such data to determine the following generations.
Execution Monitoring Instrumentation: This instrumentation injects monitoring code
that controls program executions. Upon the generation of test-data, attempts are made to
execute the suspicious path with such data. Should the data drive the execution to hit a
critical path, the current execution is halted. Additionally, the collected information from
the failed attempt is exchanged with the data-generation server as explained in Section
6.3.3. This instrumentation is needed for that purpose.
6.3.2 Dynamic Test-Data Generation
Our static analysis phase reveals the needed information to track a suspicious path, includ-
ing problem nodes and controlling variables. It is then desired to generate data that would
drive the execution through this path. To achieve that, our model converts all conditional
statements at problem nodes along the path to constraint functions. In fact, the constraints
functions are based on the master controlling variables. Further, the constraints are de-
ﬁned in relation to a value of 0. The deﬁnition of a constraint function is hence given
as follows: C(x) {<,≤,=, =} 0, where x is the set of master controlling variables along
the suspicious path. Given a general conditional statement, such as if(lhs op rhs),
at a given problem node along the path, Table 5 illustrates how constraint functions are
constructed and what constraint values are needed accordingly. lhs and rhs represent the
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left-hand and right-hand sides of the comparison statement accordingly, where op is one of
the comparison operators.
Conditional Statement Required Branch Constraint Function Desired
Constraint
Value
lhs > rhs True branch rhs − lhs < 0
lhs > rhs False branch lhs − rhs ≤ 0
lhs >= rhs True branch rhs − lhs ≤ 0
lhs >= rhs False branch lhs − rhs < 0
lhs < rhs True branch lhs − rhs < 0
lhs < rhs False branch rhs − lhs ≤ 0
lhs <= rhs True branch lhs − rhs ≤ 0
lhs <= rhs False branch rhs − lhs < 0
lhs = rhs True branch lhs − rhs = 0
lhs = rhs False branch lhs − rhs = 0
lhs = rhs True branch abs(lhs − rhs) = 0
lhs = rhs False branch abs(lhs − rhs) = 0
Table 5: Constraint Functions
With that in mind, the test-data generation problem is then converted to a variation of the
root ﬁnding problem. We refer to this variation as Root Crossing Minimization (RCM). The
generated data is to allow the constraint function at the nodes along the suspicious path to
ﬁrst reach the root, if necessary, then passes beyond it, as we explain shortly. Additionally,
since this operation is performed dynamically at runtime, where time overhead is critical,
such convergence to the root must be done as quickly as possible. Our model analyzes
the constraint function at early generation steps to judge whether it is linear or non-linear.
Based on that, the model determines the appropriate data generation technique to be used.
Below, we detail these techniques.
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Testing for Linearity
The constraint function for which data generation is needed may either be linear or non-
linear. It is important for our model to know such details since this determines the test-data
generation process. Additionally, it is important to point that our static analysis phase
traces variable dependency and is capable of determining the actual controlling variables.
However, the analysis neither trances, nor attempt to construct, the actual form of these
constraint functions. In other words, the exact symbolic form of the function and how the
variables relate to each other is unknown to us. Consequently, all needed operations over
these constraint functions must be performed numerically and not symbolically.
To detect the linearity a constraint function, f(x), our model starts by constructing
two sets of uniformly dispersed and independently selected values {x0, x1, . . . , xn−1} and
{y0, y1, . . . , yn−1}, for some bounded integer n > 0. The model then repeatedly execute the
function twice for each xi, and yi, where i = 0..n− 1. The constraint function is assumed
to be linear if:
f(xi) + f(yi) = f(xi + yi),
for all attempted xi and yi values. A failure for this rule to hold true for all attempts is
indicatives of the non-linearity of the function.
Linear Test-data Generation
Our model starts the process of data generation for each constraint function by detecting
whether or not the function is linear. Should this process concludes that such relation is
linear, the model utilizes a one-dimensional search procedure to generate the data. As an
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initial step, the model starts by conducting an exploratory search to determine the direction
of data generation in relation to a starting random point. The search initiates a random value
in a hope that such value would represent an appropriate constraint value. If this is not the
case, the model utilizes a dichotomy technique by applying a small change to the initial
value, and attempts again. The purpose of this small modiﬁcation is to determine whether
or not the new data is heading the constraint function towards root crossing minimization.
If this turns not to be the case, a small difference in the opposite direction to the initial value
is attempted. If multiple variables compose the controlling variables set, the generation is
applied to one of them at a time, while keeping the rest constant.
Following the exploratory step, a pattern search is conducted. The goal of this search
is to achieve root crossing minimization as quickly as possible. For that, a large offset
is applied to the last generated data, then program execution is initiated. If the data fails
to achieve the required minimization, yet it heads the constraint function towards being
minimized, then another large offset is applied following the same generation direction.
Otherwise, a large offset is applied to the opposite direction. A general description of our
linear data generation is given in Algorithm 1.
Non-linear Test-data Generation
If the linearity test of the function reveals that it is non-linear, our model initiates a different
test-data generation component designed for non-linear functions. Below, we ﬁrst provide
a brief relevant background to the subject of non-linear programming, then follow with the
details of our test-data generation component.
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Algorithm 1 Test-data Generation Algorithm for Linear Programming
Input: Suspicious path, instrumented program for TDG,
Output: Generated test-data
x ⇐ initial_guess_value;
while unable to pass problem node && attempt limits are not exhausted do
// Execute program with x, and track root crossing minimization
c(x) = execute(x);
if suspicious_path is executed then
// Minimization already achieved
return x;
end if
/*Adjust data with a small offset, ε, in one direction,
and re-execute program with the new value*/
x ⇐ x+ ε;
y1 ⇐ x;
c(x) = execute(x);
if suspicious_path is executed then
// Minimization already achieved
return x;
end if
/*Adjust data with a small offset, ε, in opposite direction, and re-execute program*/
x ⇐ x− ε;
y2 ⇐ x;
c(x) = execute(x);
if suspicious_path is executed then
// Minimization already achieved
return x;
end if
/*If this point is reached, pattern search is to be initiated*/
/*Determine direction of exploratory search based on
history tracked information from exploratory step*/
expolartory_direction_op =
determine_direction_operator(y1, y2, c(y1), c(y2));
/*Determine appropriate previous exploratory value based on
tracked information from exploratory step*/
x ⇐ determine_exploratory_value(y1, y2, c(y1), c(y2));
// Initiate pattern search by applying a large offset, Δ, to previous exploratory_value,
and re-execute




Newton-Raphson [114] is an iterative method for ﬁnding the root of an equation. Generally,
given a differentiable function f(x), the method can be used to ﬁnd the stationary points of
f(x). The method starts with an initial guess, x0, with the purpose of ﬁnally converging to
some stationary point x∗, such as f ′(x∗) = 0, where f ′(x) is the derivative of f(x). The
iterative equation of Newton-Raphson is deﬁned as follows:
xi+1 = xi − f(xi)f ′(xi) ,
where i >= 0.
The method has many advantages. If there is a solution, the method has a fast conver-
gence rate, which is quadratic. Additionally, the method requires only one initial guess.
On the other hand, the method has some drawbacks, including the possibility of division
by zero if the value of the denominator evaluates to zero. Other problems with the method
include the problem of root jumping [124]. Depending on the form of the method, if the
initial guess is close enough to the root, then the method may fail to ﬁnd that closet root.
While the above drawbacks may indeed represent problems, there is one particular
drawback of the method that is critically signiﬁcant for our model. For Newton-Raphson
to be applied, the derivative of the function, f ′(x) must be symbolically known. As we
previously discussed, our static analysis does not trace or attempt to construct the symbolic
representations of the constraint functions. Consequently, it is not feasible to calculate
f ′(x) symbolically, and hence it is not possible to use Newton-Raphson.
159
The Secant Method
The Secant method is a root-ﬁnding algorithm that uses approximation techniques to ﬁnd
the root of a method. If the derivative of the function, f ′(x), cannot be symbolically
calculated, it can alternatively be approximated. Using Backward Divided Difference
scheme [123], the Secant method approximates f ′(x) as follows:
f ′(xi)  f(xi)−f(xi−1)xi−xi−1 ,
where i >= 1.
With that, there is no longer a need to ﬁnd the exact symbolic formula of f ′(x). How-
ever, the method requires two initial guesses in contrast to Newton-Raphson, where only
one initial guess ia required. Now, considering the approximation of f ′(x), the iterative
equation of Newton-Raphson can be stated as follows:
xi+1 = xi − f(xi)f(xi)−f(xi−1)
xi−xi−1
= xi − f(xi)(xi−xi−1)f(xi)−f(xi−1) ,
where i >= 1. This actually deﬁnes the Secant method formula for ﬁnding the root of
f(x). As stated, the method uses two initial guesses, xi−1 and xi to ﬁnd xi+1. The method
then uses xi and xi+1 to ﬁnd xi+2, and so on, until a root is found. It should be noted that the
initial guesses may not bracket the root, and so the Secant method is an open method. Open
methods for ﬁnding functions roots are not restricted to intervals. Such methods usually
have quick convergence, but they do not guarantee ﬁnding the root, even if one exists.
Methods that use bounded intervals that bracket the root are referred to as closed methods.
Such methods usually converge slowly but they always ﬁnd the root if it exists [110].
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Multi-Dimensional Root Finding - The Broyden’s Method
The Secant method is suitable for root ﬁnding where the function is only one-dimensional.
Broyden’s method [24] is a generalization of the Secant method for multi-dimensional
functions. The method considers the solving of a set of non-linear functions in contrast to
only one function as with the Secant method. Consider the vector F is a function of the
vector x such that:
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk), and
F (x) = (F1(x1, x2, . . . , xk), F2(x1, x2, . . . , xk), . . . , Fk(x1, x2, . . . , xk)),
where k is the number of functions to be solved. The method attempts to solve the following
equation:
F (x) = 0.
Now generalizing the Secant method formula accordingly, Broyden’s method formula can
be stated as:
F ′(xi)  F (xi)−F (xi−1)xi−xi−1 ,
where i >= 1. The method then replaces the derivative F ′ with the Jacobian matrix, J ,
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The Jacobian matrix hence includes all ﬁrst-order partial derivatives of vector function with
respect to another vector. Broyden’s method determines the Jacobian matrix iteratively
using the Secant equation. Effectively, the Broyden’s formula is stated as:
Ji  F (xi)−F (xi−1)xi−xi−1 ,
where i >= 1 is the index of the iteration.
Root Crossing Minimization (RCM)
As discussed, Newton-Raphson, the Secant method and Broyden’s method, all attempt
to ﬁnd the root of a non-linear equation. Other optimization techniques, such as Quasi-
Newton [114], attempt to minimize the function to ﬁnd the minima of such function. For
our test-case generation, none of these techniques is suitable since we are neither interested
in ﬁnding the root, nor in the minima of the method. In speciﬁc, we are exactly interested
in ﬁnding a value with which the function would cross below the threshold of zero. Such
value is sufﬁcient for our model to pass a problem node, so the traversal of a suspicious
path is successful. It is true that if a minima exists below zero, then ﬁnding such a value
would automatically satisfy our condition. However, such minimization techniques may
result in a lot of extra unnecessary effort if a value below zero is found, but yet it is not the
minima searched for by the algorithm. Root ﬁnding algorithms on the other hand suffer
two problems in relation to our test-data generation concerns. Firstly, ﬁnding the root is
only sufﬁcient in the cases where the constraint function is testing for equality. For the
more general case, where a value that crosses the threshold of zero is needed, the algorithm
stops short from generating the needed value. Secondly, if the guessed/derived value at any
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point results in a satisfaction to our condition, i.e. the value leads the function to evaluate
below zero, a root ﬁnding algorithm would not stop since a root has not yet been found.
Instead, a lot of extra time may be spent after this point to ﬁnd the root, which may actually
not exist in some cases.
Since test-data generations are performed at runtime, it is crucial that our model per-
forms the convergence to the needed value as quickly as possible. Consequently, for the
purpose of our test-data generation, we deﬁne a different technique that takes advantage of
existing techniques, yet satisfy our requirement. We refer to this technique as Root Cross-
ing Minimization (RCM), which modiﬁes the Secant and Broyden’s techniques. Speciﬁ-
cally, since our static analysis do not trace the exact symbolic form of the constraint func-
tions, we are interested in performing all test-data generation numerically, which can be
done by applying the Secant/Broyden’s methods. RCM however has no particular inter-
est in ﬁnding the root. Hence RCM examines the value of the constraint function at each
iteration. Should the computation at any point of time determines that the function has
a value below the root, then the algorithm terminates since a solution has already been
found. Should the algorithm however terminate by actually ﬁnding the root where equality
is not under consideration, then RCM continues with another phase that initiates an extra
vicinity search phase. This vicinity search resorts back to linear programming. Since we
are only interested in ﬁnding a value that would exactly cross the root, that phase starts by
considering the value xi that led to the root of the function. The algorithm then attempts to
evaluate the constraint function with value such as xi + ε, where ε is a very small value. If
this results in ﬁnding the root crossing value, then the algorithm terminates successfully. If
however the computation results in the constraints function having a larger than zero value,
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then an attempt is made in the opposite direction; that is with xi − ε. The process repeats
in a similar fashion to the linear test-data generation procedure described in Algorithm 1
earlier in this section. The process terminates either by ﬁnding a solution or by exhausting
a maximum predeﬁned number of attempts.
It should be noted that there are cases, where no solution can be found even if a root is
successfully found. This can happen for instance in cases where coincidentally the function
actually touches the root by never crosses it into negative domain. In such cases, there is
actually no local solution and hence there is no possibility of ﬁnding a usable result by the
algorithm. Another similar problem is the oscillations near local minima [124]. In such
case, the algorithm may keep in repeating around a local minima without ﬁnding a solution
even if one exists.
To mitigate such problems, if a solution exists, RCM does not actually terminate once
a maximum number of failed attempts is exhausted. Instead, our model treats that as an
exhaustion of a maximum number of local attempts. In such cases, the algorithm attempts
further exploration of the neighborhood space in an attempt to ﬁnd a ﬁtter initial candidate.
This is done by selecting an initial guess that is marginally different than the initial/pre-
voiusly used one(s). The actual exhaustion attempts are reached if neighborhood explo-
ration as well as local attempts based on each selected initial candidate from the neighbor-
hood are both exhausted without ﬁnding a solution.
Another problem that is being mitigated by RCM, is the division by zero problem.
Since our model performs the computation numerically, it ﬁrst assesses the value of the
denominator before computing the approximation of the function derivative. Should the
164
denominator evaluates to zero, the algorithms halts execution, traces the initial guess val-
ues, so it can restart the process with different ones. A simpliﬁcation of our algorithm for
test-data generation for non-linear programming is detailed in Algorithm 2.
6.3.3 Execution Management
As discussed in Section 6.3.1, various code instrumentations are applied to the program
so that runtime proﬁling and monitoring can be obtained. Our model accepts both the in-
strumented program and a suspicious path as input, then attempts to generate data with
which the suspicious path is executed. The process of data-generation is however an iter-
ative process, which may require multiple runs of the program before ﬁnally a successful
generation is achieved. Generally, the generation may generate data that would rather drive
the execution towards critical paths. In such case, the execution must be halted immedi-
ately, information is collected about the data that causes the failure, and program execution
must be re-initiated for further generation attempts. The execution manager of our model is
designated to achieve such functionalities. In general, two major components compose the
execution manager: monitoring client, and test-data generation server. The decision behind
utilizing a client-server architecture for our model is driven by multiple factors. Running
both components on the same machine represents a security hazard. In speciﬁc, testing a
highly/severly vulnerable software may actually compromise the environment where tests
are being conducted. Hence, we need a full separation between our environment and the
environment where the software is executed. Additionally, since the test-data server is in-
dependent of the program being tested, it is possible to utilize it to generate data for more
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Algorithm 2 Test-data Generation Algorithm for Non-linear Programming
Input: instrumented program, suspicious path
Output: test-data satisfying the execution of the given suspicious path







// Reaching this point is indicative of execution violating the needed requirements






// Reaching this point is indicative of failed attempts with the previous two values
while Threshold of pre-deﬁned local maximum attempts is not exhausted do
i ⇐ i+ 1;
// Compute a new value xi
if c(xi−1)− c(xi−2) = 0 then
Trace history of x0 and x1;
Halt generation and restart test-data generation process;
end if




Increment local maximum attempt ctr;
end while
// Explore other parts of search space - Δ is a marginally large offset
xi ⇐ xi +Δ;
Increment global maximum attempt ctr;
end while
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than one program concurrently.
Execution Management Client
The actual execution of the instrumented program takes place at the execution management
client. The client requests test-data generation from the server, then attempts the execution
of the suspicious path with such data. If the execution leads to a critical path, the client im-
mediately halts such execution and keeps track of all dynamic relevant information, such as
problem nodes and master controlling variables involved in the failure. This information is
then communicated back to the server, which uses them to guide the following generations.
Test-data Generation Server
The test-data generation (TDG) server is the entity responsible for generating data. A
TCP/IP connection is initially established between the client and the server. Information
exchanged between the client and the server drives the generation process. Generally, the
following exchanges are performed.
• Suspicious Path Request: As part of the initial static analysis, SVR provides the
details of the suspicious path to the TDG server, which stores this information pend-
ing on client request to initiate the generation process. Once the client initiates the
process, it requests the path details from the server.
• Path Response: The server returns the path information to the client. In particular,
the server returns a basic-block representation of the path based on the sequence of
function calls made through that path. The representation is similar to the following:
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function_name:bb1, function_name:bb2, . . . , function_name:bbn;.
• Data-generation Request: Once the client reaches a statement that requires data gen-
eration for a variable, the variable information is provided to the server, which then
attempts the generations. Since the program may contain multiple variables with the
same name, using block scopes for instance, the information provided by the client
must be quite speciﬁc and accurate. The client hence provides the full details of the
variable including its scope and line number within the program. The format of the
request is as follows: data_request:function_name:bbn:variable_name:line_num;.
• Generated-data Response: The server attempts to generate data for the requested
variable. The data is then sent back to the client to attempt execution with it. The
format of the response is as follows: data_response:function_name:bbn:variable_-
name:line_num:value;.
• Failed-attempts History: The initial attempt of data generation by the server is sim-
ply random. Should this attempt fail to provide the proper data, the client detects the
execution of a critical path and hence halts the current execution. The client addition-
ally keeps track of various information such as the value of the constraint function
at the problem node causing the failure, and the execution history until the failure
point. Such information is sent back to the server, which then utilizes them to guide
the generation of the following attempts. Such dynamic operation would repeat until
either data is generated or a pre-determined threshold of the involved resources is
reached. The format of the constraint-function value and the execution history sent
by the client are accordingly as follows: constraint_value:function_name:bbn:value;
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whereas the format of the execution_history is as follows: function_name:bb1, func-
tion_name:bb2, . . . , function_name:bbn;.
Since the provided failure information from the client is crucial to the server for fol-
lowing generation attempts, the server maintains a set of data structures to record and use
such information. Generally, the server maintains the following set of hash tables:
• Branch Direction Table;
• Dependency Table;
• Minimization Table;
• Test-data Generation History Table;
Branch Direction Table
During the static analysis phase, all potential problem nodes (controlling statements) along
the path are tracked. A classiﬁcation is then given to the branches of these nodes, which can
be either required or critical. A branch is critical if its execution would permanently drive
the program away from the suspicious path. This static analysis information is recorded in
the branch direction hash table and is used at dynamic time to monitor the execution and
halt the program, should the execution fails to follow the path. The typical contents of the
branch direction table is similar to what is shown in Table 6.
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Basic Block Number Branch Direction
bb1:true_branch required || critical
bb1:false_branch required || critical
. . . . . .
bbn:true_branch required || critical
bbn:false_branch required || critical
Table 6: Branch Direction Table
Dependency Table
During the static analysis phase, all pertinent variables to the suspicious path under test are
tracked, which ﬁlters out all other variables that have no relation to that path. However,
not all of these variables may affect each of the potential problem nodes along the path.
Consequently, further static analysis is conducted to determine for each problem node the
exact set of variables inﬂuencing this node. This information is recorded in the dependency
table, and used at dynamic time to determine the exact set of needed generations should
the problem node is encountered. Table 7 shows an example of the typical contents of the
dependency table.
Basic Block Number Input Variable
bb1 x11, x12, . . . , x1m
bb2 x21, x22, . . . , x2m
. . . . . .
bbn xn1, xn2, . . . , xnm
Table 7: Dependency Table
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Minimization Table
This table keeps track of the values of the constraint functions at each of the problem nodes
along the path. The table is maintained at dynamic time. The typical contents of this table
is shown in Table 8. Constraint values along the path need to allow for root crossing min-
imization for successful execution of the path to take place. The recorded constraint value
at each of the basic blocks may not necessarily be the appropriate value for the execution
to go though the path. An inappropriate value in the table directly indicates that the node is
an unsolved problem node, and that this basic block leads to a critical path. These inappro-
priate values however need to be tracked since the server uses them for further generation
attempts.
Basic Block Number Constraint Value
bb1 val1
bb2 val2
. . . . . .
bbn valn
Table 8: Minimization Table
Test-data Generation History Table
The server records the values of each attempted generation for each of the master control-
ling variables along the path. A value from a failed generation, along with the root crossing
minimization value of the constraint function at the problem node, are then used by the
server to guide the following generation. Should there is a ﬁnal successful generations for
the suspicious path variables, the last generated value for each of them is the ﬁnal one to
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be reported. Table 9 shows the typical contents of the test-data generation history Table.
Controlling Variable Value
x1 val11, val12, . . . , val1m
x2 val21, val22, . . . , val2m
. . . . . .
xn valn1, valn2, . . . , valnm
Table 9: Test Data Generation History Table
6.4 Hybrid Framework for Automating Security Testing
An overview of our framework and its different components is shown in Figure 31. A
description of the security property that need to be tested is injected into the Static Vul-
nerability Revealer (SVR), along with a representation of the source code of the program
to be tested. SVR initiates a set of static analysis as described in Chapter 5, and reports
a set of suspicious paths that may actually be vulnerable. Further static analysis is then
conducted to achieve various functionalities. Dynamic analysis phase is then initiated to
generate concrete test-data to prove the existence of the violation. A description of the dif-
ferent components of our framework is given below. Various transformations of the code
take place ﬁrst. Instead of working directly on the source code, an object-oriented represen-
tation of the GIMPLE representation is constructed and manipulated to provide data-ﬂow
and control-ﬂow information of the suspicious path. Code instrumentations are also con-
ducted on the GIMPLE representation of the program to allow execution monitoring of the
program. The instrumented program along with the ﬂow information of the suspicious path
are then passed to the execution manager, which performs the data generation.
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Figure 31: Overall Design of Hybrid Security Testing System
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• XML-Dump: This component accepts the source code of the program, in speciﬁc
the GIMPLE representation of the code, and produces an XML representation of the
code. Such a representation facilitates the manipulation of the source code.
• XML-Parser: This components accepts the XML representation of the program and
composes an equivalent object-oriented representations of it.
• Static Analyzer: This components accepts both a suspicious path from SVR, as well
as the GIMPLE object-oriented representation of the program. Further static anal-
ysis is conducted by this component where information about control-ﬂow of the
suspicious path is tracked.
• Code Instrumenter: This component performs the needed instrumentations for the
dynamic data generation phase. In general, this component performs instrumentation
for input abstraction, history tracking and code monitoring, as described in Section
6.3.1.
• Code Instrumentation Shared Library: The code instrumenter injects monitoring
code into the program. Some of these injections are simply method calls that will
be executed if the call is made. This component contains the implementation of
these monitoring APIs.
• Execution Manager: An instrumented version of the program is ﬁnally provided to
this execution manager component, which actually controls and performs the data




We have presented in this chapter a hybrid approach to test-data generation, which takes
advantage of the powerful capabilities of both static and dynamic analyses. This novel
approach is a Goal-Path-oriented, which initially starts by the security analysts precisely
specifying the security properties that they wish to test the software against. The approach
conducts static analysis to determine the set of all suspicious paths that the software may
have in violation to the given property. The approach then conducts dynamic test-data
generation, and monitoring process to produce concrete data with which the vulnerability is
proven, hence eliminating false positive reports. Prior to conducting the dynamic analysis,
various further static analysis processing are still needed and must take place ﬁrst, including
code instrumentation, and control-ﬂow analysis.
We have presented our approach to test-data generation, which considered important
issues such as linear and non-linear programming, root ﬁnding, function minimization and
the problem of constraint solving. In this context, we have distinguished between solving
linear and non-linear functions and presented our root crossing minimization approach for
non-linear data generation. Since the process of generating data is conducted at dynamic
time, where time aspect is crucial, we have has investigated issues such as immediate halt-
ing of failed executions and exploration of search space in an attempt to ﬁnd different
candidates if the initially guessed ones do not lead to a solution after a bounded number of
attempts.
We have designed and implemented a framework in support to our approach. The
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framework provides capabilities for the automation of security testing. That includes au-
tomated detection of potential vulnerabilities that may violate security properties, as well
as an automated test-data generation to prove the real existence of such vulnerabilities. We
have detailed the different components of the framework to illustrate what type of analysis
is being used at each component as well as how these components work together to auto-
mate security testing. To analyze our approaches, and show that they are indeed better than
other approaches, we have conducted various experiments on our system. The details of
such experiments and their results are detailed in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 7
Integrated System and Experiments
7.1 Introduction
This chapter presents our integrated system for security testing. In that context, we intro-
duce the structure, interfaces and functionalities of our system and its various components.
We also provide the details of the experiments conducted over the system to validate our
approaches. Prior to providing the details of our full integrated system, we ﬁrst highlight
the design and implementations of some of the major components composing our frame-
work. Section 7.2 provides the design details of our Team Edit Automata model. Section
7.3 provides the details of our code instrumentation in support to team edit automata. Sec-
tion 7.4 provides a brief view of our APIs for program monitoring, which are needed for
dynamic test-data generation. Section 7.5 provides the details of our integrated system and
its user interfaces. Section 7.6 provides the details of the experiments conducted on our
system and the results of such experiments. Finally, in Section 7.7, we provide a summary
and conclusion of the subjects covered in this Chapter.
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7.2 Team Edit Automata - Design Overview
As discussed in Chapter 3, a Team Edit Automaton (TEA) is composed of a set of interact-
ing Component Edit Automata. We use C++ for the implementation of TEA. In general,
four major C++ classes compose our design of TEA and its components, namely Compo-
nentAutomata, TeamAutomata, Event and SuggestionSolver. The following
subsections, 7.2.1 and 7.2.2, provide further information on the implementation of Com-
ponentAutomata and TeamAutomata respectively.
7.2.1 Component Edit Automata - Implementation
Since each component represents a speciﬁc security property based on the security analyst
testing goals, the ComponentAutomata class is provided as an abstract class and is to
be inherited by a concrete class deﬁning the exact property. To facilitate the security analyst
task, we additionally provide a graphical interface, with which the analyst can rather draw
the automata instead of writing its object-oriented code, as explained in Section 7.5.
Each component automaton belongs to a team automata. The association between these
automata is made through a private member of the team, namely _team. To provide full
ﬂexibility, we allow a component to switch between different teams. This is made through
the utilization of the UnregisterToTeam() and RegisterToTeam() interfaces,
which allow the component to unregister itself from its current team and registers with
another one respectively.
In our implementation, we allow minimal coupling between the component automata it-
self and the state transition functionality. The idea behind such design decision is to enable
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any implementation of a ﬁnite state machine to be incorporated into our hierarchy struc-
ture. A component automaton reacts to events through the use of the QueryEvent() and
ExecuteEvent() interfaces. The QueryEvent() interface results in the automaton
responding to the event by merely producing a suggestion of an execution based on this
event. The execution of the actual state transition is then made through calling the Exe-
cuteEvent() interface.
7.2.2 Team Edit Automata - Implementation
A Team Edit Automaton manages multiple Component Edit Automata. The Register-
Component() and UnregisterComponent() interfaces are used to allow such as-
sociation.
The team also manages all events in the system. All unprocessed events are inserted
into an event queue (_events). Events are generally classiﬁed as external or internal
events. Internal events are those events sent between the different components, and hence
not visible to the outside of the system. These events are enqueued through the utilization
of the AddInternalEvent() interface. The team additionally provides an interface,
namely Query(), to the monitored program. In particular, the instrumented monitoring
routines periodically call this interface to collect team-wise suggestions. Upon the recep-
tion of this call, a request is sent to all the component automata to collect their suggestions.
The decision of how these suggestions are evaluated for a ﬁnal action to be taken is left to
the SuggestionSolver component. Once a ﬁnal team-wise suggestion is determined,
the suggestion is transmitted as an output action to all involved components, which result in
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the appropriate state transitions of these automata. Figure 32 shows the ﬂow of operations
initiated by the reception of the event.
Figure 32: Flow of Operations for an Incoming Event
7.3 Team Edit Automata - Code Instrumentation
In Chapter 4, we have discussed code instrumentation and its major techniques. We have
then introduced our novel AOP-compiler-assisted code instrumentation technique, which
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combines both powerful capabilities of AOP pointcut model and the compiler-assisted ap-
proach. Major factors inﬂuence our decision to utilize the compiler-assisted approach.
Program structures are naturally known to compilers, hence compilers know the lexical
structure and semantics of the code being compiled. Additionally, they are capable of
building a more structured representation of the code (i.e. Abstract Syntax Tree (AST))
and Control Flow Graphs (CFG). Consequently, instrumentation can be performed very
precisely at any program point.
Another advantage is related to execution time. Higher execution performance can be
achieved as a result of utilizing compilers. This issue is crucial to dynamic analysis, where
multiple executions of the program may take place before vulnerabilities can be detected.
In addition, since compilers perform program optimization, they are capable of optimizing
the instrumented code as well.
Our decision to use the compiler-assisted approach, had to be followed by another de-
cision on which compiler to use. The answer to the latter question was GCC. Our decision
was driven by many factors. Beside the fact that GCC is well-developed and has been
extensively used and tested in multiple platforms, the compiler supports compilation of
various programming languages such as C, Objective C, C++, Java, Fortran, and more.
Moreover, GCC uses a universal intermediate language, called GIMPLE, to represent pro-
grams written in different languages, including C, C++, Objective-C, Fortran, Java, Ada,
and Go [64]. Consequently, by instrumenting at the GIMPLE level, support for various
language can be achieved.
However, since GCC does not provide the needed functionality to support our security
instrumentation, an extension to the compiler is needed. In fact, multiple extensions are
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needed to support different programming languages. Considering the security issues of the
C languagee, we choose to implement an extension to the GCC compiler for C. The details
of GCC internals as well as our GCC extension to support code instrumentation have been
provided in Chapter 4.
7.4 Test-Data Generation - APIs for Dynamic Monitoring
For the purpose of test-data generation, further code instrumentation is required for the
purpose of monitoring the generation process as well as the dynamic program execution.
The instrumented code is injected at sensitive program points to allow automation of the
generation process, collection of information upon failure to generate the needed data,
as well as to monitor the execution itself. We implemented the instrumented routines as
calls to APIs, which are injected into the proper program points for data generation. The
following brieﬂy describes the provided APIs for test-data generation monitoring purposes:
• _initialize(): Performs various initializations needed for test-data monitoring
process, such as allocating needed memory and creating log ﬁles.
• _finalize(): Releases all allocated resources for the monitoring process.
• _do_execution_monitoring(int bb_index, const char* funcName):
Upon data generation, program execution is attempted with the intent to execute the
vulnerable path. This API call would halt program execution should the execution is
driven towards a critical path.
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• _calculate_constraint(int lhs, int rhs, int oper, int bb_-
index, const char* funcName): A call to this API is needed so that the
constraint value is calculated prior to the execution of the conditional statement.
• _abstract_input(const char* format, ... ): This API is needed
for automation purposes. The API would abstract program actions, such as user
input, by replacing it with function calls. These calls would then perform the needed
operations automatically without user interaction.
• _send_msg(char* msg): Enables the client of the test-data generator to send
messages to the server;
• _receive_msg(char* msg): Enables the client to receive messages from the
server.
7.5 Integrated System Overview
This section provides an overall view of our intergraded system. In that context, we present
the system’s interface, and describe its functionalities and capabilities.
7.5.1 System Interface
The Graphical User Interface (GUI) of the system provides multiple tabs, which are con-
trolled by the analysts to utilize the desired functionality. Figure 33 provides a general
overview of the system when the Project Overview tab is selected.
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Figure 33: Integrated System - Overview
As seen in Figure 33, three main components compose the interface. Area number 1
allows the analyst to select one, or multiple, projects for security testing. Area number 2
represents the main window of the interface. Area number 3 is designated for the reporting
of detected vulnerabilities. We will shortly describe the utilization and functionality of each
of the tabs, but prior to that we ﬁrst explain how the system is to be conﬁgured for use.
7.5.2 System Conﬁguration
For the security analyst to use the system for the ﬁrst time, there are few simple conﬁgura-
tions that must be performed ﬁrst. This conﬁguration must be done by the analyst since they
are system-dependent, and so automation is not advisable. The desired conﬁgurations are
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set through the File –> Preferences menu. Figure 34 and Figure 35 illustrate this operation.
Figure 34: System Settings through File –> Preferences Menu
7.5.3 Project Management
To facilitate the use of our tool, we design it as an Integrated Development Environments
(IDE), similar to other common software applications. The analyst needs to create a new
project then provides the root directory where the source code to be tested is located. The
creation of the project results in our system navigating the root directory and displaying all
ﬁles in this directory in the Project component of our interface. Figure 36 and Figure 37
show how these operations are performed.
7.5.4 Security Property Speciﬁcation
Once the project is opened, security analysts are capable of specifying the security prop-
erty that they wish to test the software against. The property is speciﬁed as an automaton
as described in Chapter 3. The analyst is capable of specifying the property by writing
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Figure 35: Preference Dialog
its object-oriented code. While this task may not be that difﬁcult for experienced program-
mers, it certainly represents some sort of overhead. To avoid such overhead, our tool allows
the analyst to rather specify the automata by graphically drawing it. Our tool then compiles
this graphical representations and automatically produces the object-oriented representa-
tion of it. Figure 38 shows how the automaton can graphically be stated by drawing it in
the Property Editor window of the interface, which is displayed when the Property Editor
tab is clicked.
The analyst is simply capable of deﬁning new states by selecting the edit mode ( )
then drawing the state. The attributes of this new state, such as its name, can then be
modiﬁed if needed by using the Attribute Viewer component of the interface, as shown in
Figure 39.
The transitions are added by simple mouse movement and clicking, similar to other
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Figure 36: Project Management Menu
traditional graphical software. For instance, the analyst can add a transition between two
states by mouse clicking the originating state, moving the mouse to the destination state
then releasing it. Our system allows multiple transitions to be drawn between two states,
or a transition to take place from one same state to itself, which reﬂects the reality of state
machines.
Following the creation of a transition, it may be needed to deﬁne events or guards for
this transition. Our system allows that by utilizing the Event and Guard tabs of the Attribute
Viewer. Figure 40 and Figure 41 show how these operations are performed.
Transition Actions As described in Chapter 3, a component edit automaton must emit
an action; such as suppress, halt, etc. The analyst must hence set this action. This is done
through the utilization of the Action tab of the Attribute Viewer component. Figure 42
shows this operation.
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Figure 37: Opening Project for Security Testing
Saving Security Properties Once the analyst ﬁnalizes the security property and saves it,
using the button, a series of operations are initiated by the system as follows:
1. All graphical components of the interface are stored, so they can be restored when the
the property is reloaded later on. To ensure precision of such operation, we actually
serialize all the components to XML representations.
2. A .sm (state machine) ﬁle is generated. This ﬁle reﬂects the various transitions of the
automaton.
3. The graphically-drawn automaton is compiled into an object-oriented code represen-
tation of the property.
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Figure 38: Specifying a Security Property Graphically
Figure 39: Modifying State Attributes
4. An automatic generation of a concrete class representing the automaton is performed.
The class is created as an extended/child class of ComponentAutomata.
7.5.5 Building Projects
Once the security property is speciﬁed, the analyst can build the project then executes it
through the utilization of the appropriate provided menu items to build and execute the
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Figure 40: Setting Transition Events
Figure 41: Setting Transition Guards
project. The analyst is capable however of building the project without specifying any
properties. In such case, a basic built of the project is conducted without any code instru-
mentation taking place.
Our system automates project building through the utilization of a shell script that calls
a Makefile. The Makefile must hence be located. By default, our system assumes
the existence of that ﬁle in the root directory of the project. If this is not the case, then the
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Figure 42: Integrated System - Setting Transition Actions
analyst needs to specify the location of that ﬁle through the re-conﬁguration of the system.
7.5.6 Project Execution and Vulnerability Reporting
Upon a successful built of the project, the analyst is capable to execute the project to obtain
the vulnerability reports, if any. The execution of the project is initiated through the uti-
lization of the proper menu for such action. Once the execution is conducted, error reports
and dynamically generated test-data are reported for the analyst to view. Figure 43, Figure
44, and Figure 45 show examples of such reports.
7.6 Experiments
We conduct various experiments over our system. These experiments are carefully de-
signed to analyze and test a broad range of concerns. Beside testing the basic functionalities
of the system, we particularly need to analyze the detection power of our system, as well
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Figure 43: Reports of Detected Vulnerabilities
Figure 44: Code View of Vulnerabilities Reported in Figure 43
as the capability to detect both low-level vulnerabilities and high-level vulnerabilities. Ad-
ditionally, we need to analyze other important aspects such as performance and scalability.
The following subsections provide the details and the results of our experiments.
7.6.1 Experiments Environments
The system experiments are conducted under the following environments:
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Figure 45: Test-Data Generation Reporting
• Operating System: Ubuntu Linux release 6.10;
• Linux Kernel: Linux kernel version 2.6.17-11-generic;
• C/C++: GCC 4.2;
• Java Runtime Environment: Java(TM) SE Runtime Environment (build 1.6.0_02-
b05);
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• Shell: GNU bash version 3.1.17(1)-release;
• autoconf: GNU Autoconf version 2.60;
• make: GNU Make 3.81;
• Awk: mawk version 1.3.3;
• Doxygen: doxygen version 1.4.7;
• Moped: Moped version 2.
7.6.2 Testing Against Low-Level Security Vulnerabilities
The main objective of these experiments is to test the detection power of our system against
low-level security properties. In that context, the experiments target the following low-level
vulnerabilities:
• Pointer de-referencing - use of wild and null pointers
• Double-freeing of pointers
• Freeing wild and null pointers
• Memory leak
• Reading uninitialized/unallocated memory
• Memory/Buffer overﬂow
• Out-of-boundary array indexing
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The reason behind our choice to target these speciﬁc low-level vulnerabilities is due
to the fact that they are quite common in C/C++ programs. Additionally, these types of
vulnerabilities have always been the cause of major attacks. Another reason is that these
types of vulnerabilities have been addressed by other security detection tools, so we are
able to provide detection-power and performance comparisons with these tools as well.
Tested Programs
To perform the desired testing, we implemented a set of C programs, with known low-level
memory management vulnerabilities. In particular:
• Program 1: This program include pointer double-freeing vulnerability. The program
particularly includes two circular referencing pointers, on which one of them has
been freed.
• Program 2: This program includes buffer-overﬂow vulnerabilities. The program al-
lows for a buffer size to dynamically be set through user input. Further manipulation
of the buffer is then performed without proper veriﬁcation of its size.
• Program 3: This program includes out-of-boundary array indexing vulnerability. The
program allows for the array manipulation through an index variable. The value of
that variable is improperly modiﬁed before accessing the array, hence resulting in the
vulnerability.
• Program 4: This program includes buffer-overﬂow vulnerability. The vulnerability
results from an improper use of the buffer, which results in manipulating it beyond
its storing capacity.
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• Program 5: This program targets false-positive reporting. The program included a
pointer double-freeing vulnerability that is impossible to execute. Consequently, the
program has no exploitable vulnerabilities.
• Program 6: This program includes buffer-overﬂow vulnerability. The main cause
of the vulnerability in this program is the use of an unsafe method provided by the
standard C library, resulting in buffer-overﬂow of a static-size buffer.
Experiments Results
The programs are tested using our tool as well as other two well-known security testing
tools, Klocwork K7.5 and Insure++ 5.1, to provide us with a benchmark for compression.
Our choice of these two particular tools for comparison is intentional. As part of this
research, we have evaluated various similar tools and based on this evaluation we consider
Klocwork and Insure++ to have powerful capabilities compared to other static-analysis
and dynamic analysis tools accordingly. The results of the tests are detailed below and
summarized in Table 10.
• Program 1: Our system successfully detects the double-freeing vulnerability in this
program. Additionally, following the ﬁrst freeing operation of the pointer, the system
suppresses the second freeing action, avoiding the program from crashing. Insure++
is also able to detect the vulnerability, however the program execution ended in crash-
ing after reporting an assertion failure problem. Klocwork on the other hand fails to
detect the vulnerability.
• Program 2: Our system successfully detects the vulnerability reporting an illegal
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memory access attempt, once the buffer is overﬂown. Insure++ also detects the vul-
nerability but fails to identify its exact cause. Klocwork fails to detect the vulnera-
bility and reports no errors.
• Program 3: Both our system and Insure++ successfully detects the exact vulnerability
of that program. On the other hand, Klocwork cannot detect this vulnerability. In that
particular case, it is very possible that the lack of detection by Klocwork is due to its
static analysis nature where the data-ﬂow affecting the index variable may have not
been considered.
• Program 4: Our system successfully detects the vulnerability reporting an illegal
memory access attempt, once the buffer is overﬂown. Due to version incompatibility
of the compiler, we are unable to instrument or compile the program with Insure++,
hence we cannot obtain any results about Insure++ behavior. As for Klocwork, it
fails to report any vulnerabilities.
• Program 5: We execute this program multiple times using different values that con-
trols its ﬂow. Our system does not report the vulnerability, since it is actually not
exploitable. Again, we are unable to compile this program with Insure++, and hence
cannot obtain any concrete results of its behavior. On the other hand, Klocwork
detects and reports the vulnerability in the code, which is clearly a false-positive
reporting.
• Program 6: Our system successfully detects the vulnerability once the C method is
called, hence detecting the exact location and the cause of the vulnerability. Insure++
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reports an unknown error, while Klocwork reports no errors at all.
In conclusion, these experiment results show that our system, through its underlying
static/dynamic techniques, is effectively capable of detecting low-level security vulnera-
bilities. As the results also indicate, some of these low-level security vulnerabilities are
difﬁcult to detect through mere static analysis approaches.
7.6.3 Testing Against High-Level Security Vulnerabilities
This group of experiments is designed to validate our system functionality and detection
capability against high-level security vulnerabilities. To be more precise, we target the
detection of a mixture of both low-level and high-level vulnerabilities listed by the United
States Department of Homeland Security [45]. In that context, the experiments targeted the
following high-level vulnerabilities:
1. Temporary File Utilization and Access Privileges:
This type of vulnerabilities, known as TEMPNAM-TMPFILE [45], is often caused
by improper use of intermediate and temporary ﬁles needed at program execution.
Software programmers usually use this type of programming approaches, where they
create intermediate ﬁles to temporarily store information and allow different program
entities to communicate at execution time. While the approach itself might be con-
sidered as reasonable at a ﬁrst glance, it is vulnerable. The calls to create a temporary
ﬁle actually result in the creation of a ﬁle name, instead of a ﬁle. An attacker may
take advantage of this by creating the ﬁle itself after the call is made but before the
actual ﬁle is created. Since the contents of the ﬁle are totally under the attacker’s
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Vulnerable Programs Experiment Results
Program # Vulnerability De-
tails
Used Tool Result Summary
Program 1 Double-freeing Our System Error: Double-free or corruption at
0x80a68b0 at Experiment1.c::17
Klocwork K7.5 Passed: 0 Errors, 0 Warnings, 0 Fil-
tered
Insure++ 5.1 Freeing dangling pointer, 1 unique
occurrence at an unknown location
Program 2 Buffer-overﬂow -
dynamic setting
Our System Error: Illegal memory access at
0x80a7990 at Experiment2.c::20
Klocwork K7.5 Passed: 0 Errors, 0 Warnings, 0 Fil-
tered




Our System Error: Illegal array index-
ing with index value −2 at
Experiment3.c::15
Klocwork K7.5 Passed: 0 Errors, 0 Warnings, 0 Fil-
tered
Insure++ 5.1 Writing array out of range: stat-
icBuf[i] Index Used: 2. Valid




Our System Error: Illegal memory access at
0x80a68fb at Experiment4.c::20
Klocwork K7.5 Passed: 0 Errors, 0 Warnings, 0 Fil-
tered
Insure++ 5.1 Could not compile with Microsoft
Visual C++ & Insure++ 5.1
Program 5 No Exploitable
Vulnerabilities
Our System (No errors were reported)
Klocwork K7.5 Experiment5.c(25: Severe: Double
freeing of freed memory pointed by
’buf2’
Insure++ 5.1 Could not compile with Microsoft
Visual C++ & Insure++ 5.1
Program 6 Buffer-overﬂow Our System Error: Illegal memory access at
0x80a908d at Experiment6.c::19
Klocwork K7.5 Passed: 0 Errors, 0 Warnings, 0 Fil-
tered
Insure++ 5.1 INSURE_ERROR: Internal error, 1
unique occurrence
Table 10: Experiment Results of Low-Level Security Vulnerabilities Testing
199
control, it is possible to attack the system, for instance by destroying/modifying the
application’s data. Worst, the standard C library provides a family of calls, such as
tmpnam(), tempnam() and tmpfile() that facilitate the creation of temporary
ﬁles. However these calls are considered to be unsafe. The names of the created
ﬁles using these methods can easily be guessed by attackers, hence facilitating such
attacks even further.
Consequently, a property against this type of violation would target multiple high-
level concerns: the utilization of unsafe calls to create the ﬁle, the use of temporary
ﬁles, as well as access privileges to these ﬁle. Our automaton description of this
security property is shown in Figure 46.
Figure 46: Temporary File Utilization and Access Privileges Automaton
The property speciﬁes the following: The use of the unsafe calls from the standard
C library would directly transit the automaton to the Error state. Prior to calling an
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appropriate method to create the ﬁle, such as mkstemp(), a call to umask(077)
should be made, restricting access permissions over these ﬁles only to the owner. A
change of that mask after being set would simply transit the automaton back to its
Start state. Assuming that a sequence of proper calls is made, a transit is made to a
state where the creation of temporary ﬁles is allowed. However, executing any call
from this latter state that would change access privileges, such as chown, chmod,
etc., would result in transiting the automaton to the Error state.
2. Synchronization and Race-Conditions:
This type of vulnerabilities is known as Time-Of-Check-to-Time-Of-Use (TOCTOU),
which is caused by synchronization problems, where a process checks for a partic-
ular condition before performing an action. For instance, CPU interrupts between
veriﬁcation and use may allow multiple processes to concurrently proceed to critical
sections of the code. Attackers can use these potential timing gaps between veriﬁ-
cation and use/proceeding further, to cause very severe attacks, such as modifying
application’s data or producing incorrect execution behavior. Figure 47 shows our
automaton representation of this security property.
3. Unauthorized Access to System Resources and Privilege Escalation:
This is rather a common type of security vulnerabilities, where an attacker gains
unauthorized access to some system resources, then uses this access to harm the
system. To mitigate some of these problems, operating systems may provide some
methods to properly restrain access to system resources. The chroot() system
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Figure 47: Race-Condition Automaton
call is one of such methods provided by the UNIX operating system. The main pur-
pose of chroot() is to restrict the access of a user process to a particular portion
of the ﬁle system, hence preventing access to unauthorized resources. The method
performs this task by establishing a virtual root directory for the calling process and
restrains access of the process and its children to that directory. Consequently, the
directly is commonly known as "chroot jail". However, chroot() suffers various
serious problems. The method cannot defend against intentional improper manipu-
lation by privileged root users. On most systems, chroot() contexts do not stack
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properly. For instance, a jailed program with sufﬁcient privileges may perform a sec-
ond chroot() to break out [145]. The call hence must be followed by a call to
chdir(/) to prevent the breakage-out-of-jail problem. Another problem with ch-
root() is that it requires a root privileges to be called. A program that fails to reset
the privilege back after the call is made, could open a great opportunity for attackers
to take advantage of this improper privilege escalation.
Consequently, the method must be used with care; otherwise its utilization may ac-
tually compromise systems security due to illegal access and improper privilege es-
calation. Figure 48 shows our automaton representation of chroot() utilization
property.
Figure 48: CHROOT-JAIL Automaton
4. Utilization of Vulnerable Methods from Standard Libraries:
Standard libraries provided with programming languages offer a large set of use-
ful methods that facilitate programmers’ tasks. For instance, the standard C library
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provides various methods that enable programmers to easily work with strings and
buffers. However, some of these methods have been found to be quite vulnerable
and the source of very severe attacks [143]. An example of such methods is str-
cpy(), which allows a source buffer to be copied into a destination buffer. Due
to potential difference in size between the source and the destination, the method
may result in buffer-overﬂow, leading to various vulnerabilities including denial-of-
service attacks. In general, buffer-overﬂow is one of the most common causes of
security attacks. Instances of such include AT&T Win Virtual Network Computing
(WinVNC) [1] vulnerabilities, where an attacker generates a custom-crafted HTTP
request and sends it to the WinVNC server. The server will overﬂow and overwrite
variables on the stack, including the return address. The Cisco 7xx Router Password
Buffer Overﬂow Attack [33] is another example, where an attacker only needs to
have a remote prompt to enter a user-name and a password to login into the router. A
long string for the password is then entered, which causes a buffer-overﬂow and re-
sults in crashing the router. The router crash consequently breaks down the network.
A small script is then written by the attackers, which waits for the router to restart,
then repeats the attack, hence resulting in a denial-of-service attack on the network.
To avoid such attacks, the destination buffer must be guaranteed to be of a larger size
than the source, or at least of an equal size. Additionally, the terminating character,
(’\0’), must be present in the copied string. Figure 49 shows our automaton repre-
sentation of buffer-overﬂow using strcpy() method from the standard C library,
where n is the size of the destination buffer.
204
Figure 49: STRCPY Automaton
5. Memory Management:
Improper pointer manipulation and memory allocations are among the very common
sources of vulnerability attacks, especially in languages such as C/C++. That is due
to the powerful capabilities given by such languages to programmers to create and
manipulate pointers easily through the “*” operator. We focus in this experiment on
testing the major causes of memory attacks, which are as follows:
• Use of unallocated pointers: Most programming languages separate the issue
of creating pointers from allocating space to these pointers. In other words, it is
syntactically legal to create a pointer without initializing it. Since pointers are
naturally created to facilitate movement around memory areas, an uninitialized
pointer may actually include the address of a previously allocated memory loca-
tion. This consequently comes with a hefty price in terms of security since there
is no guarantee that a pointer will indeed be pointing to an allocated memory
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prior to its use.
• Memory leak: This is rather a serious problem that may result in consuming a
large amount of the executable memory of the system, leading the system to a
standstill. Languages such as C and C++, do not maintain automatic garbage
collectors to claim previously allocated memory that is no longer in use. In-
stead, these languages require the program to delete any allocated memory that
is no longer needed. Programmers may very well overlook such needed opera-
tions, resulting in memory leak.
• Double-free: This is rather an extreme opposite operation to the memory leak
problem. With such operation, programmers delete allocated memory as needed,
but later follow with another deletion to the same memory location. The dou-
ble deletion may not necessary be made through the same pointer. The second
deletion may actually be made through a different pointer, that is pointing to
the same location.
Figure 50 shows our automaton representation of memory management, which tar-
gets all the aforementioned memory management vulnerabilities.
Tested Programs
The main goal of this part of the experiment is to analyze the detection capabilities of our
system against high-level security vulnerabilities, as well as the effectiveness and the per-
formance of our test-data generation techniques. A test suit is designed with ﬁve programs
carrying various vulnerabilities, which we refer to as Program 1 to Program 5. Below is a
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Figure 50: MEMORY-MANAGEMENT Automaton
description of the exact violations of these programs.
• Program 1: It contains violations of synchronization and race-condition security
properties.
• Program 2: It contains violations of privilege escalation and unauthorized access. In
particular, the program utilizes UNIX chroot() system call improperly.
• Program 3: It targets violations in relation to memory management. In speciﬁc, the
program improperly utilizes C pointers and memory allocation/deletion.
• Program 4: It contains buffer-overﬂow vulnerabilities. The program improperly uti-
lizes the strcpy() method.
• Program 5: It contains violations related to the utilization of temporary ﬁles.
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Experiment Results
In relation to the detection capabilities, our system is successfully able to detect the vulner-
abilities on each of the ﬁve programs. The vulnerabilities are reported as a set of suspicious
paths, on which we then perform test-data generations. The generation of test-data elimi-
nates the reporting of our system to any false-positives.
Since our experiments additionally target both the effectiveness and the performance of
our test-data generation techniques, we need to obtain similar results using other test-data
generation techniques for comparison reasons. Hence, four different results are obtained.
The ﬁrst set of results is obtained using random-testing since it generally provides the
benchmark for other comparisons. The second set is obtained using our Moped reachability
checker, while switching off our slicing mechanism for the data generation process. The
third set is obtained using Moped reachability checker with our slicing mechanism being
enabled. The ﬁnal set is obtained using our hybrid static-dynamic analysis approach. Table
11 shows the results obtained using Random testing. Table 12 shows the results obtained
using Moped reachability checker with and without slicing being enabled. Table 13 shows
the results using our hybrid approach for test-data generation.
Program name Security property Time (milliseconds) Iterations
Program 1 RACE-CONDITION 329325 151
Program 2 CHROOT-JAIL 5234254 2057
Program 3 MEMORY-MANAGEMENT 95520 175
Program 4 STRCPY 27249942 9763
Program 5 TEMPNAM-TMPFILE 17239761 6560
Table 11: Experimental Results using Random Testing
As shown in Table 11, the random approach is able to generate the needed test-data for
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Table 12: Experimental Results using Moped Reachability Checker
all ﬁve programs. The amount of time and the number of iterations needed to generate the
data vary greatly from one program to another, which is expected due to the nature of this
approach. Nonetheless, we are able to obtain our comparison benchmark. We particularly
notice that the needed time to randomly generate the data is greatly affected by the existence
of an equality comparison at the problem nodes of the suspicious paths.
Program name Security property Time (milliseconds) Iterations
Program 1 RACE-CONDITION 1413 13
Program 2 CHROOT-JAIL 1493 13
Program 3 MEMORY-MANAGEMENT 5757 12
Program 4 STRCPY 140800 37
Program 5 TEMPNAM-TMPFILE 502532 121
Table 13: Experimental Results using the Hybrid Approach
Table 12 provides the results of our test-data generations using Moped with and without
slicing. The results also show that a great enhancement is obtained using this approach in
comparison to random testing. While the results are promising and show that this approach
provides tremendous advantage over random testing, they have to be analyzed with a great
care; otherwise they can be quite misleading. Due to the static nature of this approach, it
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has many serious drawbacks. The approach is not suitable for use with large and complex
software. While performance seems impressive for small-size software with limited state
space, it dramatically and quickly degrades once the state space increases. Additionally,
the complexity of the program, such as the number of variables involved and the high
coupling between different components, directly, and greatly, inﬂuence the performance
of the approach, even if the state space is limited. The coupling between components
also affects slicing quite negatively that the improvement using slicing becomes negligible.
This approach is hence very appropriate for use with relatively smaller-size software such
as embedded software.
Figure 13 shows the results obtained using the hybrid approach. For practical reasons
and due to the vast difference in capabilities and applicability between this approach and
the Moped reachability approach, these results can meaningfully only be compared to ran-
dom generation. The obtained results conclude that the hybrid approach not only allows
for a better generation performance but also a consistent one. The needed time to gener-
ate the data is dependent on various factors, such as the number of problem nodes along
the suspicious path, the number of executions of the program until data is generated, the
number of linear and non-linear constraint functions along the path, etc. In spite of these
factors, the results show that the generation time is still reasonable, and that an increase of
the state space would increase such generation time in a linear fashion.
In conclusion, we consider the hybrid approach as the most promising approach for
test-data generation. That is due to its generation performance, its ability to work on a
large spectrum of software including those complex ones with large state space, and its
mitigation to false-positive reporting.
210
Project Name Num of Files Num of Lines Project URL
Amaya v9.55 2281 907947 http://www.w3.org/Amaya/
gdLibrary v2.0.35 214 107889 http://www.libgd.org/
gzip v1.24 96 24247 http://www.gzip.org/
inetutils v1.5 498 206574 http://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/inetutils/
Table 14: FOSS Projects used in Scalability and Usability Experiment
7.6.4 Scalability, Usability and Automation
This group of experiments targets the validation of other crucial aspects. In that context, we
need to analyze the capability of the system for testing large-size software. Additionally, we
need to analyze its level of automation; in other words, how much involvement is actually
required by the analysts to use our system.
To achieve the needed goals, we conduct the experiment over four open-source software
projects of various sizes; gzip version 1.24, Amaya version 9.55, inetutils version 1.5, and
gdLibrary version 2.0.35. The details of these projects are shown in Table 14. We apply
code instrumentation over these projects for detecting memory management vulnerabilities.
Experiment Results
• gzip version 1.24:
The initial project creation and conﬁguration are performed as expected following
the usual procedure described in Sections 7.5.2 and 7.5.3. The code instrumentation
is preformed successfully without any difﬁculties. The manual intervention needed
is minimal, where the creation of a makeﬁle for building the project is needed, which
is achieved through the execution of Autoconf [2], an automatic conﬁguration utility.
• Amaya version 9.55:
211
The initial project creation and conﬁguration are performed as expected following
the usual procedure described in Section 7.5.2 and Section 7.5.3. The code instru-
mentation and building of the project however required further user intervention. Our
system is designed to validate software where source code is available, such as Free
and Open-Source Software. Should the software requires the utilization of additional
libraries, these libraries must be available. Amaya represents an example of a FOSS
project that uses a particular library that is unavailable in the operating system. The
library needs to be installed, which is achieved by manual intervention.
In general, testing this project requires three operations to be performed manually.
The required library has to be installed. A distribution-speciﬁc directory has to also
be created. Finally, a command-line conﬁguration option has to be stated for proper
execution of the makeﬁle for building the project. Nonetheless, regardless of this
manual intervention, we are able to successfully conduct the needed experiment over
the software.
• gdLibrary version 2.0.35:
Our selection to test this particular project, which is a library, is aforethought, since
we need to validate the automation level of our system for such type of software.
As anticipated, due to the particular nature of this software, more effort is initially
needed to create the project. A makeﬁle for building and instrumenting the project is
needed, which is simply achieved through the execution of autoconf. However, the
execution of this project requires additional user intervention effort due to the fact
that it is only a library. Nonetheless, we are able to successfully conduct the needed
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experiment on this software.
• inetutils version 1.5:
The project creation and conﬁguration are performed as expected following the usual
procedure described in Section 7.5.2 and Section 7.5.3. The code instrumentation is
preformed successfully without any difﬁculties. The manual intervention needed is
minimal, where a makeﬁle needs to be created, which was again achieved through
the execution of autoconf.
In summary, the experiments conclude the following about our system capabilities con-
cerning scalability, usability and automation level:
• Project creation and conﬁguration are quite straightforward to conduct. They are
performed in a standard way similar to utilizing other common software. Specifying
the security properties, and the ﬁnal reporting by the system are quite easy as well,
from user-utilization perspective.
• The automation level of the system is reasonably high when the validation process
is concerned with open-source executable projects. As detailed above, the system
mainly requires minimal user intervention in three of the four experiments to create a
makeﬁle through an automatic conﬁguration utility. No modiﬁcation to the makeﬁles
are needed in all three cases. For the fourth experiment, Amaya, further manual
intervention is needed in order to build the project due to the fact that the software
required a library that was unavailable in the system. So far, our system is unable
to provide further automation for such cases since library dependency is project-
speciﬁc.
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• Our experiment over gdLibrary is indicative of the difﬁcultly achieving full automa-
tion. In such particular cases, as an instance, where the validation is not performed
over an executable project, rather over a library, further manual effort is required. In
such cases, dynamic analysis of the library behavior may be needed before ﬁnally
be able to analyze it. This consequently requires manual intervention by the ana-
lyst. While this intervention may not be that complex, it is deﬁnitely indicative of the
difﬁcultly and limitations achieving full automation.
7.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented our integrated system, which combines the various com-
ponents and approaches presented in this thesis for software security testing and vulnerabil-
ity detection. In that context, we have ﬁrst detailed the design and implementation of some
of the major components composing the system. An introduction to the system and its user
interface have been provided. Finally, we have detailed the various conducted experiments
over the system for the purpose of analyzing it and comparing it with different approaches.
A set of experiments has been conducted over the system to provide a real-life analysis
of the system and its different approaches. Three sets of experiments have been carefully
conducted. The experiments have targeted various aspects including the detection against
low-level and high-level security properties as well as the effectiveness of test-data gener-
ation. The experiments have additionally targeted other crucial aspects such as scalability,
usability and system automation. The results have concluded that both our Moped reach-
ability approach and the hybrid approach are far more effective than random generation.
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Careful analysis of the results has concluded that the Moped reachability checker approach
is most suitable for testing relatively small-size applications, such as embedded software.
The results have showed that the hybrid approach is capable of effectively providing con-
sistent test-data generation.
In terms of automation, the experiments have concluded that our system is reasonably
capable of providing a quite high-level of automation in the more-general case when the
software being tested is executable. The experiments have also concluded that in other
particular cases, such as testing a library, a more manual effort and a user involvement by




Software is taking an increasingly predominant rule in today’s world. Further, the utiliza-
tion of open source software in particular is exponentially on the rise. However, a great
deal of software has been designed, implemented and deployed without having security in
mind. Such software are currently in usage within environments that are security-critical
including networking/worldwide web. Software attacks still make ﬁrst-page headline news.
Various vulnerabilities are only discovered after they have been exploited and in many cases
already resulted in sever damages. Software testing is a primary approach for alleviating
many of these security problems. Additionally, if the source code is accessible, such as in
open source software, then effective testing can be conducted. However, testing is generally
a very comprehensive process that can be quite time and cost consuming. In this context,
the automation of software security testing of open source software, which is addressed
thoroughly in this thesis, is becoming a very challenging and interesting problem.
In the sequel, we summarize brieﬂy the main thesis contributions:
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• Security speciﬁcation language, with which security analysts are effectively capable
of expressing the security properties they wish to test the software against.
• An Aspect-oriented and compiler-assisted approach for code instrumentation.
• New Aspect-Oriented pointcut extension for AspectC++ to support security testing.
• Extension to the GNU compiler collection (GCC) to enable the desired security code
instrumentation.
• Reachability analysis approach for vulnerability detection.
• Test-data generation approach through static and reachability analyses.
• Hybrid approach for vulnerability detection and test-data generation.
Although the current approaches for software security testing may be effective in re-
vealing some security vulnerabilities, they suffer shortcomings caused by their underlying
analysis. For instance, static-based approaches suffer the major drawback of false positives.
Dynamic-based approaches suffer signiﬁcant drawbacks such as the potential of unrealis-
tically excessive number of executions before detection may be achieved. Another critical
concern is the matter of automation. Manual intervention may have devastating conse-
quences in terms time, cost and reliability, especially when testing a large-scale software.
Consequently, the amount of manual involvement and the dependence on a particular anal-
ysis to achieve what is needed are very important. These issues have been addressed in the
proposed vulnerability detection approaches for security testing.
The realization of the proposed approach has been achieved by elaborating various
interrelated components. A security speciﬁcation language called Team Edit Automata
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(TEA) has been proposed to enable security analysts to precisely specify the needed secu-
rity property that need to verify the software against. The language allows the speciﬁcation
of individual properties as well as relating these properties into one team so that a determin-
istic behavior is achieved if more than one property is concurrently violated. The language
also allows the analysts to alter program execution if desired through the insertion of ad-
ditional actions or the suppression of others. All detected ﬂaws are ﬁnally reported by the
team.
The proposed approach to property speciﬁcation requires the instrumentation of mon-
itoring code into the original code to be tested. Consequently, an approach to code in-
strumentation is needed. We have investigated the applicability and usability of Aspect-
Oriented Programming (AOP) for such purpose. Our research concluded that the cur-
rent implementation of AOP is incapable of allowing it to be used for such desired pur-
poses. Consequently, we propose the needed extensions to the language, particularly to
AspectC++, with which the language is capable of achieving what is desired for code in-
strumentation. Nonetheless, understanding the beneﬁts of the pointcut model of AOP, we
propose a novel approach to code instantiation, which is based on the compiler-assisted
instrumentation and the AOP pointcut model. For the compiler, we choose the GNU Com-
piler Collection (GCC). The proposed approach requires extending GCC ﬁrst in order to
support the needed security instrumentation. Considering that C is among the most vulner-
able languages, in terms of security, we implement an extension to the GCC compiler for
C.
In order to achieve the desired security testing results, other major issues have to be
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considered. These are the matter of test-data generation and the dependence on the under-
lying analysis. These issues have been addressed by elaborating two different approaches
for security testing. The realization of the ﬁrst approach has led to the proposal of reacha-
bility analysis for detecting reachability security properties, where the execution of some,
possibly orderly, events is sufﬁcient to violate a security property. The approach is addi-
tionally heavily based on sole static analysis. The realization of the proposed approach has
been achieved by elaborating a static analyzer, referred to as static vulnerability revealer
(SVR), and a test-data generator based on program slicing and the Moped checker. The
static analyzer is automatically identiﬁes vulnerable points in a control-ﬂow graph. Given
a source code of a program, and a formally speciﬁed security property, SVR main concern
is to ﬁnd out all (the largest set possible) program paths that have the potential of violat-
ing the security property in concern. We illustrate the feasibility and capability of such
approaches by implementing an entire framework based on such approaches. Our results
show that approaches that are heavily based on static analysis can be very useful and more
suitable for testing relatively small software, such as embedded systems. For testing large
systems, we need to have other approaches and tools that combine the powerful capabilities
of both static analysis and dynamic analysis. This has led to the proposal of a more generic
approach that is based on a synergy between both static analysis and dynamic analysis. We
refer to such approaches as hybrid static-dynamic analysis approaches.
The realization of these propositions has been achieved by implementing a general
framework for automating security testing, including security vulnerability detection and
test-data generation. We propose a novel approach to test-data generation, namely the
Goal-Path-oriented System (GPS). Both data-ﬂow and control-ﬂow analyses are initially
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performed by our approach. Following this static-analysis phase, a dynamic analysis phase
is performed for the purpose of generating concrete test-data. The execution of the program
with such data would result in the execution of the vulnerability, hence eliminating false
positive reopenings. To validate our proposed approaches, we implement a framework,
which provides capabilities towards the automation of security testing. A set of experiments
has been conducted over the system to provide a real-life validations of the system and its
different approaches. The obtained results conclude that our approaches are effective in
detecting both low-level and high-level security vulnerabilities. In terms of automation,
the experiments have concluded that our system is reasonably capable of providing a high-
level of automation in the more-general case when the software being tested is executable.
In other cases, some level of analyst intervention seems to be unavoidable, which raises
the question of whether full automation of security testing, where no manual involvement
whatsoever is required, is practically achievable. This very well represents one of the major
issues that could be considered for future work.
Limitations and Future Work
The work presented in this thesis can be extended in different directions. Currently, our
framework and approaches are limited to non-GUI software. Additionally, we have fo-
cused on C language in particular due to its high susceptibility to security vulnerabilities.
The future extension plan of our work will target the systematic integration of security test-
ing approaches at the early life cycles of software development. This would effectively
disallow/reduce the deployment of many vulnerabilities. Additional work is also needed
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to increase the expressiveness of team edit automata by addressing issues such as time-
liness. We also need to address further limitations of the AOP technologies for security
testing code instrumentation through elaborating new pointcut and primitive constructs. In
particular, propose needed extensions to other AOP languages, such as AspectJ. We also
need to formalize the proposed instrumentation behaviors as primitives in the pointcut/ad-
vice model of AOP. An additional effort is also required to revisit the current prototype
design and implementation to deal with the issue of automation as well as security testing
of GUI-based software, software libraries, etc.
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This appendix presents the grammar of the instrumentation guide language used by our
GCC extension. Below is the grammar speciﬁed in EBNF [62] form.












:= ’inscope’ scopeId flexibleInstrPoint
’callfunc’ LPAREN normalId RPAREN




:= flexibleInstrPoint varUseOptions LPAREN varIdString RPAREN
’inject’ ’"’ ID ’"’
;
statVarDecl
:= ’after’ ’declvar’ LPAREN varIdString RPAREN
’inject’ ’"’ ID ’"’
;
statOutOfScope
:= ’before’ ’exitfunc’ LPAREN normalId RPAREN
’inject’ ’"’ ID ’"’
| ’before’ ’exitscope’ LPAREN varIdString RPAREN
’inject’ ’"’ ID ’"’
;
scopeId














































WS := (’ ’|’\r’|’\t’|’\u000C’|’\n’) {$channel=HIDDEN;} ;
LPAREN := ’(’;
RPAREN := ’)’;
WILDCHAR := ’*’;
LINENUM := (’0’..’9’)+;
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